federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

A recent report by the International Crisis Group on Sri Lanka is titled “Sri Lanka; Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus”. The report examines the nationalism of the country’s largest ethnic community and its relationship to the almost 25-year conflict. While observing that ” the Sinhalese are not unalterably opposed to a fair deal for the minority Tamils” the report also suggests that a ” new approach is needed that addresses legitimate Sinhalese fears, so as to tackle supremacist nationalism and allow for the necessary southern consensus on devolution. ”

Originally I intended writing an article based on the report but after reading the report I changed my mind. I thought the report was a worthy effort and felt that much of the commentary should be read widely. Therefore I have taken the liberty of excerpting significant sections of the report and reproducing them here. I do hope this would help portray Sinhala nationalism in a different light and help evolve a fresh approach towards addressing legitimate Sinhala fears when trying to find a reasonable solution to the long festering ethnic crisis of Sri Lanka.

Introduction

” The legacy of colonialism hangs over Sri Lanka, not least in the form of competing nationalisms that intensified in the last years of British rule. Soon after independence in 1948, the pan-ethnic “Ceylonese” nationalism of the elites was eclipsed by the self-assertion of the Sinhala and Buddhist majority. Rooted in a desire to overcome the humiliation of colonial rule, Sinhala nationalism also aimed to resist what it saw as the excessive political demands of Tamil leaders and the disproportionate power and positions Tamils had gained under British rule.

Tamil nationalism began as a peaceful movement for minority rights, partly in reaction to Sinhala control of the state. Failure to achieve a political settlement eventually led to armed militant movements fighting for a separate Tamil state in the north east of the island. The Tamil nationalist movement came to be dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group many states have banned because of its terrorist tactics. Sinhala nationalism has also spawned violent offshoots but has mainly been channelled through political parties, which have used it to mobilise popular support. The competition between the two major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), has led to destructive “ethnic outbidding”, as each claims to be the authentic representative of the majority.

Both major parties also have faced repeated challenges from smaller groups agitating in the name of the Sinhala people’s endangered rights. Sinhala nationalism and opposition to foreign interference were central to the revolutionary program of the People’s Liberation Front (JVP) in its 1971 and 1987-1989 uprisings. In addition, a politically organised section of the Sangha (Buddhist clergy) has formed, together with activist laymen, an even smaller but influential minority, whose frequent interventions in the name of the Sinhala Buddhist majority have had major political effects.

Sinhala nationalism has waxed and waned in response to the political context. At times, there has been strong Sinhala support for a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, competition between the two main parties and their inability to neutralise smaller nationalist parties have prevented governments from compromising with Tamil nationalists. The LTTE has been equally important in blocking the elusive “southern consensus”. Its violence and intransigence have provided political ammunition for the most extreme Sinhala nationalist elements.

As a general rule, it is easier to see what Sinhala nationalists oppose (federalism, the Norwegian-facilitated peace process, the LTTE, terrorism and so forth) than their positive alternatives to resolve the country’s problems. Much of their energy has been taken up with combating Tamil views of the state. While Tamil nationalists generally argue that the state is irredeemably racist, in response Sinhala nationalists question the reality of Tamil grievances and argue that it is Tamil nationalism that is racist and mono-ethnic.

1. Sri Lankan Tamils are not a nation

Central to Sinhala nationalism is the denial that Tamils are a distinct nation or people deserving political recognition that requires a restructured state. The concept of Tamils as a separate nation is generally associated with their claims to an exclusive territory or homeland-”We have our own territory so we are a nation”, Tamil nationalists say. This explains Sinhala nationalists’ strong resistance to “federalism” or any proposals that would grant significant political autonomy to the north and east. To recognize Tamil rights to determine their own affairs, even within a united Sri Lanka, would be, they say, to accept the right of full self-determination. Any concession, it is feared, would whet appetites for more, and ultimately Tamils would seek separation and sovereignty. Hence the widespread Sinhala resistance to merging north and east into a single, Tamil-majority Northeast Province, a central demand of virtually all Tamil nationalists (even those aligned with the government).

The insistence on federalism or other forms of autonomy is frequently dismissed as simply the desire of the Tamil elite to gain the political power that would flow from having their own territory. Average Tamils, the argument goes, have no interest in federalism. Udaya Gammanpila, a prominent lay member of the JHU, said, “the Tamil elite wants a political solution to enjoy power and the luxuries that come with being politicians. But ordinary Tamils only want one thing-to be liberated from their so-called liberators [the LTTE]“.

More recently, the president and others have taken to claiming that 54 per cent of Tamils now live outside the north and east. That figure-for which no evidence is given-is used to argue that devolution is not relevant, since many Tamils no longer have a connection to their supposed homeland and in any case prefer to live in the south, where a federal solution would not benefit them. That so many Tamils live outside the north and east is also offered as proof they are well treated by the government and the Sinhala majority. “There is no ethnic conflict”, Gammanpila said. “If you come to Colombo, you see every ethnic community living in harmony. Outside of the north and east, all communities are living in peace and harmony”. What all Sri Lankans suffer from, it is said, is not an ethnic conflict but terrorism, from which the government is doing its best to liberate Tamils, since they, more than any other group, suffer from the LTTE. “When we liberated the east”, Gammanpila said, “civilians came and flocked around the [armed] forces. They knew who their real liberators were”.

2. Tamil grievances

The nationalist position for the most part rejects Tamil complaints. “There are no real Tamil grievances”, said a government official, “there are only Tamil aspirations”. A nationalist commentator argued that:

Members of the Sri Lankan Tamil community, who today constitute less than 10 per cent of Sri Lanka’s population, keep reminding us of the need to address their grievances without specifically defining what these grievances are. Without clearly enunciating the problem, the Tamil community has come to the conclusion that the sources of their grievances is the structure of the state, and the mere transformation of the state into a federal structure, would somehow resolve their grievances.

The vision of a democratic, liberal Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens as equals continues to be defended strongly by most Sinhala nationalists. Gammanpila and the JHU maintain that “in Sri Lanka, everyone is equal before the law. Tamils have no right to self-determination or political independence but they have equal citizen rights and equal human rights”. There is genuine bemusement among many Sinhalese at Tamil complaints of discrimination. They argue that earlier Tamil problems concerning education, language and employment have been corrected: university policies favouring Sinhalese are a thing of the past, Tamil is now an official language for official documents and signs, and Tamils have more than their proportionate share of state and private sector jobs.

These claims are formally accurate but ignore the history of discrimination and oppression, which governments have not adequately acknowledged, and that formal legal equality does not always translate into equal treatment in practice. It continues to be difficult for many Tamils to do government business in their language. Even in the Jaffna peninsula and Tamil areas of the east, official forms are more often than not in Sinhala. Few police stations, even in the north and east, have Tamil-speaking officers. Almost all government activities and many government signs, even in multi-ethnic Colombo, are only in Sinhala. Governments have promised to fix these problems but they persist.

Ongoing security force harassment is generally explained as the effect of the war and accompanying security measures. According to a senior official, “if the violence stopped, the harassment would stop too”. This is true to a large degree but discounts the impact on Tamil society and the resentment of the militarisation of communal relations. There is no evidence of serious attempts to reduce the discriminatory effects of security policies.

The Sinhala nationalist concept of a land of liberal equality is ill-equipped to comprehend the continued inability of Tamils to receive justice for the many massacres and gross violations of human rights they have suffered at the hands of the security forces over the past three decades. Sinhalese have also suffered from the brutality of an unaccountable military and continue to suffer police abuse. Nonetheless, it is hard to maintain that the justice system fails all equally. There have been too many killings and disappearances of Tamils in which the legal system was unable to convict anyone despite overwhelming evidence of security force involvement.

3. Myth of one nation

Consistent with the vision of a liberal, “colour-blind” state is the argument that Sri Lanka is already one nation. In 2007-as the army was clearing the Eastern Province of LTTE fighters at the cost of displacing hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians-a government poster campaign in Colombo showed attractive children from all three major ethnic communities-Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim-accompanied by the slogan, “One nation, one people, one Sri Lanka”. The suggestion that there exists a nation encompassing all its ethnicities and able to overcome all differences is particularly attractive for many liberal Sri Lankans tired of war and conflict. The same approach was evident in discussion of the national cricket team. In response to Amnesty International’s “Play by the Rules” campaign, which tried to use Sri Lanka’s participation in the 2007 Cricket World Cup to raise awareness of the human right crisis, several voices objected, asserting that the team represented an already existing multiethnic identity.

While this approach has certain attractions, echoing more considered arguments for a civic nationalism rejecting both Sinhala and Tamil nationalist views, it is but a step away from a dangerous attempt to subsume Sri Lankan identity into a Sinhala identity that recognises some cultural differences but not the Tamils as a distinct community deserving political and legal recognition. A Sri Lankan identity overriding ethnic differences might be welcome but cannot be achieved while much of the state’s symbolism and reality is Sinhalese.

Both the liberal “one nation” rhetoric and more obviously Sinhala nationalist defences of the state are blind to the symbolic marginalisation to which Tamils and Muslims are subject. State symbols are essentially Sinhalese. The flag is dominated by a lion wielding a sword, the ancient symbol of Sinhala kings; Muslim and Tamil communities are represented by two coloured stripes along the side. State ceremonies are intimately tied up with Buddhism; ministers regularly seek monks’ blessings; each full moon is an official holiday. Coins and paper money show only Sinhala and Buddhist cultural objects and symbols. The military is imbued with Sinhala patriotism. Regiment names are taken from Sinhala kings: the Gemunu Watch, named after Duttugemenu, who defeated the Tamil king Elara, the Sinha Regiment, the Gajaba Regiment, and the Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment. Even the economic development plan for the newly “liberated” east is called in government statements by its Sinhala name Negenahira Udanaya (Rising of the East), though more than two thirds of those in the Eastern Province speak Tamil.

