Archive for August, 2007

Muslim Youths in North-East being given wrong signals

By M.I.M. Mohideen

President Mahinda Rajapaksa led UPFA government having elaborate plans to rebuild and rehabilitate the East. The Muslim community feels the government has not so far included them into the development process.

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) Leader and Minister Rauff Hakeem had deplored the government’s decision to have development projects in the East supervised by the security forces and police. Before the government can think of rebuilding the infrastructure, the people must be given back their lost lands and freedom to engage in whatever livelihood they were engaged before.

Controversy over the New Flag

Soon after the demerger of the East by the Supreme Court and following the take over of the province by the armed forces, Sri Lanka government has designed a new flag for the Eastern Province. This new flag has caused much misunderstanding and confusion as the flag has failed to represent all the communities living in the East in a just and faire manners.

The new flag has three symbols-the lion, eagle and fish. The Muslims claimed that while the lion and fish represent the Sinhalese and Tamils respectively there is no symbol to represent the Muslims.

The Muslim community which is the largest ethnic group in the East has raised serious concern over the failure of the government to recognize this community by not printing any symbols in the flag to represent the Muslims.

Para Military Forces harassing civilians

Law enforcement authorities in many parts of the Eastern province are allegedly turning a ‘blind eye’ to the continuous complaints made against the Karuna faction.

Despite several political parties in the Batticaloa and Ampara districts taking up this issue with the law enforcement officers, they have failed to address this issue adequately.

Apart from encroaching lands belonging to Muslims, the Karuna cadres have commenced taking ransom. Most victims have now stopped complaining to the police because when complaints were made to the police the details of those who made the complaints were leaked. As a result these families are intimidated and harassed.

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission in its last weekly report states that the SLMM has received several complaints regarding extortion and harassment by the so-called Karuna group in Batticaloa and Ampara.

Muslims discriminated

Batticaloa District

Serious issues have been raised by Muslims of Batticaloa on the ongoing activities of the several international organizations assisted by the Government and the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) in re-locating displaced Tamils on lands owned by Muslims.

After 1985, LTTE forcibly occupied Muslim residential, agricultural and cattle farming lands – more than 35,000 acres in areas under their control. The GOSL did nothing to restore these properties owned by the Muslims on title deeds, government permits and paddy cultivation register. The displaced Muslims suffered untold hardships during the last 22 years. Now after the GOSL cleared these areas from the LTTE, the TVMP of Karuna with the help of the government security forces and INGO assistance, putting up permanent houses, churches, temples and schools in the Muslim lands forcibly occupied by the LTTE without any consideration for Muslims’ right to settle the displaced Muslims who are the lawful owners of these lands.

Koralaipaththu Central

Although the Local Government Commission declared Koralaipaththu Central – the area of historical habitation of the Muslims, covering more than 240 sq. km., consisting of 11 Grama Sevaka Niladhari divisions, the boundaries have not yet been demarcated on ground.

The Batticaloa district consists of 14 Pradesiya Sabhas and covering an extent of 2633 sq. km. These are 4 predominant Muslim DS divisions and the land area – Kattankudi 3.4 sq. km. Eravur Town 3.89 sq. km., Koralaipaththu West (Ottamavadi) 6.84 sq. km. Koralaipaththu Central 6.50 sq. km. Total extent of Muslim land area approximately 20.0 sq. km., which is less than 1.0% of the total area of Batticaloa District where the Muslim population is nearly 30% today.

Eravur

Most of the Muslim agriculture and cattle farm land owned by the Muslims lie along the Chenkaladi – Badulla – A5 Road. Today the entire area along this road has come under the control of GOSL armed forces. Eravur Muslims owned more than 12,000 acres. Arrangements are being made now to bring back the Tamils who have been unlawfully occupying Muslim lands and settle them permanently by the TMVP of Karuna and the Government armed forces without any consideration of the displaced Muslims by the LTTE.

During the ethnic conflict 1983, 1985, 1990 etc., more than 12,700 Muslim families were chased out by the LTTE and the Tamils forcibly occupied all the Muslim lands that came under LTTE control. The GOSL did nothing to provide any relief or paid compensation for the loss of livelihood of these displaced Muslims.

Resettlement of displaced Tamils on Muslim land in Iyankuni, Meerakerni, Mitchanagar, Hidayathanagar, Thakvanagar in and around Eravurpathu Pradeshiya Sabha would further deteriorate the peaceful co-existence of Muslims and Tamils in Eravur.

Further, the Eastern University is making arrangements now to acquire nearly 30 acres of land in Meerakerni Muslim area which is about 7 km. away from the university. This is a sinister move by the Tamils to prevent Muslims settling.

Kattankudi Muslim Border Villages

Ollikulam, Sikaram, Karbela, Palamunai, Kankayan Odai, Keechampallam are the Muslim border villages of Kattankudi in Arayanipathu Pradeshiya Sabha. Displaced Tamils after the ‘Tsunami’ and GOSL military operations to flush the LTTE terrorists in the Paduvankarai Tamil villages have been temporarily settled in private lands owned by the Muslims and the Mosques. Now the TMVP of Karuna with the assistance of Government Armed Forces and help from INGO’s are making arrangements to provide accommodation to settle the displaced Tamils who have come from Tamil areas, permanently on land belonging to the Muslims and the Mosques, depriving the Muslims, the lands belonging to them.

Trincomalee District

Kuchchaveli

Kuchchaveli in Trincomalee district is a predominant Muslim area. Total population 29,967 and 8,058 families. 65% Muslims 19,443, 31% Tamils 9,282, 3% Christians 905 and 01% Sinhalese 337. Kuchchaveli Pradeshiya Sabha 9 members, Muslims 6, Tamils 3.

Discriminations

Public Administration

The Divisional Secretary is a Tamil in the predominant Muslim division. Total grama niladharies 24.65% Muslims are given only 7 GS but the balance 17 GS are given to the Tamils and others who are only 35%. Average population of a Tamil GS division is 250 people whereas the population in Muslims GS is around 1350 eg. Pulmoddai 31I and 31I divisions.

Land Issue

Iqbal Nagar is a Muslim area. Due to ethnic conflict the Muslims were displaced during 1984, 1990 and 1994 and settled in a place called Love Lane in Trincomalee. In 2002, the Muslim refugees came back to Iqbal Nagar and living under abject poverty.

In the East of Iqbal Nagar almost 250 acres are forcibly taken over by the Eastern University. 50 acres from Thamraikulam and Muthuraimalai are allocated to JICA (INGO) by Kuchchaveli Divisional Secretary for Tsunami Housing Project. 185 Muslims were promised 15 perches each but all the lands were distributed to the Tamils and Government officers and nothing was given to the displaced Muslims.

In the 265 Muslim families identified as refugees only 45 families selected for the NERHP projects. But all the Tamil refugees were settled in the new housing projects in Konespuri, Kopalapuram, Kumpirupity, Iranaikerni and Thriyai.

Hospital

The new hospital building constructed 5 years ago not yet opened to the public. There is no proper medical facilities for the Kuchchaveli people.

Fishing

There is restriction for fishing in Kuchchaveli. The navy allows only 5 days between 4 am. and 6 pm. Fishing equipment have not been distributed to the affected Muslim fishermen.

Roads

The new road construction started from 6th mile post to Pullimodai is unduly delayed.

Schools

Pullimodai, Arafath Naga, Jinnah Puram are the most neglected areas. However, the Sinhala areas in Kuchchaveli is categorized as most difficult area and given priority for the allocation of funds and other facilities.

Resettlement

Basic facilities such as housing, electricity, roads toilets have not been provided to the Muslim refugees settled in Pattikuda, Ponmalaikadu, Veeranthevu, Thethavadithieru, Karayaveli, Sadam Nagar villages – NERHP – 31J, 31G, 31H, 31L villages have been neglected.

Ampara district

Harassment of Pottuvil Muslims

Another glaring example where the security issue of Muslims have been compromised for political agenda is the massacre of ten Muslims in Pottuvil in September 2006. The perpetrators of this massacre were well exposed by the public.

The area of Radella in Pottuvil has been the bone of contention between the Sinhala and the Muslim communities, both groups accusing each other of encroaching state land. Radella was abandoned during the conflict and was reclaimed by Muslims farmers who were in the habit of making temporary shelters during cultivation season and leaving the area once the crop has been harvested. The STF was vehemently opposed to Muslims cultivating the state lands in the Radella area.

Muslim tsunami victims

It is widely criticized that the government has not treated the Muslim Tsunami victims fairly.

Ampara, the country’s worst affected district is a glaring example of how ineffective institutions, political rivalries and misinformation can make a mockery of disaster management.

In the LTTE controlled areas of Batticaloa District, the TRO (Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation) a LTTE – backed organization has been channeling funds to resettle the affected Tamil people. But Kattankudy’s boarder villages such as New Kattankudy, Palamunai and other Muslim concentrated areas continue to remain neglected.

Mutur, Kinniya, Kuchchaveli, Pulmoddai and Trincomalee town are the Divisional Secretariats Division in the Trincomalee District where thousands of Muslims have been affected by the Tsunami. Political confusion has greatly contributed to the mismanagement of relief. LTTE held areas in the district have come under INGO – baked relief and resettlement works. But Muslim areas are continued to be neglected.

The situation in the South is different. In Hambantota, the need is only 1,057 houses for the Tsunami Victims. But the donors have built 4,852 houses.

Abduction of Muslim Businessman

The issue of abduction and extortion of Muslim Businessmen was raised recently in Parliament. The Muslim politicians in the UNP took up the issue and demanded the resignation of Muslim Ministers. The Muslim ministers reacted to counter this demand and traded allegations against the UNP saying that when the Northern Muslims were ethnically cleansed in 1990 during the UNP government, the then Muslim ministers did not resign.

Wrong Signals

Political leaders have failed and neglected to resolve the issues confronting the Muslim community. They have tackled Muslim issues from and within the scope of their party politics and have sidelined the issues to suit their political agenda.

Whoever the perpetrators of the crimes may be, the government cannot shirk their responsibilities since the crimes have taken place in areas under the control of the government. A feeling is now developing within the Muslim community that they are discriminated and the government is disinterested in utilizing its resources when it comes to safe-guarding the interests of Muslims. It is the Muslims who have been at the receiving end of atrocities committed by the Tamil Terrorist for not extending support for the creation of a separate Tamil Elam state in the North East. If the Government and the security forces too cause harm, harass and making their lives miserable, one wonders to whom can the Muslims look up to for protection.

Muslim youths are now wondering what is the signal that the Government, Tamil Terrorist and Muslim Ministers are giving out to them? Is it that, they want the Muslims to think on the lines of protecting themselves? Are the Muslims to believe that if they remain unarmed there would not be any respect or protection for them? What would be the consequences if the Muslims too place their faith on arms? It is time for everyone to realize the gravity of the situation. The Muslims can no longer be at the receiving end losing more and more lives and properties in the most horrendous manner for no fault of theirs. The Government must now clearly indicate without any hesitation that it is prepared to stand by the peaceful and unarmed Muslim community to resolve their legitimate grievances before it is too late.

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Displaced People Used As Pawns By State and Non-State Actors In N-E Sri Lanka

Summary Of Report By South Asians For Human Rights

A recent fact – finding mission undertaken by the South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR) organization has uncovered details about the manner in which Displaced persons in the North and East of Sri Lanka are used as “pawns” by state and non – state actors in Sri Lanka in clear violation of basic principles of basic law.

The report released this week by SAHR notes that the “findings of the mission reveal the manner in which IDPs are often used as pawns by both state and non-state actors, in clear violation of basic principles of humanitarian law.” and also notes that “Various agencies working amongst the IDPs and advocating on their behalf have also been the target of both warranted and unwarranted criticism, and at times intimidation and harassment by both state and non-state actors”

Former Indian Prime Minister and chairperson of SAHR Inder Kumar Gujral in a brief foreword to the report says – ” This report on the state of displaced persons in the North and East of Sri Lanka analyses the security condition and concerns of those who live in makeshifts and camps in conflict affected areas. It provides an overview of the current ground situation, i.e. the altered displacement landscape, and the dynamics which shape the distribution of aid and resettlement. In doing so it highlights the manner in which resettlement, sometimes forced resettlement, is changing the ethnic composition of certain areas, and being used to establish the political dominance of certain parties/segments of the population. “.