The exclusion of Tamils, Muslims and other minorities from collective state symbols is consistent with the majoritarian vision of democracy accepted by most Sinhalese and virtually all nationalists. Democracy means majority rule, even if that means a distinct, stable minority is unable to have any significant policy influence. On this view there is no need for or right of Tamils to be a majority with their own political power anywhere on the island, especially as this would likely result in restrictions on the freedom of Sinhalese to settle where they want. In practice, then, only Sinhalese have the right to be represented collectively, either politically, through elections and the political system, or symbolically, through state symbols, ceremonies and connections to Buddhism.

4. Sri Lanka as “Sinhale”

While Sinhala nationalists at times invoke the liberal vision of Sri Lanka as one nation, they have another, more troubling and explicitly exclusionary vision of the country as culturally Sinhala and Buddhist. That the cultural practices of most Sri Lankans come from Sinhala and Buddhist traditions is argued to give the state the right to institutionalise those practices in the political system and the society as a whole. The JHU’s Gammanpila said:

We know there are English in England, French in France, Thai in Thailand, and Japanese in Japan. They are the people who created the civilization in those countries. This doesn’t mean there aren’t minorities in those countries. Likewise, Sri Lanka is the country of the Sinhalese and Sinhalese civilization was born in Sri Lanka. The British name Ceylon was derived from “Sinhale”, which means land of the Sinhalese. What’s the country for Tamils? They should also have a country. Everyone accepts that Tamils emigrated from India. Tamil Nadu means “land of the Tamils”. No nation has two homelands. Tamils admit their civilization was born in Tamil Nadu, and they immigrated to Sri Lanka.

Tamils thus have equal rights, but must on this view remain content with being a minority on a Sinhala and Buddhist island. Rather than seeing Sri Lankan-and even Sinhala-culture as a complex co-creation, the JHU and other Sinhala nationalists propound a vision of “Sinhalese civilization” as separate, distinct and rightfully dominant in Sri Lanka. There can only be one civilization in any country, the argument goes, and in Sri Lanka it is Sinhala and Buddhist.

5. Sinhalese as a majority under siege

Strident versions of nationalist ideas permeate the heart of the present government. The denial that Tamils are a constituent people of Sri Lanka, the refusal to accept their claims of discrimination, and the repetition of dubious statistics can at times be explained away as products of cynical quests for power. But they also suggest a deeper psychological dynamic. The international emphasis on Tamil suffering has been viewed as one-sided, ignoring the historical problems faced by many Sinhalese.

A recurring theme in nationalist writings suggests it is not Tamils who are the targets of discrimination but Sinhalese. This mindset, which has led many scholars to characterise the Sinhalese as a majority with a minority complex, explains some of the lack of confidence with which Sinhala nationalists approach minority issues. The rise of the JHU and the growing appeal of Sinhala supremacist positions have much to do with the widespread view among Sinhalese that they are, regionally speaking, a threatened minority, potentially at the mercy of the 70 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu and their foreign supporters, and thus in need of someone who can speak on their behalf and defend their rights.

This viewpoint draws on what is seen as the long history of excessive demands by Tamil nationalists, beginning with G.G. Ponnambalam’s request for “50-50″ representation in the electoral reform debates of the colonial Donoughmore Commission in the 1930s and concluding with the demand for a separate Tamil Eelam, first by the Tamil United Liberation Front in the 1976 Vaddukoddai Declaration, then in the subsequent armed struggle. These have contributed to a feeling among many Sinhalese that Tamils are unreasonable on the ethnic issue.

Sinhalese fears grew stronger with the peace process, as the LTTE flouted the ceasefire and carried out political assassinations and child recruitment with impunity. The appeal of nationalist visions is partly due to their engagement with issues ignored by many liberal anti-nationalists. The Sinhala nationalist critique of the exclusive nature of some Tamil nationalist voices, its strong rejection of LTTE brutality and suppression of pluralism and its highlighting of human rights abuses suffered by Sinhalese, such as the expulsion of many from parts of the north and east in the early 1990s, resonate widely. Many of these issues have been glossed over in the liberal, pro-negotiation approach to the conflict; there has been insufficient understanding of the extent to which LTTE attacks, on Buddhist monks in 1987 for example, and on religious sites have deepened fears and exacerbated militancy.

Conclusion

Peace is a long way off. The LTTE has demonstrated a clear lack of interest in a negotiated settlement. The government is beholden to and sympathetic with forces that conceive of Sri Lanka as an essentially Sinhala and Buddhist nation. Denying the existence of legitimate grievances specific to Tamils and the need to accommodate their concerns in a settlement, the politically dominant forms of contemporary Sinhala nationalism assert that the central problem is a terrorist threat that needs to be crushed.

[Professor Tissa Vitharana, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) chairman & Minister of Science and Technology and a member of Peoples Alliance discusses with Udaya Gammanpila Legal Adviser of Jathika Hela Urumaya, during a Symposium on Indo-Lanka Accord - Pic: By Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]

Despite claims to be committed to a political solution, the decision to rely on hardline Sinhala nationalist parties with an ideological commitment to the unitary state has left the government with little option other than to pursue the LTTE’s military defeat. Any meaningful southern consensus on devolution-necessary for a lasting solution-will take time but without much stronger international efforts to persuade both the government and the UNP to find common ground beyond unitary and federal labels, there is little chance the APRC will produce a political package attractive to Tamil moderates and able to win two-thirds support in parliament. Reaching a sustainable settlement will be even harder if government plans to establish new Sinhala settlements and weaken the power of Tamil and Muslim political parties and civil servants in the Eastern Province are in fact carried out.

Moving away from supremacist versions of Sinhala nationalism and toward the conditions for sustainable peace requires a new long-term strategy for both domestic and international actors that addresses the sources of that nationalism and supports development of a truly multi-ethnic identity. The first step should be to take Sinhalese fears and concerns more seriously. Too often they are dismissed as irrational or majoritarian intransigence. Sinhala nationalism, both in its intensity and content, shifts with the political context. Recently it has fed off the mistakes of its liberal critics and their international supporters but there is ample evidence Sinhalese are not unalterably opposed to a fair deal for Tamils. Peacemakers must learn to distinguish the legitimate concerns and grievances from positions that consciously or unconsciously render many Tamils and Muslims second-class citizens. The most extreme views of Sinhala supremacists exploit the wider community’s unaddressed fears but are the preserve of a small minority whose links to the government and domination of the media give it disproportionate influence.

The past decade’s slow progress in gaining Sinhalese acceptance of the legitimacy of Tamil grievances and the need for devolution was reversed in large part thanks to the unprincipled nature of the 2002-2006 peace process, which gave human rights little consideration and allowed the LTTE to further consolidate its power, even as neither side made any serious attempt to address Tamil grievances. There is considerable truth in the Sinhala nationalist critique of the 2002 ceasefire agreement, the peace process and LTTE violations. A new peace process must directly and convincingly address Sinhalese fears and sense of insecurity.

To be sustainable, the next attempt at peace also needs to be conceptualised and presented as part of a larger project of state reform and good governance from which all communities benefit, not merely a deal in which Sinhalese trade territory for an end of war and terror. State reform can begin immediately and, with human rights protections crucial to guaranteeing Tamils and Muslims equal citizenship, should be framed to invite Sinhalese endorsement. Thus, attempts by civil society groups to address human rights violations connected with the renewed war could be linked more effectively with police reform and anti-corruption efforts, whose benefits could be seen by average Sinhalese. Stronger efforts are also needed to reconstitute and strengthen the independent commissions-most importantly the Human Rights, Police and Judicial Services Commissions-established under the Seventeenth Amendment, which are crucial for more accountable governance and on which professionals and civil society groups of all ethnicities have already begun to cooperate.

Language policy offers another area for reforms that could build bridges between communities. Since the advent of “Sinhala Only”, the absence of state services in Tamil has been a major cause of Tamil discontent. Linguistic barriers have also been a source of much misunderstanding, while the lack of English competence has blocked youth of all communities from better jobs and fuelled economic grievances that have historically been channeled in Sinhala nationalist ways. A serious long-term commitment by the government, donors and civil society is needed to address the three issues in a program of “language rights for all”: expanded training in Tamil for government services and wider availability of translators; expanded instruction in Tamil for Sinhala speakers and Sinhala for Tamil speakers; and expanded access to quality English instruction.

There is room for engaging more skillfully with Sinhala nationalism by addressing its causes and responding to the sense of grievance and insecurity that gives it power. But until it is taken more seriously and made a central focus of peace building, it will continue to challenge attempts to formulate a political settlement to Sri Lanka’s conflict.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Last month saw the golden jubilee of a shameful event in the political annals of this Country. October 3rd 1957 was the day on which the United National Party organized a protest march to Kandy from Colombo under the leadership of Junius Richard Jayewardena. JR’s Kandy march as it was known played a very negative role in souring ethnic relations in the Island.