The “FEDERAL IDEA” presents here some excerpts from the SAHR report including a background note on situation and methodology adopted , the summary of report findings , a list of recommendations and also a a description of SAHR and Mr. Gujral’s foreword.

Background and Current Situation

The last eighteen months has seen increased fighting between the armed forces of the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The last year, in particular, has been marked by intense fighting including aerial bombardments in the East of the country leading to massive displacements of civilians in the area. Concerns regarding the manner in which civilians were originally displaced, their treatment and safety while displaced and, more vitally in the long term, the conditions of their return have all been controversial.

Beginning with the bombardments of the Sampur area in April 2006, we have observed massive shifts in population. The situation worsened in late July/ early August last year when fighting led to a mass exodus of people from Muttur. The impact of this particular displacement was further exacerbated by allegations of the killing of fleeing Muslims by the LTTE, the death of several Muslims in a multi barrel attack by government forces and the massacre of 17 aid workers from the French Relief Agency, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) who stayed behind in Muttur and the difference in the amount of compensation paid out by the government of Sri Lanka immediately after the cessation of fighting in mid August to Sinhalese farmers for crops ruined due to closure of the Mavil Aru dam by the LTTE and those displaced (mainly Tamil and Muslim) in Muttur due to the fighting.

Despite the fact that many moved after receiving notices from the government regarding potential fighting, preparedness to deal with displacement was inadequate. More disturbing however, were reports, both of forced return of the displaced to their home areas, (mainly in order to establish the government claims that particular areas were now totally within its control), and the compulsion (mainly by the LTTE) that people remain in their home areas despite fighting. Both attitudes showed absolute disregard for the material and physical safety of civilians.

The politics of the Eastern part of Sri Lanka, always controversial, has now been further complicated with the split within the LTTE. The breakaway Karuna group which assists the government forces in their security efforts in the East is also involved in establishing its own hegemony upon the people of the East. The people of the east seem to be stuck between parties in a contestation for power and control of their lands.

It is in this context, especially following reports that humanitarian agencies and even inter-governmental bodies are unable to visit the areas most affected by the conflict in order to guarantee security safety and the decent treatment of the displaced, that SAHR decided to undertake a fact-finding mission to the North and East of Sri Lanka. When it was planned, our intention was to ascertain the situation of civilians, especially in the East. Since then, there is a general sense that the fighting will now shift to the North of the country, probably leading to more pressure on civilians. It is hoped that this report will thus, not only address the immediate issues highlighted in it but also lead to better co-ordination of humanitarian aid and a general sense of preparedness for displacement in this continued war.

Methodology

The 5 day long fact finding mission, from June 8th-13th, 2007 was carried out by 3 groups consisting of 4 members each, 2 Sri Lankans and 2 South Asians. South Asian mission members were Sahba Husain, Radhika Mukerji, Dr. Aruna Upretty, Nuzhath Kidvai, Aishath Velizinee and Lubna Marium. The Sri Lankan team consisted of Rukshana Nanayakkara, Ambika Satkunanathan, Kumudini Samuel, Anberiya Hanifa, Dhanukshi Jayawickreme, Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai and Shreen Saroor.

The geographical areas covered are Batticaloa, Kalmunai and Akkaraipattu, Vavuniya, Puttlam and Mannar as well as Trincomalee, Muttur and the ‘border’ area of Kabetigollawa and Morawawe in the contiguous district of Anuradhapura. The mission met with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), government officials, community groups, non-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations and UN agencies.

For reasons of security the identities of the persons/groups the mission met have been withheld. The structure of each field report varies as they were shaped by the issues at the sites visited and the narratives of the interviewees.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE MISSION

The SAHR mission focused on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), since the process of displacement creates a climate which is conducive to the perpetration of all forms of rights violations, and particularly because minorities constitute the majority of displaced persons. Although the mission’s brief was to concentrate on the larger, political aspect of displacement rather than the day-to-day life of the displaced, as the narratives highlight, it was difficult to separate the two. In the case of displacement, the every- day, ordinary, personal life of the displaced and the political dynamics of displacement are enmeshed and interlinked. Also of particular relevance were the gendered consequences of displacement.

The element of fear has had a major impact on the people and their lives. Most people said that the multiplicity of actors -GOSL, LTTE, TMVP, EPDP- made it difficult for them to negotiate the simplest activities on a day to day basis. The mission found that despite such a high element of fear leading to the radicalization of some sections of all communities, whereby they resort to extreme forms of responses as they believe no just solutions can be obtained, there were also individuals who had a nuanced and in-depth understanding of local realities and were firm in their belief that a negotiated settlement was the only way forward.

The findings of the mission reveal the manner in which IDPs are often used as pawns by both state and non-state actors, in clear violation of basic principles of humanitarian law. Various agencies working amongst the IDPs and advocating on their behalf have also been the target of both warranted and unwarranted criticism, and at times intimidation and harassment by both state and non-state actors.

The increase in the presence and activities of the LTTE splinter group Tamil Makkala Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)/Karuna Group, has also had an impact on displacement, return and resettlement. Further, continued internecine violence within the Tamil armed groups such as the reported split within the TMVP, (where commander Pillayan issued a warning to Karuna to leave the group or face being removed by force), only added to prevailing insecurity in the region and heightened the threat of forced recruitment of adults and children by both factions.

Response to IDPs Needs

Visits to the IDP camps and welfare centres illustrated the inadequacy of the response of both government and non-governmental aid agencies. The large numbers and the sprawl of many camps required very well managed services and a co-ordinated relief response, which the local officials were trying desperately to accommodate. However it seemed very obvious, for instance at the Killivedy camp, that they were over stretched, under staffed and had insufficient capacity to deal with enforced displacement of such magnitude. The living conditions in most camps were cramped, and sanitation facilities dismal. In many instances temporary shelters were constructed with materials, such as tin sheets, which are unsuitable for the searing temperatures in the region. Some camps had irregular supply of food, such as Killivedy and Kinniya, leading to deteriorating health conditions among inmates, especially children, pregnant and lactating mothers. Since many camps were situated in isolated spots, the IDPs didn’t have access to water, schooling, employment opportunities and health facilities. The location of the camps also created a sense of insecurity amongst the people as they felt isolated and cut off from the rest of the community. In some cases camp conditions were so unbearable, such as at Killivedy, that some families the mission spoke to said they would rather go back to their villages even though they had grave fears about renewed fighting and uncleared landmines.