The agreement signed by SWRD Bandaranaike and SJV Chelvanayagam in 1957 was a significant event in the political history of post-independence Sri Lanka. The Prime minister of the day and the leader of the biggest Tamil political party had come to an understanding which if implemented may have helped contain the ethnic conflict at its nascent stages.

The agreement known generally as the “Banda-Chelva pact” was never allowed to work because of political opposition in the South. The opposition came from hardliners among the Sinhala Buddhist clergy and laity as well as hawkish elements among both the Government and opposition.
The UNP was vehemently opposed to the B- C pact calling it a sell-out of the Sinhalese. The UNP had only eight seats in Parliament being buried in the landslide victory of SWRD in 1956. With Sir John Kotelawela becoming a mere figurehead and Dudley Senanayake inactive it was JR Jayewardena ’s task to revive the UNP’s flagging fortunes.

Just as SWRD rode to power by playing the communal card ,JR too resorted to communalist politics to discredit the new regime. Jayewardena seized on the B-C pact as a vulnerable target and began whipping up communal frenzy against it. The UNP began toying with the idea of organizing a massive road march in protest against the betrayal of the Country through the B-C pact.

The UNP first thought of trekking on foot from Colombo to Anuradhapura and swearing before the sacred Bo tree that they would safeguard the Country by opposing the B-C pact. That plan was shelved because the 119 mile journey was too long and also because the greater part of the route was through sparsely populated areas and jungles.

It was decided then to march to Kandy and take the oath at Dalada Maligawa. The UNP wanted to make a grand spectacle of it and the densely populated areas along the Colombo-Kandy road as well as the shorter distance of 72 miles was ideal. A public meeting was scheduled at the “Paddiruppuwa” at the end of the march.

A recurring political phenomenon in this country has been the conduct of Politicians using the Buddhist clergy as a cover to pursue divisive racist politics. These politicians manipulate sections of the Buddhist clergy and use them as a front for their selfish political project.

So in 1957 the Mahanayakes of Asgiriya and Malwatte chapters were persuaded to extend an open letter of invitation requesting people to assemble in Kandy on October 8th and take a vow before the sacred tooth relic that they would prevent division of the Country through the agreement between Bandaranaike and Chelvanayagam.

October 8th was a full – moon poya day.JR’s plan was to start a six day march on October 3rd and reach Kandy well in time for the mass rally on the 8th. The marchers describing themselves as pilgrims wanted to cover twelve miles each day.

The Government was perturbed by the political mileage the UNP could derive through a successful march. The national press criticised the plan as one that could cause communal unrest and violence. Various pressures were exerted on JR to call it off but he stood firmly by his decision.

One man who anticipated Government instigated violence was former premier Sir John Kotelawela. He warned the party that SWRD Bandaranaile would not allow the march. Being a pugnacious personality Sir John advised party members to arm themselves to resist and counter violence. This of course was not followed.

Thousands of UNP stalwarts and supporters including JR Jayewardena, MD Banda, Anandatissa de Alwis and Ranasinghe Premadasa began the march from Colombo on October 3rd. Violence was unleashed in the form of stones being thrown and marchers being beaten. Cabinet ministers like Philip Gunawardena, William Silva, Stanley de Zoysa and CP de Silva were suspected of organizing gangs to attack the marchers. Colombo Central MP MS Themis also sent his thugs.

The stoning was intense in areas like Grandpass and Peliyagoda. The Police did nothing as they had been instructed not to intervene. Mobs of Government supporters gathered along the route and began hooting and jeering.

Several traffic jams were caused y the march. Many turned back due to the violence.The marchers walked twelve miles and reached Kadawatte to rest for the night.

Once again Govt backed mobs began to stone the houses in which UNP marchers were staying in Kadawatte. Again the Police did nothing.
JR’s younger brother and eminent lawyer HW Jayewardena queried from Deputy Inspector General of Police CC “Jungle” Dissanayake whether the Police would not stop the attacks to which the DIG replied that his orders were not to interfere.

HW then threatened “Jungle” with a lawsuit for dereliction of duty in the face of a threat to peace. Thereafter the DIG exceeded his orders and extended protection to all the houses.

JR hoped to end the second leg of the trek at a Buddhist Vihare in the Attanagalla electorate. Attanagalla then was the pocket borough of the Bandaranaikes. Allowing JR to march in and tarry for the night was seen as a political challenge and personal affront. Gampaha MP and SWRD’s kinsman SD Bandaranaike was assigned the task of stopping the march.

The UNP re- commenced its march early morning on October 4th. Most of JR’s demoralised followers had deserted him overnight. Instead of the thousands of people marching on the first day there were only about 125 people ready to follow the leader. The streets of Kadawatte too were generally deserted and there were no jeering mobs.

Three miles of marching saw the UNP reach Imbulgoda at about 7. 20 am. At one point the marchers saw two vehicles parked in the middle of the road. A man was lying on the road between both vehicles. About a 150 people were sitting on the road behind the vehicles.
More than 500 persons were standing on either side of the road with stones to be thrown at the marchers. The horizontal obstacle was none other than Gampaha MP SD Bandaranaike.

Having heard of the Kandy march and how it was stopped at Imbulgoda I was very curious to see the exact spot it happened. Though I travelled frequently along that road I could never locate it.

Finally in the eighties my friend Yapa Karunaratne from “Divaina” took me to the exact spot. I found the road to be on an embankment and around a short bend. SD Bandaranaike had chosen the ideal place to launch his attack. The mobs would have had a field day pelting stones down.
Former Assistant Supdt of Police DS Thambaiyah was in charge of security in that area. Even as the stone throwing began he intervened amd asked JR and the marchers to stop a while. He then began talking to SD Bandaranaike urging him to remove his supporters.

SD replied by saying that he had not brought anyone to stop the march and that he was only protesting non – violently to prevent the march as it was likely to disturn peace and trigger off violence of allowed to proceed unchecked.

The ASP then informed his superiors of the stand-off and placed a Police party in between both groups as a buffer. He also warned the bystanders not to pelt stones. The mobs then ended stoning but threw paper balls, trash, and sand at the dwindling number of marchers.
Soon DIGs’ Jungle Dissanayake and Sidney de Zoysa arrived with a posse of armed Policemen. After palavering with both parties the senior DIG’s asked JR to call off the march as a major breach of peace was anticipated.

JR was aware that his followers were deserting him and agreed to call it off. But he told the DIG’s that he intended walking alone as a pilgrim to Kandy. A solitary pilgrim could not disrupt peace JR pointed out.

Dissanayake and de Zoysa then asked for time to consult higher authorities about JR’s request. SD Bandaranaike was informed that the march was officially banned. SD then made a rousing speech to his supporters and got them to disperse by 10. 30 am.

JR meanwhile squatted by the side of the road and told his supporters that he would continue his march and in an exhibition of “gallery sellama” said that he had written his will before starting out. JR requested his supporters to go back. But predictably the UNP supporters would not accept JR’s stance and urged that all of them retreat with honour.

Subsequently JR was told that the march was totally banned and no individual would be allowed to proceed on foot. So JR called off the march officially.
Four buses of the Ceylon Omnibus company were called and the remaining 70-75 UNP members including JR got in and started out for Colombo at about 12. 30 pm. Police escort was provided.

Thus ended the infamous Kandy march of JR.

Thereafter SD Bandaranaike was described on political platforms as the “Imbulgoda Veeraya” or Hero of Imbulgoda. SD himself called it a people’s victory and said that he had initially blocked the march with only twelve people and that gradually hundreds of people had flocked in support voluntarily.
The scheduled rally in Kandy was held as planned on Oct 8th. Both JR and Dudley spoke but the attendance was not large.

Though the Kandy march was aborted the event was a watershed in the sense that it focussed negative attention on the B- C pact effectively.
JR’s Kandy march was the forerunner that helped foment adverse public opinion against the B- C pact. Ultimately Bandaranaike abrogated the pact unilaterally and tore up a copy of it in front of demonstrators.

When I was working for the “Virakesari” I used to cover the then ministry of state. Anandatissa de Alwis was Minister of state then. Being an ex-journalist de Alwis used to get along well with scribes unlike those in charge of media nowadays.

Once I read somewhere that Anandatissa too had participated in the Kandy march. When I asked him about it he seemed very embarassed .
He said that the move seemed very reasonable to him at that time but with the passage of time he had come to regret it. He said that many in the UNP felt remorse about it now. I then asked him whether the President (JR) too felt that way to which the diplomatic Anandatissa replied he did not know but felt that JR would be sorry about it too.

But I do recall that JR was asked a question about the Kandy march at a rally in the Jaffna esplanade when he visited as opposition leader in 1975. JR was bold and honest enough to say that he would lead a similiar march to Kandy again if similiar circumstances warranted it. Jaffna SLFP Mayor Alfred Duraiyappa’s supporters then used it as a pretext to disrupt the meeting.

This then is the story of JR’s Kandy march and how SD Bandaranaike helped stop it and became known as the “imbulgoda Veeraya”. The ultimate casualties were the B-C pact in particular and ethnic harmony in general.

DBS Jeyaraj appreciates your responses on the federal idea.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The Ceylon Workers Congress which held its party convention in Chilaw on Sunday October 28th has passed a resolution urging that a scheme on the lines of the “Hong Kong” model be set up for the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka.

In adopting the resolution the CWC noted that a special administrative region like that of Hong Kong coming within the People’s Republic of China was an admirable solution that has led to two systems in one nation and that a similar system in Sri Lanka would effectively meet the aspirations of the Tamil people in the north and east, said media reports

“A negotiated settlement in the format of the Hong Kong special administrative region can see an end to the on going shooting war that continues to decimate young lives on both sides of the ethnic divide,” the CWC resolved .

In adopting the party position, the CWC also recalled that the Hong Kong model solution had been proposed earlier by the departed leader Saumyamoorthy Thondaman.

According to sources who were close to the Plantation patriarch , Soumiyamoorthy Thondaman, had suggested the Hong Kong model to both Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremasinghe at different times and both had been agreeable in principle. To what extent the senior Thondaman pursued this idea with previous regimes is not clear. It may simply have been an idea that he tossed about.

Likewise it is equally unclear as to what importance the CWC attaches now to this proposal. It also seems unlikely that the CWC has thought this thing through and compiled tangible provisions related to this idea.
It seems more of a “token” proposal to demonstrate that the CWC is concerned about finding a solution to the Tamil National Question just as in the past Sri Lankan Tamil political parties used to pass resolutions calling for citizenship rights to Plantation workers.

Whatever the outcome of the CWC resolution on the Hong Kong model, the prevailing relationship between Hong Kong and China provides an interesting example of a political system being flexible enough to adopt “unorthodox” arrangements to meet extra – ordinary situations. Even the “red” dragon has been “soft” enough to understand that it cannot be rigid in all situations.

The peoples republic of China (PRC) cannot be classified as a federation, quasi – federation or confederation. According to Constitutional experts it is a Country that is structurally unitary in the sense that “ultimate authority rests with the Central government”. It can however be called a Constitutionally de- centralised union because it “incoroporates Constitutionally protected sub – national units of government which have functional autonomy”.

[From Kowloon side right after the Laser show, marking 10 years]

The PRC has twenty – two Provinces , five autonomous regions, four municipalities and two special administrative regions. The first special administrative region was set up for the former British colony of Hong Kong in 1997. The second one was set up for the former Portugese colony of Macao in 1999. The Hong Kong Special Administrative region (HKSAR) was the pioneering model emulated with appropriate changes for Macao. It is the HKSAR model that the CWC cites.

When speaking of the HKSAR it is important to note three things. One is that this special arrangement was done to reclaim Chinese territory “lost” to colonial powers in a smooth manner with the full cooperation of Hong Kong residents. Secondly it is of a transitory nature applicable only for 50 years till 2047. Thirdly the different system principle was adopted for purposes of economic and democratic governance rather than reconcile ethnic differences.

Nevertheless the HKSAR is a shining example of “creative flexibility” depending upon compelling circumstances. The special “heritage” of Hong Kong is recognized leading to a different system of administration to that of mainland China. While China remains nominally “socialist” the Hong Kong economy continues to be a”free enterprise” one.

There is a different system of governance for Hong Kong that is run by the people of Hong Kong alone. There are also safeguards to prevent swamping of Hong Kong by mainland Chinese through unrestricted internal migration.

The greater part of Hong Kong’s land area – New territories – became British under a 99 year lease “granted” in 1898. Two treaties ceded Hong Kong and Kowloon permanently to Britain. China never accepted these. But the impending expiry of the lease held potential problems.

Meanwhile the Mao Ze Dong was no more and in 1978 the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping took over the reins. China commenced negotiations with Britain and in 1984 both Countries agreed on the “Joint Declaration” that affirmed Hong Kong’s reversion to China at the end of the lease.

There was a lot of intense negotiations preceding the handover of 1997. In an unprecedented display of “flexible magnanimity” Deng agreed that the transfer of power will be on the basis of “one Country, two systems”. Until 2047 Hong Kong would have its own economic and political system and also autonomous powers in everything except Defence, National security and foreign affairs.

These were hailed as extraordinary compromises by China. Deng’s pragmatic approach is best illustrated by his famous remark to Margaret Thatcher ” it matters not if the cat is black or white; so long as it catches mice”.

The virtual mini – constitution that governs Hong Kong is the “Basic law of the Hong Kong Special administrative region of the Peoples Republic of China”.

The Basic Law was drafted by a Committee composed of members from both Hong Kong and the Mainland. The Basic Law was formally promulgated on April 4th 1990 together with the designs for the flag and emblem of the HKSAR.
Some of the notable features enshrined in the basic law are -

* The HKSAR has a high degree of autonomy and enjoys executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication . The former judicial recourse by appealing to the UK’s Privy Council is not available. Instead, the Court of Final Appeal was established within the HKSAR to take up the role.

* The executive authorities and legislature of the HKSAR is composed of permanent residents of Hong Kong in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Basic Law.

* The socialist system and policies are not to be practised in the HKSAR, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

* The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity , ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law (such as Chinese clan law) shall be maintained, except for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the HKSAR

* The HKSAR shall protect the right of ownership of private property in accordance with law.

* All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law. Permanent residents of the HKSAR shall have the right to vote and the right to stand for election in accordance with law.

* The freedom of the person of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. No Hong Kong resident shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful arrest or imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful search of the body of any resident or deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person shall be prohibited. Torture of any resident or arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of the life of any resident shall be prohibited.

* The selection of Chief Executive is to be ultimately by means of Universal Suffrage.

According to observers “Although the PRC has responsibility for Hong Kong’s foreign relations and defence, Hong Kong is permitted to participate in international organizations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and affecting the HKSAR, or may attend in such other capacity as may be permitted by the PRC government and the international organization or conference concerned, and may express their views, using the name “Hong Kong, China”. The HKSAR may also, also using the name “Hong Kong, China”, participate in international organizations and conferences not limited to states.”.

When Hong Kong was handed over in 1997 few expected China to honour its assurances. But to everyone’s surprise they have been basically honoured and in July this year the 10th anniversary of the transition was celebrated.Economically China has grown and Hong Kong has grown. Much of Hong Kong’s growth has been achieved in symbiosis with that of the mainland.

Everything however is not rosy. The judiciary and media continue to function but not as vigorously in the past. The calibre of judgements are seemingly deteriorating while most media are becoming pro – government. Self – censorship is on the rise.

One area where Beijing seems to be defaulting is the democratisation of Hong Kong. A system consisting of a 60 member legislative council (Leg Co) and a Chief executive is in force now. The Leg Co comprised of representatives directly elected and elected through special “functional constituencies “. The Chief executive was elected by a 800 member elections committee. The Basic law “mini – constitution” pledged that the “Ultimate aim” was full suffrage whereby the chief executive and Leg Co members will be eventually directly elected by the people. This however has not happened as Beijing is reluctant to promote speedy democratisation in HKSAR because of its demonstration effect on the rest of China.

There are 30 functional constituency representatives who are accused of acting as stooges of Beijing. The Elections committee too is manipulated to echo Beijing’s line. The chief executive Donald Tsang who was earlier a British lackey has now switched loyalties completely and follows the new master’s wishes.

China’s “Parliament” the National Peoples Congress is the final arbiter of the Basic law governing the HKSAR. The NPC has ruled unequivocally that the time is not ripe to grant full franchise to the people of Hong Kong.

Whatever the problems, the setting up of the HKSAR and Beijing’s adherence to its commitment is commendable. In 1999 another Special Administrative Region was set up for Macao. China has also wooed Taiwan to re- merge with China and offered even more flexible autonomous terms.

The basic principle in all this however is the recognition of the need for special arrangements to solve difficult problems. This then is the reason why the “Hong Kong in China model” is cited as worthy of emulation. It is a case of “two systems of governance” functioning within “one Country” to cope with an extra-ordinary situation.

DBS Jeyaraj appreciates your responses on the federal idea.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Velupillai Prabakharan the numero uno of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a man with a keen sense of history. When he was a youth dabbling with explosives there was an accident and his legs were charred. Acutely conscious of having blackened legs Prabakharan referred to himself as Karikalan which literally means man with black legs. But the name was chosen due to the LTTE leader’s sense of history too.

[View of Mihintale, from Nuwarawewa Anuradhapura - Photo: Emile Bremmer]

There was a great Chola King who was also called Karikalan. His original name was Thirumavalavan but it was as Karikalan or Karikal Peruvalathan that he was famously known. The Chola King too had had an accident during childhood as a result of which his legs were charred and blackened. That’s why he was called Karikalan. So when Prabakharan’s legs too got burnt he tapped into his historic consciousness and emulated the Chola king in renaming himself.

The organizations he helped found like the Tamil New Tigers or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam revolved around the tiger name . One reason for Prabakharan’s preference for the “puli” or tiger may have been because the “Pulikkodi” or tiger flag was the Chola flag. Technically the Chola emblem was not that of the striped tiger because that feline species was not native to the Tamil realm. The “puli” of the Cholas was the “venkai” or cheetah. Later Prabakharan’s followers were to refer to their leader’s Chola charisma in adulatory discourse.

For all his history, the LTTE leader was quite modern when it came to the existential reality of warfare. He did not seek to revive by gone history but focussed more on the creation of a modern nation state called Tamil Eelam. Instead of harking back to Tamil Kings and chieftains of the Island like Ellalan (Elara) , Sankiliyan, Segarajasegaram, Pararajasegaram, Kulakottan or Pandaravanniyan and naming things after them the LTTE leader opted to honour his fallen comrades.