The state of the camps also highlighted the lack of coordination between and amongst INGOs, NGOs and the government. This was sometimes exacerbated by a lack of knowledge of local context and politics, which restricted the ability of the agencies to respond effectively to the actual needs of the population as opposed to perceived needs of a generic IDP population. Sometimes provision of aid by INGOs created a dependency on ‘aid’ among the affected people. There have also been cases where increased violence, in particular targeted violence against humanitarian workers, has led to discontinuation of the presence of aid agencies or reluctance to work in the area. For instance, the Muslims in Muttur noted that following the massacre of 17 Action Contra Faim (ACF) aid workers in August 2006, NGOs were reluctant to come into the area resulting in the local populace being deprived of humanitarian assistance.

Return and Resettlement

The government began resettling people in the Batticaloa West region in three phases, with the first phase beginning on 14 May 2007. The entire process was completed in mid June. The resettlement process has been controversial with allegations of forced resettlement, inadequate support to the newly resettled and imposition of policies which restrict the freedom of movement of resettled persons. Minister Hakeem of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, a minority party at present aligned with the government, made a statement during the emergency debate in Parliament on the 06th of June, 2007 that he had credible information that authorities were forcibly resettling those displaced by conflict.

Following a claim that the East has been liberated from the LTTE, the government announced plans to return all people displaced in the East. However, many IDPs the mission members spoke with, did not wish to return at the time because they feared for their safety as they felt conditions, both material and security, were not conducive for return. For instance, many IDPs the SAHR mission met, such as persons from Vavunaitheevu, one of the new resettled areas, did not want to return at the time, as sporadic clashes continued between the SLA and the LTTE. The word ‘return’ was conspicuously absent in the language used by the INGOs and the displaced themselves to describe the situation (such as relocation, resettlement and permanent housing). Local groups on the other hand, cast doubts on the voluntary nature of return. The only instance the word was used in the discourse was when the displaced categorically said they did not wish to return until a solution is found to the conflict and arrangements are made for an honourable return.

Most of these people were not given a choice regarding return. Residents from the Trincomalee district who fled to Batticaloa and were in camps at Valaichenai, Eravur, Chenkaladi and Batticaloa were moved to Killivedy by the government in the weeks preceding the mission’s visit. They had been told that they were being transported to their home villages but were instead brought to the transit camp in Kiliveddy. The mission was told by many people at the camp that they did not wish to move to yet another transit location or camp but had no choice since they were not consulted. Nor were they taken on go-see assessment visits to their homes prior to return. As the regional mission reports below will illustrate, in the majority of the camps visited by the mission, the IDPs were merely instructed by the Grama Sevakas that they would be returned to their places of origin on a certain date. The role of INGOs and particularly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is supposed to function as a coordinating agency in Sri Lanka, falls short of what is required of aid and protection agencies. Above all, interviews with both IDPs and local groups revealed that advocacy by UNHCR on this issue was inadequate. Further, the statement by UNHCR that resettlement was taking place in line with international protection standards was utilised by the government to silence critics, particularly local critics of the return process.

The haste with which return took place has meant that material and security conditions in the areas have been less than conducive to resettlement. Issues include lack of facilities in the areas, inability to resettle people who live in the interiors due to security reasons, inadequate provision of support to the resettled and lack of access to INGOs and NGOs to the areas. The lack of access continues to be a problem to both local and international groups with the government putting in place additional restrictions upon the activities of aid agencies. This is compounded by the absence of a number of regular government officials appointed to serve in these areas, many of whom opt not to reside in these unsafe locations or refuse to take up regular postings. Increased militarization of the Eastern province also lends itself to the creation of an environment which is conducive to military oversight and control of civil society and non-governmental organisations.

Militarization and (In) Security Issues

Increased militarization of the region was visible in the form of military checkpoints and the active engagement of the military in the return, resettlement and rehabilitation processes. From the appointment of military personnel to high posts in the Provincial Council of the Eastern Province, such as the Governorship, to military oversight of INGO activities, a militarized civil administration appears to exist in the East. Mission members noted the presence of armed men in civilian clothing at the District Secretariat Office in Batticaloa. Due to the presence of armed groups functioning in the area there is no way of determining whether they were members of the Sri Lanka Army, Special Task Force (STF) or the Karuna group. In other areas of the East, such as Kalmunai mission members also saw men in civilian clothing carrying guns boarding public buses and patrolling the streets. When an armed person who is a member of the army or a paramilitary group boards or attaches himself to a civilian object he effectively transforms the object into a military target. This creates a sense of insecurity amongst the public and contributes to the atmosphere of tension, lawlessness and impunity. Mission missions (in all three areas) were informed that the armed forces often establish camps on private property without paying rent or compensation to owners. Public property such as temples, schools and hospitals, have also been taken over by the armed forces thereby denying the public access to, and the use of, these spaces.

In many of the border villages, i.e. the areas adjoining or contiguous to the conflict affected Northern and Eastern provinces, most if not all families have a connection with the military apparatus. In the village of Morawewa every family the team interviewed had some connection with the armed forces. Almost all the women the mission spoke with either had a family member who was directly attached to the armed forces (as a soldier or home guard) or worked for the forces in another capacity (casual labourers, cooks).

The displaced people’s narratives clearly illustrated increasing disregard for the safety and security of civilians by both the GOSL and the LTTE. The attack on Muttur and ensuing forced mass displacement of August 2006 was still a major issue for all Muslims the mission spoke with. They were especially insistent that the government conduct an independent investigation into the killing of 63 Muslims during the fighting between the GOSL and the LTTE from August 2nd to 4th in Muttur. The Muslims were also concerned that they were not able to give proper testimony to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Serious Violations of Human Rights, when they visited the area. The people alleged that a number of army officers accompanied the Commissioners, due to which many witnesses did not come forward. They were critical of the Commissioners who they felt should have asked the military to leave if they wished to hold an independent and impartial investigation without jeopardizing the security and lives of witnesses. The Muslims in Muttur also condemned the attack by the military and navy who launched Multi-Barrel Rockets (MBRs) into densely populated Muttur in response to the LTTE attack on the Trincomalee Naval Base resulting in a large number of civilian deaths and damage to homes and infrastructure. The Muslims were concerned that their request to the government to include the incident of the massacre to the 17 being investigated by the Commission had so far not met with a positive response.

Minority Fears and Land Issues

The current wave of displacement, return and resettlement has also led to fears amongst the minority communities about state sponsored colonization programmes and alteration of administrative boundaries in the region, which they believe seek to change the ethnic demography of the province. The cases of state takeover of minority lands (listed in the regional reports) illustrate that the fears are well-founded. Since the Eastern province forms an important part of the area demarcated by the LTTE as the homeland of the Tamil people, i.e. Eelam, state colonization programs have been taking place in the region for years with the aim of changing the ethnic demography and thereby defeating the claims of the Tamil homeland theory of the LTTE. The village of Morawewa in the Trincomalee district is a good example. The villagers the mission members spoke with alleged that settlers have been brought to Morawewa from the south since the 1950s with the promise of land for agriculture and that most owned no significant property in the south prior to the settlement.

The fallout of the political machinations of the government and the LTTE has impacted Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim civilians, with Sinhalese civilians being subjected to violence by the LTTE, and Tamil civilians being ousted from their lands and attacked by state forces in retaliation for LTTE attacks. Muslim civilians have been the target of both GOSL and LTTE violence. The regional report from the visit to Trincomalee and the ‘border’ villages illustrates the volatile and complex local context in the ‘border’ villages and the problems related to co-existence. The report of the mission to Batticaloa and adjoining areas details the state sponsored land grabbing exercise that is taking place in Pottuvil, the ensuing tension between local communities and the struggle of the Muslim population against the scheme.

Discrimination against the Muslim Community

Discrimination by government officials and processes were also a common complaint, with each community citing discrimination by both the majority Sinhalese and the other minority group. The Muslim community stated that since the northern Muslims were resettled in a relatively safe location like Puttlam, aid agencies and the government do not treat the Muslim IDP issue with the seriousness it requires. Muslim community groups alleged that discrimination against Muslims was common since a significant number of departmental heads in Batticaloa are Tamil. Another example cited by the interviewees was the allocation of post-tsunami land given to Muslims in Ariyampathy by the NHDA, to Tamil IDPs instead. It was pointed out to us that although Ampara is a Tamil speaking majority division, to date a Tamil speaking GA has not been appointed.

The Muslims expressed discontent at their political marginalization both by the State and the LTTE. They were particularly concerned about the one sided negotiations which resulted from the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA); their marginalization from development processes and the discrimination inherent in Tsunami relief and recovery processes. They also contended that it was in the interest of both the state and the LTTE to maintain a state of tension between Tamil and Muslim civilians. The Muslim leaders the team spoke with reiterated that their interests were inter-twined with those of the Tamils as a collective people occupying the eastern province. However, they had no trust in the LTTE, Muslim politicians or the state and insisted that an independent group of civil society representatives had to watch over the interests of the people in the area.

Gender Issues

The SAHR mission also focused on issues affecting women in the context of displacement, return and resettlement, particularly since gender issues are often ignored in the provision of humanitarian aid/support, and because conflict impacts mend and women differently.

Women spoke of their experiences from the perspective of the consequences of the conflict on their families and not from the perspective of political losses and gains. Many Sinhala women from the ‘border’ areas stated they were reluctant to let their sons join the armed forces or other armed groups, but said they had no option because of economic hardships. Women also feared for the safety and well-being of their children, particularly male children and other male members of the family due to forced recruitment by the LTTE and Karuna faction. Increased militarization, the recruitment of young men into home guard units and the presence of guns in the villages, women stated, led to men exercising more violence in the home and in intimate relationships. Women also spoke of the increased presence of military and police personnel in the vicinity of their villages and the sexual demands on women, which at times women had no means of resisting. There is fear amongst families, both within and outside IDP camps about sexual violence against young women, leading them to arrange ‘marriages’ for their teenage daughters. Many interviewees noted the high number of under-age ‘marriages’ where parents either gave consent to marriages of girls over the age of 16 or falsified their ages. Some of these resulted from instances of teen age love affairs and subsequent pregnancies. Often these marriages cannot be sustained and the young men leave their wives and re-marry after a while, leaving many young mothers to take care of themselves and their children. Conflict related frustrations and hopelessness were cited as reasons for early school drop outs, under-age marriage and the gendered consequence of early pregnancy for young girls.

At many camps and welfare sites there were minimal facilities with regard to health issues such as family planning, child bearing and feeding infants. There appeared to have been no preparedness on the part of the state or NGOs to address the inevitable consequences of large scale enforced displacement resulting from concerted military engagement. There were a number of accounts of child-birth in flight and inadequate conditions at camp sites to address the post partum needs of mothers and infants. Women spoke of the lack of privacy in camps and the pressures put on them by husbands who demanded conjugal relations despite the adverse circumstances. They also spoke of their fears for the security of girl children. The mission noted that there did not appear to be a systematic emergency response in place to address the reproductive health needs of women in situations of enforced displacement. Mobile clinics were operational in some instances but were inadequate to deal with the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis. Health services in host communities were seriously overstretched and women’s immediate needs with regard to menstruation, birth control and essential clothing such as appropriate underwear and underskirts were often overlooked or neglected. Women also spoke of gender violence in camp situations and the mission came across instances where such violence had been suppressed by management authorities.

The mission also came across a significant proportion of single women or widows, responsible for family welfare among the displaced. These women were often at a disadvantage with regard to accessing services and provisions since they were in relatively powerless positions and had to take whatever was available or given to them. In camp situations the men were better positioned to negotiate with authorities and were more likely to be consulted in decision making or asked to assist with camp matters. There was no definitive mechanism in place to ensure that women were also part of decision making processes in relation to camp administration and in relation to decisions with regard to the well being of the displaced.