When it came to naming it was a case of Charles Anthony infantry division, Kittu artillery division, Victor anti – tank division etc and not Ellalan or Sankiliyan. When it came to codenaming military operations the choice was names like Operation Thavalai or frog for an amphibean operation or a operation Ithayabhoomi (heartland) for Weli Oya/ Manal aaru or the series known as “Oyatha Alaigal” (Unceasing waves) .

In that context it was but a remarkable deviation for the LTTE leader to codename his latest operation Ellalan Por nadavadikkai” (Operation Ellalan). Why did he do so? It may have been due to the theatre of combat being Anuradhapura or Anuradhapuram where the “dharmarajah” King Ellalan or Elara reigned for 44 years. Ultimately he was defeated by the Prince from Ruhunu ,Gamini Abhaya known as Dutugemunu.

If the tiger flag was the Eelam counterpoint to the lion in the Sri Lankan flag then the choice of Ellalan is to revive memories of the Elara – Dutugemunu conflict. Though it was a case of a young Sinhala prince trying to oust an old Tamil king and gain power it is often depicted as a Sinhala – Tamil conflict. The fact that Tamils fought on Dutugemunu’s side and Sinhalese fought alongside Elara is ignored or not taken into account.

[King Dutugemunu - Pic: DKC Dedigamuwa]

The historic memory of Dutugemunu lingers powerfully in the Sinhala psyche. Numerous Sinhala males are named Gamini, Gamani, Gemunu and Abhaya. Since he was a son of the Ruhunu the name Rohana is also widely prevalent with even the pseudo – marxist Wijeweera adopting that name.

In recent times another son of the Ruhunu region has become nominal ruler of Sri Lanka. Yet there is a Tamil pocket of resistance in the North. Just as Dutugemunu conquered the east before marching to the North this latter – day Rohana too has taken the east and is setting sights on the North.

In this “Dutugemunu” climate it seems inevitable that the LTTE too should resurrect Ellalan and codename the Anuradhapura operation after the wise and just ruler who was ousted not because he was unjust but due to him being an outsider obstructing the ambition of an indigenous contender.After all Elara was perhaps the only king in our history who comes closest to the concept of “dharmaraja” as envisioned by the Jathika Hela Urumaya.

Code naming the operation after Ellalan strikes a responsive chord in the Tamil psyche. I was interviewed a few days ago by the BBC Tamil service on the Anuradhapura attack and I referred to the Ellalan – Dutugemunu episode in that. The feedback I received suggests that Prabakharan has shrewdly tapped into the historic memory of Sri Lankan Tamils. I do not know what response this will evoke among certain sections of Sinhala society but currently many Tamils are elated.

Historically Elara may have been defeated by Gamani Abhaya but to many Tamils , Ellalan lost in an unfair fight. They perceive single combat between a 78 year old king and 32 year old Prince as being “asymmetric”. Nationalist fervour will not accept historic defeat but will always refuse admittance of reality. The spirit of revolt will always prevail among people unbowed in spirit.

This is why any guerilla movement fighting for the goal of national liberation remains hard to defeat permanently through military means. As RAND corporation expert Brian Jenkins once put it ” A man may outgrow his ideology but cannot disown his race”.It is because of this phenomenon that many advocate a political solution over and above a military solution to nationalist conflicts.

It is perhaps due to this rankling in Tamil collective memory that Prabakharan’s codename “Ellalan” evokes positive response among many Tamils. Anuradhapura being the arena of conflict gives this feeling some relevance. The fact that the LTTE “won” this round gratifies Tamil pride.

Adding to this heady historical mix is the fact that the Airforce base is situated in Saliyapura named after Gamini Abhaya’s son Saliya who was estranged from his father due to his love for Asokamala.

Jumping into this historical fray is the UNP which fast forwards a few centuries and talks of Anuradhapura being militarily attacked for the first time in many years after the Chola invasion.. Hmmm! and it’s not exactly a coincidence that the Sinhala monarch of the day was Mahinda the fifth. Perhaps the President will drop Mahinda and revert to his original name Mahendra. Better still will be his other name Percival.

But this history cannot be confined to the battlefield alone. Gamani Abhaya may have defeated and killed Elara but he was magnanimous in victory to his fallen foe. History records that the victorious king built a tomb in Elara’s honour and decreed that everyone must dismount from horse, elephant, chariot or palanquin and walk when passing that tomb.

This practice soon became a custom and centuries later a Sinhala king fleeing for his life got down from his vehicle and walked in front of Elara’s tomb although his pursuers were close and every minute counted in that race against certain death.

The July 1983 anti – Tamil pogrom was a dark chapter in contemporary history. During those dark days my departed friend and colleague Ajit Samaranayake wrote a brilliantly moving editorial referring to the Elara tomb decree and how it was honoured for generations by the Sinhala people. Two people who were touched by that leader were Maithripala Senanayake and KB Ratnayake.

Maithripala spoke to Ajit directly while KB called him on the phone. They were full of praise. It was not a coincidence that both were great sons of Rajarata. Both were educated in Jaffna . Senanayake at St. Johns and Ratnayake at Hartley. But what really moved them I think was that they were heirs to the Anuradhapura heritage and inherited the Rajarata ethos. Ajit’s references to those sentiments struch a responsive chord in them.

Why do I refer to this? Simply because an incident occurred in the cradle of Sinhala civilisation that was revolting.. The bodies of 20 Black tigers were stripped of clothes during the inquest which is understandable. But what happened later was disgusting. The naked bodies including that of three women were thrown into two tractor-trailers and paraded around the streets of Anuradhapura. Some elements took photos and video filmed it.

That such a travesty of basic decency should occur in the sacred city assaults the mind. Feeble attempts to deny the incident and also apportion blame to the courts are being made. It is indeed sad that some people could not display basic decency towards dead bodies of their foes in a land where a conqueror showed great respect and honour to his fallen rival many years ago.

The souls of Maithiripala and Kiribanda must truly be troubled at this happening in Anuradhapura. Even though some powerful elements got this done the ordinary people were disgusted and repulsed. The pseudo – patriots who did this were clueless about Sinhala society. This is a country where even the “worst” of human beings are not slandered after death.

However much this war has brutalised people society at large has not lost all its values yet. Some people ran and complained to Anuradhapura Catholic Bishop Norbert Andradi who went public condemning the act.The leftist front has also criticised it strongly. The people of Anuradhapura were aghast at this act. I know of people who refused to “view” this spectacle on principle.

All decent human beings regardless of ethnicity were appalled by this incident. But the LTTE and its propagandists exploited the incident crudely at an “ethnic” level . From the English “Tamilnet” to the Tamil “Nitharsanam” the incident was highlighted as an example of the depths of depravity to which Sinhala society had sunk into.

But LTTE supporters conveniently forget what the tigers did to former Tamil National Alliance election candidate Rajan Sathiyamoorthy in Batticaloa. Sathiyamoorthy was linked to Karuna. He and his brother in law were shot dead by the mainstream LTTE while they were worshipping at the shrine in their home. Later Karuna conducted an elaborate funeral ceremony for Sathiyamoorthy and buried him with honours. The tigers dig up the body and threw it elsewhere after setting fire. It was in a half-burnt state.

There is however a point in the LTTE claim that they cremate bodies of soldiers with full military honours. The LTTE also returns bodies of soldiers through the Red Cross in a respectful manner. The LTTE bodies could have been covered in non-transparent body bags at least. Displaying the bodies was a violation of Geneva conventions as well as basic humanitarian norms.

While criticising those who exhibited the naked bodies some of the pro-tiger websites shamelessly flaunted pictures of the very same bodies under the guise of condemnation.Some Tamils egged on by the tiger and pro-tiger elements are rushing to accuse the Anuradhapura Sinhalese in particular and the Sinhala people in general. Two things must be noted here. One is that this was not an act of the people . This was done by some persons wielding power and authority. Sinhala society at large is revolted by this act.

The other is that self – righteous Tamils cannot forget what the tigers did in Anuradhapura on May 14th 1985. The sanctity of the sacred city was shattered when the LTTE went on the rampage then. It was a despicable act but there was a prominent Tamil editor who called it an assault on the Sinhala psyche.

But most Tamils were horrified. The poet Ilavalai Vijayendran spoke up for conscience stricken Tamils when he wrote “Intha kaigalai Entha Gangaiyil kaluvuvathu” (In which Ganges shall we wash these hands?)

It is certainly true that this “exhibition” incident has to be condemned but at the same time one cannot subscribe to this “holier than thou” trend of condemning a whole people for the action of some members of its society. If a people are to be condemned wholesale for the acts of some of its members then the Tamils too have to be condemned for incidents like the Dalada Maligawa attack, Kattankudi and Eravoor mosque massacres or the eviction of Muslims from the North.

The Anuradhapura air base attack victory is being utilised by the LTTE to whip up a jingoistic mood among Tamils particularly the Diaspora. The Rajapakse regime was doing this among Sinhala people for a long time. Now it is the turn of Velupillai Prabakharan. Two wrongs do not make a right.

All visions of a military victory are illusions. Be it either side military success can only be ephemeral. War will beget only more war. Violence will bring about more violence. The problems faced by ordinary Tamils cannot be resolved by notching up sucessful guerilla strikes alone. The Tamil national question can be solved only through a political settlement. Such a settlement cannot be enforced through war.

Right-thinking Sinhala people found themselves marginalised when Rajapakse’s military juggernaut was rolling on successfully. Those who spoke of a political solution were viciously attacked and vilified as traitors and tiger agents. Sinhala supremacist ideology ruled the roost.