In relation to forced recruitment, mission members were told that in response to the LTTE demand of one person per household, sometimes families were more willing to give away a female family member instead of a male. This is for two main reasons; the family would not have to worry about the security of the woman, marital prospects etc and secondly, sons are seen as an economic security for the family, particularly ageing parents.

In cases of sexual violence, particularly incest, communities indicated that the young women would be ‘given’ to the LTTE. For instance, in Mannar where a father raped his young daughter, the community stated the girl was sent away from the area but later stories began circulating that she had been given to the LTTE. The mission also came across similar narratives in the East where victims of violence, particularly incest, were reportedly given to the Karuna group. Two victims of violence stated that the only way they could lead a life with dignity after rape was by joining the LTTE.

In relation to the Muslim community, many groups pointed out that at present women are compelled to wear the fully concealing garb originating from foreign Muslim tradition. Prior to the conflict the northern Muslim community had a very relaxed and local Tamil-culture based sense of dress. However, the host community’s practice of orthodox Islam has led the IDPs to adopt a more conservative form of Islam which in some instances has had an adverse impact upon women.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1 All policies and interventions with regard to IDPs must be consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

1 IDPs should enjoy equal rights and freedoms under international and domestic law with no discrimination on the ground that they are internally displaced.

2 The Government should maintain a clear demarcation between civil and military authorities. The current militarization of civilian authority in the Eastern Province is a disturbing trend which should be stopped.

3 All documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of legal rights and citizenship, such as passports, personal identification documents, birth certificates and marriage certificates should be issued to displaced persons. Any documents lost during displacement should replaced. This should be carried out without imposing unrealistic conditions such as return to one’s original place of residence. Women and men must have equal rights to obtain such necessary documents and have the right to have such documentation issued in their own names.

Protection & Security Issues

1 The right to life, liberty, dignity and security of person should not be violated in times of conflict and during displacement.

1 The government should refrain from establishing military camps in the midst, or in the vicinity of public buildings, residential areas and camps for the displaced.

2 The government should vacate public buildings such as schools, hospitals and temples and ensure that civilian and public establishments are not appropriated for use as military camps or installations.

3 The government should ensure that only members of the regular armed forces are authorized to carry weapons. Further, in line with humanitarian law, members of the state forces should be required to be easily identifiable, i.e. should be in uniform etc.

4 International and local agencies dealing with conflict affected populations should ensure that security and access concerns are addressed more effectively through joint advocacy mechanisms.

5 Agencies engaged in providing humanitarian assistance should monitor human rights violations and ensure that accurate information is conveyed speedily to relevant institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the ICRC and the SLMM for immediate attention.

6 Government authorities and other agencies providing humanitarian assistance should also focus on the protection concerns, particularly of women and children, by providing adequate lighting and security, within and in the periphery of camp premises.

7 Internally displaced persons themselves, including women, could be organized into protection committees with relevant training and specific responsibilities to deal with infringements of security at camp sites.

8 Arrangements for the protection of women need to be strengthened, including through the designation of women to cater for special protection needs of women.

9 Internally displaced persons have the right to request and to receive protection from child recruitment and should not be persecuted or punished for making such a request.

Forced Displacement and the Right to Return

4
Every effort must be made to protect civilian populations from being arbitrarily displaced from their places of habitual residence.

5 Prior to any action that can cause inevitable displacement of persons, the authorities concerned should ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures must be taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects.

6 In the event of arbitrary or enforced displacement or emergency dislocation, all relevant authorities must ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided in satisfactory conditions of safety and security. Mechanisms must also be in place to ensure the provision of food, health facilities and sanitation to meet the immediate needs of populations forced into displacement. It must be ensured that members of the same family and community are not separated.

7 The right of return must be protected with respect to all internally displaced and areas of habitual residence must be made safe and secure for return. These areas must not be appropriated for other purposes such as the creation of special economic or high security zones (HSZs).

8 Return of the displaced to their habitual places of residence should not be jeopardized through the imposition of restrictions to familiar and traditional livelihoods. All such restrictions imposed to fishing, agriculture and trading must be withdrawn.

9 Arbitrary settlement of new communities or populations which affect existing demographics must be halted immediately.

10 Internally displaced persons must not be arbitrarily transferred from temporary camps to transit camps on the pretext of return or resettlement. They must be provided with accurate and adequate information to make an informed choice about when and in what circumstances they return. They should also be given the freedom to choose not to return at a given time or opt for relocation.

11 The government should take special measure to ensure that the property of the displaced is safe and secure from theft, looting and arbitrary damage.

12 The government should assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. When this is not possible, the government must provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation. The compensation should be adequate and commensurate with the loss incurred.

13 Internal displacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances and the displaced must be ensured informed choice to determine their return or continued residence in camps or with host communities.

14 The concept of resettlement of northern Muslims must be on the basis of community resettlement. Northern Muslims were expelled as a community hence return too should be collective. Since the term IDP does not extend the right to collective return it is vital that the northern Muslim evictees be categorized as ethnically cleansed persons (ECPs).

Freedom of movement

1 The right of every internally displaced person to freedom of movement and to choose his or her residence should be ensured. Internally displaced persons should also have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements.

1 The issuance of special ID cards for returnees should be stopped immediately as it identifies them as persons from a particular region/village which in turn leads to additional checks and harassment by the security forces who sometimes also impose restrictions upon their movement. This system should be stopped with immediate effect and returnees should be issued National ID cards like every other citizen.

Gender Issues

2 Effective mechanisms must be in place to ensure coordinated response to conflict imposed emergencies including enforced displacement.

3 Women must be consulted in all matters relating to displacement including, the location of camp sites, the provision of basic amenities, food, health services and security. They must be present in equal numbers on all camp committees. Government frontline workers should be given adequate training in gender related concerns and women administrative officers should be recruited in greater numbers.

4 Special attention should be paid to the health needs of women and adolescent girls, living in conflict affected areas and in camps for the displaced. This should include access to female health care providers and services, such as reproductive health care, as well as appropriate counseling for victims of sexual and other abuses.

1 Programmes should be designed for men and boys as well to ensure safe and responsible sexual behaviour.

1 The special nutritional needs of pregnant and lactating mothers, infants and children must be adequately met. Government rations must be adequate to meet the basic nutritional needs of conflict affected and displaced communities. These rations must be supplemented with other nutrients such as vegetables through a coordinated response of governmental and non governmental agencies.

2 Women living in the vicinity of militarized areas, military encampments, military transit points, in areas controlled by paramilitaries and other armed entities and women IDPs should be protected from enforced sex work.

3 Activities to prevent and manage the consequences of sexual violence and provide protection from and prevent sexually transmitted infections (STIs) must be in place in conflict affected areas and in humanitarian emergencies.

4 Attention must be paid to address and prevent the high levels of domestic and sexual violence, including incest and sexual harassment, prevalent in militarized and conflict affected environments. Preventative work must address the gendered effects of conflict on men and masculinities and its impact on women.

5 Women living in conflict affected areas and facing humanitarian emergencies must be provided with skills, training and access to income earning opportunities. Lack of economic opportunities place women and adolescent girls in extremely vulnerable situations. Economically dependent on others, women and girls suffer domestic violence, trade their bodies for needed cash and commodities and suffer a range of human rights violations.

6 The lack of livelihood options for women is highly prevalent in situations of internal displacement. Attention must be given to providing viable economic activities for women and adolescent girls so that they are not marginalized, economically isolated and vulnerable to abuse both within their families and in society.

7 Special attention should be paid to the gendered needs of single women headed households, widows, women with young children and women caring for the disabled. They must be offered shelter with sufficient protection and easy access to basic amenities so that they are not discriminated against or forced to bargain or barter sexual favours for basic needs.

8 The government should establish one stop crisis centres at least in the Base Hospitals in all the conflict affected districts and contiguous districts so that women affected by gender based violence can access medical attention, counseling and be referred to other support services in a safe and supportive environment. Such Centres can help reduce the impunity surrounding violence against women and play a preventative role as well as a curative role.

Livelihood Issues

1 The State should protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minority communities, peasants and cultivators, fisher-folk and traders with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands and communities. In the event of return, the state should take all measures to ensure support is provided to help them revive their original livelihoods.

1 Government should respect the traditional livelihood practices of villagers in the conflict affected areas including ‘border’ villagers and should minimize the military restrictions imposed on livelihood of villagers in every possible way.

2 Internally displaced persons must have the right to seek freely opportunities for employment and to participate in economic activities. IDPs should be allowed to find work opportunities outside the camp once they have ID cards to reduce total dependence for subsistence.

Security of Property

3 The property and possessions of internally displaced persons should in all circumstances be protected, in particular, against the following acts:

(a) Looting;
(b) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence;
(c) Being used to shield military operations or objectives;
(d) Being made the object of reprisal; and
(e) Being destroyed or appropriated as a form of collective punishment.

4 Property and possessions left behind by internally displaced persons should be protected against destruction and arbitrary and illegal appropriation, occupation or use.

Rights to Adequate Standard of Living, Health and Education

1 Attention must be paid to the educational needs of all displaced children. Evidence based research is necessary to determine the needs of these children including the tracking of attendance, school retention and the need to provide appropriate education for children suffering multiple displacement and war related trauma which impact on their continued education.

1 Since the majority of internally displaced have suffered multiple and repeated displacement and since displacement is a long term phenomenon, resulting in children having little access to formal or non-formal education, schools and comprehensive education have to be designed to meet the long term needs of the displaced.

2 Education and training facilities must be made available to internally displaced persons, in particular adolescents and women, whether or not living in camps, as soon as conditions permit

Access to Aid & Assistance

15 There should be no discrimination based on region, ethnicity, religion or gender in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced communities.

16 National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.

17 At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:

(a) Essential food and potable water;
(b) Basic shelter and housing;
(c) Appropriate clothing; and
(d) Essential medical services and sanitation.

1 Special efforts should be made to ensure the full and equal participation of women in the planning and distribution of these basic supplies.

18 Programmes should also reach internally displaced persons who live in non-camp situations with friends, family or in host communities

19 Internally displaced persons, with special needs, such as pregnant and lactating mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, should be entitled to assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their specific requirements.

20 The subsistence needs of IDPs must be adequately met with regular provision of basic food rations; the provision of food that is in good condition for consumption and the provision of supplementary food to meet the overall nutritional needs of the displaced

21 The shelter and living conditions of the internally displaced needs rapid improvement. Options include the use of environmentally sound material that is available locally, involving the displaced in decision making regarding their accommodation and the maintenance of shelters and the extension of overcrowded camps such as in Kiliveddy.

22 Government frontline workers such as Grama Sevakas should be made aware of the Guiding Principles on Displacement and the gendered dimension of displacement.

Dispensation of Aid and Safety of Humanitarian Workers

1 All persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transport and supplies should be respected and protected from attack or other acts of violence. Safety and security of all NGOs and human rights organization should be ensured and they should be allowed to work independently without intimidation.

1 Humanitarian agencies should be given unrestricted and rapid access to all camps and resettlement villages.

23 Donor agencies, the United Nations, human rights agencies and local and international non-governmental organisations have to work together to assess and meet the needs of internally displaced persons in accordance with the Guiding Principles on IDPs. These agencies should also work together to encourage the government to incorporate Guiding Principles into domestic law.

24 The capacity of locally based civil society organisations working among the internally displaced should be strengthened and their work should be integrated into coordinated work plans so that local expertise in made use of and duplication and the waste of resources minimized or avoided.

Efforts should be taken to strengthen the knowledge of humanitarian and protection work of local implementing partners and their capacity to undertake it.

___________________________

IK Gujral’s foreword to report

“This report on the state of displaced persons in the North and East of Sri Lanka analyses the security condition and concerns of those who live in makeshifts and camps in conflict affected areas. It provides an overview of the current ground situation, i.e. the altered displacement landscape, and the dynamics which shape the distribution of aid and resettlement. In doing so it highlights the manner in which resettlement, sometimes forced resettlement, is changing the ethnic composition of certain areas, and being used to establish the political dominance of certain parties/segments of the population.