The wheel is slowly turning now. It is true that the war-mongering Rajapakse regime has been given a hard knock but it would be futile to think war by itself is a solution or that war can provide a solution.

Unwarranted euphoria is being whipped up among the Tamils now.This is widely prevalent among the Tamil Diaspora. Martial songs of the LTTE are being regularly heard on Tamil radios. Also emotion rousing Tamil film songs are being requested by many listeners.

[Leopard in Yala National Park - Pic: by Ranil Amarasuriya]

In “Tamil Canada” the current favourite is from the film “Anbutholi”. Its sung by Manikkavinayagam and the opening lines are “Siruthaiyai Seendathedaa, Sirunarigal Thaangathada” (Dont taunt the leopard, you small jackals cant withstand ).

In such an atmosphere any condemnation of the war and a call for peaceful resolution must necessarily jar on war mongering ears. However the dismissal of the idea of war as a solution must be accepted whole heartedly and sincerely.

There must be a principled approach. One cannot call for peace when the other side is seen as winning and praise war when one’s own side is perceived as succeeding.War cannot be an answer to the problems facing Tamils in particular and Sri Lanka in general.

A photograph of Prabakharan with the 21 black tigers who died in Anuradhapura is being widely circulated. It is being widely hailed as the high watermark of the LTTE’s military prowess.

As for me I feel very sorry for those young men and women though I commend their courage, dedication and self – sacrifice.

But the sight of a plump Prabakharan posing for the camera with those sacrificial lambs is for me the low watermark of Sri Lankan Tamil society.

Related: Anatomy of Tiger Assault on Anuradhapura Air Force Base

DBS Jeyaraj appreciates your responses on the federal idea.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Who’s afraid of Louise Arbour the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights?

Very few in Sri Lanka if reported responses to her visit are any indication!

Mahinda Samarasinghe rules out emphatically the questions of establishing a UN country office and setting up a field mission in Sri Lanka; the indefatigable peace secretariat chief Rajiva Wijesinghe says she is being kicked about like a political football and urges her to issue a statement.

Rohitha Bogallagama is miffed that she was too tired to have dinner with him;First brother Basil advises her not to “police” Sri Lanka on human rights despite her being UN Human Rights Commissioner; A newspaper editorial depicts Arbour as a knight slaying Komodo dragons;

The saffron brigade takes Arbour’s former student at Osgoode hall along and asks the UN official to look into animal rights; The Crimson comrades accuse her of being an American stooge and also link Arbour to the tigers; Selvi of the LTTE queries whether Louise Arbour can see through the government propaganda smoke screen.

This 60 year old eminent French – Canadian jurist and law professor was at one time a Canadian Supreme court judge and prosecutor at the International Criminal Court. She became UN human Rights Commissioner when her predecessor Sergio Veire de Mello was killed in the Canal hotel explosion in Baghdad.

The TV movie Hunt For Justice: The Louise Arbour Story chronicled her attempts to bring Bosnian war criminals to justice after a decades-old civil war. The movie starred Canadian Wendy Crewson as Louise Arbour.

Her Sri Lankan visit has aroused much expectation. Louise Arbour issued a press statement at the end of the trip. She scrupulously avoided any direct references to what was probably the primary purpose of her visit namely the setting up of a UN field mission and country office for Sri Lanka.

Yet most news reports revolved around that aspect alone despite it being a non – issue in the statement. This caused Rajiva Wijesinghe to rail against the media and state that Arbour never, ever made such a request. If that was the case one is perplexed as to why the usually diplomatic Samarasinghe came out with a strong public refusal of a request that was never made according to Wijesinghe.

In her statement Arbour laments thus – ” I was struck in my discussions by the fact that broader human rights issues affecting all communities on the island have largely been eclipsed by the immediate focus on issues related to the conflict. These include issues of discrimination and exclusion, gender inequalities, the low participation of women in public and political life, the rights of migrant workers and press freedom”.

Unfortunately the focus has not only been on conflict related issues but also in the final analysis got whittled down further to a solitary issue alone.The forest seems to have been missed for trees.

The tendency to view and even portray her trip as one of UN versus GOSL has distorted the scenario. Sinister motives are attributed unfairly. In this political frenzy about the Rajapakse regime’s culpability in human rights violations the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam dimension has been ignored or overlooked.

Human rights violations in this Country are not perpetrated by Government agencies, security forces, Police and para – militaries of the state alone. Human Rights are violated with impunity by the LTTE also.

A silver lining in the dark cloud as far as the Government controlled areas are concerned is that many of the incidents are reported even if culprits are not penalised. But incidents in the LTTE controlled areas are seldom reported.

The Tamil people of this country are caught between two terrors. One is state terror and the other is tiger terror. Louise Arbour did not intend focussing only on one aspect during her trip but the Government did not allow her to visit the Wanni and meet LTTE leaders. What would she have done had she gone to Kilinochchi?

This is what she said “I also regret that I did not have the opportunity to visit Killinochchi, where I would have liked to convey directly to the LTTE my deep concern about their violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including the recruitment of children, forced recruitment and abduction of adults, and political killings.”.

The response of the LTTE and fellow travellers towards her visit – before and after – is extremely revealing. The LTTE did not evince great interest in getting her down to their areas. Seious efforts were not made presumably because the LTTE anticipated criticism. But when it became definite that she was not coming to the Wanni the tigers exploited the issue by publicly requesting her to visit the Wanni.

Subsequently the LTTE adopted a lofty attitude and advised Arbour to look beyond the propagandistic smokescreen of the state and not to be deceived by government propaganda. LTTE media organs also played up the visit and highlighted instances of the security forces preventing people from meeting her.It was as if human rights violations were from one side only and that the LTTE were pure white like a jasmine flower.

The “pappadam” crumbled when Louise Arbour explicitly stated what she would probably have told the tigers if she had an opportunity of meeting them. With that disclosure the tigers clammed up and their propagandists began downplaying Louise Arbour. Suddenly her visit became a non – event.

The setting up of a UN field mission and country office in Sri Lanka is being viewed as a “problem” for the Government alone. But it is a problem for the LTTE also. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was not allowed into the LTTE controlled Kilinochchi and Mullaitheevu districts and other tiger dominated areas of Vavuniya ,Mannar , Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. The Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission does not have representatives in LTTE controlled regions.

Establishing a UN field mission could lead to an International presence in LTTE areas also. This could be a great boon to the suffering Tamil civilians. Abductions, forced recruitment and incarceration of civilians by the LTTE could come under spotlight. The long suffering Tamil people would have an “ear” to voice complaints. So the LTTE too like the Government does not like a UN field mission

The LTTE response should be differentiated from the general Tamil response. The beleagured Tamil people have no one of stature to seek solace from. They are like drowning souls ready to clutch at straws.

The visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was to many Tamils a godsend. They looked up to her hopefully as ray of bright light in a dark, gloomy situation.

There was a strong element of spontaneity in the large crowds that sought to line up the streets of Jaffna. Thousands thronged the Jaffna Bishop’s house to see her. Hundreds crowded outside the UN office in Colombo too.

The families of the disappeared and the detained were particularly anxious to meet her. So too were the Tamil detenues who went on a hunger strike demanding a meeting.

Louise Arbour met representatives of all those sections seeking to meet her. She promised action and possible redress to the detenues by December.

Arbour also went out of her way to reach out to the suffering people by going to the gates at Jaffna Bishops house and Colombo UN office. It was a commendable humane gesture that touched the hearts of many.

The victims of human rights violations and their loved ones had high hopes of Louise Arbour’s visit. It was seen as a prelude to a permanent UN human rights presence here. Some may have even thought that the UN could impose its will on Colombo and unilaterally set up an office here.

Arbour’s frank admission that such a course was impossible without Colombo’s concurrence would have disappointed quite a few people.Likewise others may be elated at this recognition of sovereignty.

What is at stake here are not merely issues like sovereignty or face – saving bluffs or scoring brownie points. What is at stake here is that a major crisis of human rights violations prevails. This is what Louise Arbour said -

” However, in the context of the armed conflict and of the emergency measures taken against terrorism, the weakness of the rule of law and prevalence of impunity is alarming. There is a large number of reported killings, abductions and disappearances which remain unresolved. This is particularly worrying in a country that has had a long, traumatic experience of unresolved disappearances and no shortage of recommendations from past Commissions of Inquiry on how to safeguard against such violations. ”

“While the Government pointed to several initiatives it has taken to address these issues, there has yet to be an adequate and credible public accounting for the vast majority of these incidents. In the absence of more vigorous investigations, prosecutions and convictions, it is hard to see how this will come to an end. ”

“While Sri Lanka has much of the necessary human rights institutional infrastructure, critical elements of protection have been undermined or compromised. The application of treaties in domestic law has been questioned by the Supreme Court in the Singarasa case. ”

Against this backdrop the need of the hour is to recognize that there is a problem on either side of the ethnic divide in this respect. It is not a case of responding or not , to global pressures. The problem is that of ours !

Such flagrant human rights violations strike at the root of our collective humanity. A country boasting of a 2500 year civilization and of being an abode to four major religions cannot let this state of affairs continue

Colombo’s current refusal cannot and should not be treated as a full stop. There has to be more forward movement on this issue. Arbour herself keeps the door open in this regard -

” I am aware that there is a lively national debate about the need for international support in human rights protection. In light of the gravity of the reported ongoing abuses, and in particular of threats to life and security of the person, I believe that we should urgently resolve our ongoing discussions about the future of a productive relationship between OHCHR and the Government of Sri Lanka” , she says.

What stands in the way? A realistic answer would be fear! Three – pronged fear!!

Firstly there is a feeling that the LTTE is on the verge of a defeat. It is tacitly recognized that deliberate human rights violations have contributed to this state of affairs. Given the ruthless manner in which the JVP insurgencies were defeated it is felt that large scale human rights violations are a necessary evil to defeat the tigers. The end justifies the means. A UN field mission at this point of time will conscrict such activity and perhaps let the LTTE off the hook is one fear.

Secondly there is the fear that the state and its armed forces will be blamed and shamed by the UN for such violations. National pride and the nation’s welfare is at stake here.

Thirdly there is a question of soverignty and international intervention. The UN field mission could lead to a greater UN presence here is the fear. A peace mission accompanied by UN troops could create two de facto states it is feared.

Resistance to a UN field presence and country office stems from these fears. Fear that victory over the LTTE will be denied, fear that the Country will be disgraced and fear that de – facto secession would occur. These fears may sound irrational but they are very much a reality.

The bitter irony in this is that by stubbornly resisting instead of accomodating international concerns to some extent at least, Sri Lanka may be precipitating negative international intervention. The thing that is greatly feared may come upon the country due to its uncompromising intransigience.

The UN Human Rights Council of which Sri Lanka is a member will meet this December. Louise Arbour’s report on Sri Lanka will be presented then. If Colombo continues to be defiant then there is a strong possibility that the report would come down hard.

This in turn will strengthen the hands of those human rights conscious nations seeking a condemnatory resolution on Sri Lanka. There is also the chance that a special session could be convened to discuss Sri Lanka. Only 16 of 46 member Countries are needed for to set this up. If that happens further international intervention is likely.

There may also be a sense of confidence prevailing in Colombo that no punitive repercussions are likely. Countries like India, China and Pakistan for reasons of their own will ensure that Sri Lanka is not condemned. The western nations desiring action will be outnumbered.

Besides member states will not like to rap a fellow member. Earlier attempts to bring about a resolution did not succeed it is pointed out. Just as the world is allowing Sri Lanka to prosecute a brutal war, the International community will not restrict its pursuit of that war through reprimands is the feeling.

This line of thought may or may not prove to be wrong. Countries may go through the motions of censuring but there may be no censure. A lot of hot air may blow but ultimately everything could turn out real cool. But the important question is whether that risk or gamble could be taken. Is Sri Lanka capable of withstanding resultant pressure if its bluff is called?

More importantly what does happen to the question of human rights violations regardless of international action? Is the Country to continue in this fashion violating right after right and de – humanising itself in the process? Can this nation go on sacrificiing the rights of a weak segment of its society on the altar of a military victory mirage?

The problem will not go away unless constructive action to address it is taken.!

Against this backdrop the prudent course appears to be that of flexibility. Regardless of the seemingly inflexible positions there is room for positive forward movement.

For one thing there is already a limited but active UN human rights presence in the form of a senior human rights adviser (SHRA) on ground in Sri Lanka since June 2004. The earlier SHRA Rory Mungoven completed his term and has been replaced by Jyothi Sangkheira. The possibility of enhancing the SRHA’s role is worth exploring

What would be more feasible is to engage in more quiet discussions with Louise Arbour. The Minister for disaster management and human rights is one of the few ministers in this government who has impressed me.

Mahinda Samarasinghe is one of the few assets acquired by Mahinda Rajapakse from the UNP elephant kraal. His tact and tactical approach has been immensely useful in containing negative fall – out against Sri Lanka. But there are limits to crisis management.

Why Samarasinghe resorted to a blunt refusal instead of adopting his customary conciliatory approach puzzles me. It may have been due to directives to that effect from minister Mahinda’s “lokka” President Mahinda. Whatever the reason for wielding the sledgehammer it is time now for damage control.

Samarasinghe must interact with Louise Arbour and arrive at an understanding. This should not only be a device to stave off international pressure but also that of getting the UN’s aid to improve the human rights situation in the Country. A UN field mission and Country office for Sri Lanka is a must if the human rights situation is to improve.

So who’s afraid of Louise Arbour? There was a picture in the papers of an enormous Samarasinghe towering over Arbour who seemed diminutive in contrast. But appearances are deceptive.

The lady ain’t no pushover! Ask ex – Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, French anti – terror magistrate Jean -Louis Bruguirre or former US envoy to the UN John Bolton!

DBS Jeyaraj appreciates your responses on the federal idea.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

“Pona Machan Indru Thirumbi Vanthane – Poomanathode – Ennidam Puthumanathode” (My cousinn who went away has returned to me today with a fresh, flowery fragrance).

These well – known lines from a very old Tamil film song sung by P. Leela came to my mind when I saw pictures of the Ceylon Workers Congress returning to Government ranks on Thursday October 11th. The five MP’s of the CWC were now back hovering around the President like the “Mahabharatha”s Panchapandavas surrounding their consort Draupadhy.

[CWC Representatives with President Mahinda Rajapaksa - Pic: Daily News]

Two months ago the CWC had tendered their resignations in a huff after a tiff with Basil Rajapakse. The Government did not totter let alone fall. Now the CWC was back like cockerels returning to the coop.

All five were sworn in before the President at Temple Trees.They were given the posts they held earlier.Arumugam Thondaman took oaths as Minister of Youth Empowerment and Socio-Economic Development, S. Sellasamy as Deputy Minister of Posts, M. Sivalingam as Deputy Minister of Estate Infrastructure, S. Satchithananthan as Deputy Minister of Education and S. Jegadeeswaran as Deputy Minister of National Integration.

The unwarranted crisis is seemingly over.

It all began when Basil Rajapakse , the President’s brother and intermediary in dealings with the CWC got embroiled in a heated argument with the Plantation Tamil politicians. The causes were childish. The consequences puerile.

The villain of the piece or peace was Mahindananda Aluthgamage. The CWC’s Muthu. Sivalingam had set up an electricity scheme in Nawalapitiya through funds allocated under the de – centralised budget.

Aluthgamage had allegedly demanded prominence in the ceremony but was refused. He had then met Presidential Adviser Basil Rajapakse and allegedly conveyed a distorted version about what happened.

Basil Rajapakse was apparently misinformed that Sivalingam had criticised “Mahinda Chinthanaya” and refused to give due credit to the Government. When Rajapakse accused Sivalingam about it without clarifying whether it was correct or not a heated argument ensued.

The usually unflappable Basil lost his cool and used harsh language on Sivalingam compelling Arumugam Thondaman to enter the fray on Sivalingam’s behalf.

This resulted in Thondaman and Rajapakse engaging in a verbal slanging match threatening mutual destruction.

There were media reports that Rajapakse had called Sivalingam “Para Demala” but this was denied by both sides publicly. It was admitted however that intemperate language was used in a fierce argument.

According to informed sources a thoroughly upset Sivalingam was distraught. Emotionally worked up, he wanted the CWC to quit the Government instantly and return to government ranks only after a public apology was tendered.His colleagues Sellasamy and Jegatheeswaran felt such a response was too drastic.

CWC officials and important supporters then met at the Taj Samudra hotel and discussed the issue further. There was divided opinion but an emotionally charged Sivalingam was adamant.

Arumugam Thondaman was visibly moved by his senior colleague’s state of mind. Sivalingam was an ardent Arumugam loyalist and had stood through thick and thin by him.

Thondaman was constrained to express solidarity with Sivalingam though it was against his better judgement. A decision was taken to submit letters of resignation from ministerial posts. It was implemented promptly.

It was also decided that the CWC summon a meeting of branch officials to discuss pulling out of the Government completely.

The CWC hierarchy was in for a shock when a meeting was held in Kotagala. The overwhelming opinion among branch officials was that the leaders had acted hastily. Branch officials felt that this was not an issue requiring pull – out from the Government.

The branch officials were also worried about repercussions if the CWC pulled out. The Rajapakse regime was a vindictive one it was pointed out. The prevailing security situation of the Country could be used as a pretext to crack down on the CWC it was feared. Active members could be incarcerated as suspected terrorists it was pointed out.

Then there was also the danger that charges of corruption and abuse of power could be brought up against some CWC officials. Mahinda Rajapakse was accused of using these methods as a tactic to coerce the CWC into joining the Government then. Now the same tactics could be used again. Some persons whose hands were unclean feared the worst.

There was also the question of political upmanship. The Up Country Peoples Front was already in the Government. So too were CWC dissidents. If the CWC pulled out of government these sections could strengthen themselves at CWC expense. The President could promote them to teach the CWC a lesson.

Thus it became apparent that a wholesale pull – out from the Govt was unwelcome at this point of time. A pull-out was desirable and practicable only when the regime faced imminent collapse.

By now Sivalingam’s passion had subsided.Under prevailing circumstances the CWC refrained from pulling out from the Government and joining the opposition.

Thondaman however explored his options. One was to probe the possibility of defections. Mangala Samaraweera with whom Thondaman enjoyed a close relationship had quit the Government and was trying to engineer more defections.

If Samaraweera was sure of success then Thondaman too could throw in his lot against the regime. One to one discussions with Mangala revealed that such a possibility was remote at this point of time

So the CWC did not cross over to the opposition from Govt ranks despite resigning their posts. When tricky money bills came up for voting the CWC supported the Government.

Thondaman also attended party leader meetings of the Government though he was not a cabinet minister.

Meanwhile President Rajapakse too did not accept the CWC resignations. They were kept in a state of limbo. The CWC security or staff were not reduced. Their official vehicles were also not removed. But they did not receive their ministerial emoluments.

Both sides were in a stand – off situation. Tragi-comically this situation was not over some matter of principle or key policy differences but due to wounded pride and hurt ego.

In a mature democracy no party would have resigned over such frivolous reason.

Likewise no Presidential adviser worth his salt would used such intemperate language with a constituent party. Even if he did such an adviser would have tendered his apology and made amends

But it did not happen here as both sides dug in stubbornly .The situation was actually a tempest in a tea cup but allowed to develop into a grave, political crisis.

Comic relief was provided when Basil Rajapakse took his oaths as MP. One of the first to shake Basil’s hand heartily was Muthu Sivalingam. The broad grin on his face made a mockery of the so called reason for CWC splitting.

[Crack of dawn, Dambatenna, -Photo: HA]

Arumugam’s grandfather Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman was a master strategist. He often adopted tactics bordering on political brinkmanship. The grandson has in recent times demonstrated that he is a chip of the old block as far as political manouevring was concerned.It was now his task to extricate the CWC from an unenviable situation without losing face.

Thondaman was faced with a prickly predicament soon after Rajapakse became President in 2005 . The CWC had supported Ranil Wickremasinghe. The new Government began cracking down.There were two police raids.

The first police raid was on November 25. A special Criminal Investigation Department (CID) team was sent from Colombo to search a youth centre run by the CWC-controlled Nuwara Eliya divisional council at Kotagala . The pretext was to find evidence of misappropriation of funds allocated from the estate infrastructure ministry. According to police, they found a large stock of TVs, sewing machines, bicycles and roofing sheets meant for plantation workers and reported that the store had been rented by CWC MP V. Puthrasingamani.

The police sealed the store but no charges were laid. Media reports, however, implied that the stock of goods had been obtained fraudulently.

A second raid, again by a special CID team from Colombo, took place on the home of Arumugam Thondaman.. Police claimed to be looking for evidence of misappropriated funds, but gave no indication that they had found anything. No charges were laid.

In further developments the security given Thondaman was reduced. CWC MP for Badulla Vadivel Suresh was enticed into the Government with a deputy minister post. Attempts were also made to undertake development activities in the estates without CWC involvement. The CWC was to be undermined on its home turf.

But Thondaman struck back. In a controversial move the CWC leader flirted with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. He made a trip to Kilinochchi and met tiger political commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan for political discussions.

Thondaman spoke to the press on his plans to form a united effort among the Upcountry and Western Province Tamil political parties. He told the media that his party and the LTTE discussed the strategic need to form a broad Tamil front to meet the challenges from the Southern polity and to further the common aspirations of both the Tamil communities in the Northeast and the Upcountry.

Although the challenges faced by the Tamils in the Northeast and the Upcountry are different in scope, both communities have to face the common challenge posed by Sinhala nationalism, Thondaman told the media then.

“Emerging new political formations in the South have created an urgent strategic need for NorthEast and Hillcountry Tamils work together. Such a broad front will be able to confront the rising threat to the security and welfare of Tamil people living in all areas of Sri Lanka, and to resist attempts from the Southern Polity to relegate the status of Tamils to second class citizens,” Thondaman was quoted by media.

This overt shift by the CWC towards the LTTE sent alarm bells rimging in India House. Indian High Commissioner Nirupama Menon Rao intervened to bring about rapprochement between Rajapakse and Thondaman. Meetings were set up.

After some haggling and hiccups an understanding was arrived at. Arumugam Thondaman ditched the LTTE and his plan of a broad Tamil front. Instead the CWC joined the Government.

The CWC now needed an issue that could exert pressure on the Goverment like the brief “affair” with the LTTE.

The dangerous tactics used then could not be repeated now. The LTTE card was a non-option. But Thondaman had another ace up his sleeve. This was the Collective agreement signed with estate managements in December 2006.

After privatisation In 1998, the first collective agreement was signed between the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon (on behalf of the 21 Regional Plantation Companies) and the Trade Unions consisting of the Ceylon Workers Congress, Lanka Jathika Estate Workers Union and the Joint Plantations Trade Union Centre. Since then, every 2 years wages have been revised through Collective Agreements.

The last wage agreement was re-negotiated and revised in December 2006. The parties to the agreement remained the same. The parties agreed then that the agreement will be effective up to 31st December 2008.

According to the Dec 2006 agreement the total wage package of a plantation worker was revised to Rs 260/- per day. The package consists of a basic wage of Rs 170/-, price share supplement of Rs20/- and an attendance incentive of Rs 70/-.

[Tea Estate workers, Dambatenna: Picture by Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]

But now Thondaman felt the time was opportune to strike at this Collective agreement. Cost of living had increased drastically. Plantation workers were particularly hit due to steep rise in the price of kerosene, flour and infant milk food.

The CWC hoped to strike a responsive chord among workers by exploiting the issue. At the same time it hoped to use the issue and exert pressure indirectly on the Government.

So the CWC used a clause in the agreement where a signatory could opt out by giving a month’s notice. The CWC informed the managements of its intention. The CWC demanded a revision of the agreement to increase the daily wage to 200 rupees per day.

Thus a person working for 25 days will get a minimum wage of 5000 Rupees monthly. This was on par with President Rajapakse’s decision to increase the minimum wage of all workers to 5,000 Rs per month.

Negotiations began with the estate managements under the auspices of Labour minister Athauda Seneviratne. Even as discussions were on CWC spokespersons told media that “work slow” and “work stoppage” campaigns will commence if agreement was not reached.

In a separate development Thondaman increased pressure on the President by raising further demands.. He began pressing the Government to implement the 10-year action plan for the welfare of the plantation workers. The plan with a multi – billion rupee budget envisaged improvement in education, health and housing facilities.

The CWC also submitted a charter of demands to the President to improve the lot of the plantation sector workers. The charter included demands for appointment of Tamil co-coordinators and an expanded secretariat in the National Education Ministry for promotion of Tamil language.

Even as the CWC began mounting pressure the Government started planning retaliatory measures.

According to newspaper reports the government began discussing issues described as “custodianship of the estate population under its purview”.
Under a strategic plan, the government proposed taking over the education and health sectors and “immensely increase State influence in the plantations sector”. The take-over of 110 estate hospitals was contemplated.

Health Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva publicly declared that there was absolutely no need to deal with the estate population through a third party. Addressing estate superintendents, teachers and principals at Badulla, de Silva emphasised the importance of the government dealing directly with the estate population.

Even as the Govt – CWC cold war continued fresh political developments increased Thondaman’s bargaining power. The Ranil – Mangala combine was canvassing JVP support against the Government on the budget vote. Also moves were on to submit a no confidence motion against Milinda Moragoda. It appeared that the JVP could support it.

The possibility of the JVP voting with the UNP against the Government posed a dicey situation where the CWC with five MP’s could hold the power balance. In a scenario of equally matched division the CWC could tilt the scales either way if it wanted to.

CWC spokesperson R. Yogarajan kept the CWC’s options open by declaring that the CWC would decide on its course only after examining the budget in detail.

The political animal in Mahinda Rajapakse became sharply alive. The President stepped in and quickly resolved the workers wage issue. A daily wage of 200 was agreed upon. A person working 25 days would get 5000 Rs. With other emoluments it could exceed Rs.7000.

With that “victory” in hand the road was clear for the CWC to re- join Government and accept their old portfolios. That has now happened and the Plantation prodigals are back in Govt folds.

It cannot be denied that the CWC had used the legitimate aspirations of plantation workers to pressurise the Government. The CWC was essentially a trade union with a political wing earlier. The political wing was to help workers win their benefits and dues.

But now the roles were reversed. Politics had overshadowed trade unionism. Sharing political power was seen as being more important than trade union activism. The CWC was now a political party with a trade union wing. In 2006 the plantation workers agitated for 300 Rupees as daily wage. The CWC however abandoned protest and compromised with managements for 170 rupees as basic wage.

The new rate of 200 rupees and promise of a minimum monthly 5000 rupee wage is a mirage. Rarely do estates provide work after a Friday. A five day week means only 20 – 23 working days per month. Thus 25 days of work is not guaranteed. The 75 % work attendance is also rare. So the attendance incentive is not guaranteed. The price share supplement will fluctuate according to the market rates.

So expectations of an all inclusive 290 rupee daily wage as well as a 25 workday guarantee are likely to result in disappointment.

What the workers need is a guaranteed monthly salary and not one based on accumulated daily wages.

The CWC however had created a worker issue for its own political interests, used it as a pressure tactic and compromised easily . The gain was more to CWC Parliamentarians than the hard – pressed worker whose monthly subscription is the mainstay of the union.

The tempest in a tea – cup has subsided and the CWC has become part and parcel of the Government again.

There are doubts however about the bona fides of both parties in this reconciliation..

The Government has reluctantly given in due to CWC triggered pressure and also because of its indispensability in maintaining a Parliamentary majority.

The CWC has joined the Government only due to fear of consequences and also a lack of alternative options..

Two qustions arise at this point.

Will the Government abandon its plan of dealing with Plantation workers directly and sidelining a “third Party” like the CWC?

The other is will the CWC remain steadfastly loyal to this regime by not voting against it at a critical juncture?

The coming days will provide answers to these questions. Interesting times lie ahead!