The usefulness of this report lies in the fact that while it sets out the current living conditions of displaced persons (right to life, liberty, food, water etc.) it also provides an analysis of the causes of displacement within the framework of the human security vs militarisation debate.

During the fact-finding mission all attempts were made to address the concerns of Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities with regard to displacement and security issues.

I hope this report will function as a useful advocacy tool for those working to protect and promote human rights, in particular the rights of displaced persons.”

ABOUT SOUTH ASIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (SAHR)

South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR) is a democratic regional network with a large membership base of people committed to addressing human rights issues at both national and regional levels. SAHR seeks to contribute to the realization of South Asian peoples’ right to participatory democracy, good governance and justice by strengthening regional response, including regional instruments, monitoring human rights violations, reviewing laws, policies and practices that have an adverse impact on human rights, and conducting campaigns and programmes on issues of major concern in the region.

SAHR comprises both institutional and individual members. An elected bureau works as the organisation’s executive body while a membership committee oversees enrolment of members. The SAHR Chairperson and Co-chairperson are Mr. I.K Gujral, former Prime Minister of India, and Dr. Hameeda Hossain of Bangladesh, respectively. The secretariat is in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Chapter offices are located in Colombo, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Lahore and New Delhi.

The bureau consists of the following members:

India: I.K Gujral, Kamla Bhasin, Aruna Roy, Maja Dharuwala

Nepal: Dr. Devendra Pandey, Vijay Singh, Mohammadi Siddiqui

Pakistan: I.A. Rahman, Sairah Irshad Khan, Salima Hashmi, Salman Raja

Bangladesh: Dr. Hameeda Hossain, Sara Zaker, Shaheen Anam

Sri Lanka: Sithie Tiruchelvam, J.C. Weliamuna, K.S. Ratnavale, Shreen Saroor

Afghanistan: Abdul Rahman Hotaki

For further information please contact:

Shiranthi Jayatilleke,
Executive Director
SAHR Secretariat
345/18 Kuruppu Road (17/7 Kuruppu Lane)
Colombo 08.
Ph: 00-94-11-5549183
Ph/Fax: 00-94-11-2695910
Email: sahr@sltnet.lk
Website: www.southasianrights.org

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Paradise Gained and Lost: The Indo-Lanka Accord and Tamils

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

“Nallathor Veenai Seithe – athai
Nalangkedap Puluthiyil Erivathundo?”

[ Is a good Veena (musical instrument) made and thrown into the dust to decay? ]-Subramaniya Bharathiyar

Twenty years have passed since the signing of the Indo – Lanka accord by Rajiv Gandhi and Junius Richard Jayewardena on July 29th 1987. It was hailed as a great breakthrough when it was signed. Much was expected of it then. Today it remains “valid” only on paper and seems destined for the dustbin of history unless New Delhi makes a determined effort to re-activate and enforce it vigorously.

When the accord was signed and Indian soldiers arrived in the Island as “peacekeepers” the predominantly Sinhala “South” protested vehemently. But the Tamils of the North – East welcomed the “jawans” whole- heartedly. Within months the situation reversed when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) took on the Indian army.

In the words of Jayewardena “the referee was now fighting in the ring”. The image of the IPKF underwent a change from that of “Indian Peace Keeping Force” to “Innocent People Killing Force”. When the Indian army left Lankan shores in 1990 there were few to mourn its departure.

Much water has flown between both shores of the palk straits during the past two decades. New Delhi’s policy towards Colombo has changed. While its commitment to Sri Lanka’s unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty remains steadfast there is discernible change towards the Tamils. No longer is the envisaged solution to be “acceptable to the Tamils”. Nowadays it has to be “acceptable to all sections of the people”.

Striking Contrast

A striking contrast between an event that happened twenty years ago and recent developments nearly two decades later, provide penetrating insight into this changed state of affairs.

On June 4th 1987 the Indian Air Force conducted “operation Poomalai” by which food parcels were dropped over Jaffna in what was described as a humanitarian exercise. This was in the aftermath of “Operation Liberation” in Vadamaratchy and India was concerned then about starvation in Jaffna.

Actually no one was starving in Jaffna then. The whole exercise, beneath the humanitarian facade, was a power projection, intended to drive home a lesson to Colombo.

[J.R. Jayewardena]

To his credit Jayewardena realised what was in store if he failed to toe the line. So he ‘bowed” to the big neighbour. The immediate consequence was the accord. Yet, later events proved that JR had only “stooped to conquer”.

Last year in August the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) shut down the entry – exit point along the A – 9 Highway in Muhamaalai. This resulted in a de – facto “economic embargo” on Jaffna. A massive shortage occurred in Jaffna of food, medicine and essential items. Non – Governmental organizations described the situation as being “famine – like “.

Against this backdrop the head of the “Thamizh Thesiya Iyakkam ” (Tamil National Movement) in Tamil Nadu – Palaniyappan Nedumaran – got his act together. He collected at short notice dry rations and medicine valued at one crore Indian rupees.

[P. Nedumaran]

When attempts were made to send the stuff through the Red Cross to Northern Sri Lanka the Indian authorities clamped down. Permission was refused. Nedumaran has engaged in many protests and representations have been made by several politicians to the Indian Government but New Delhi remains unrelenting.

Twin Phenomena

These twin phenomena to my mind illustrate vividly the altered perceptions of New Delhi towards Jaffna in particular and Sri Lanka in general.

In 1987, reality in Jaffna was distorted to convey an impression that there was starvation warranting the drastic action of violating Lankan air space. So food parcels were dropped in what was essentially a “demonstration”.

In 2006 , when an acute food shortage prevailed in Jaffna, attempts to send food by concerned Indian Tamils is prevented and restricted. Food is dropped when there was no real need then. Now, when there was a real need, the shipping of food is prohibited.

Call it what you will – hypocrisy, double standards, political expediency, enlightened self – interest , political maturity , transformed inter – state relations or changed perceptions about the Sri Lankan Tamil issue , this “contra – distinction” between then and now , is harshly clear proof of prevailing reality.

What is sad about this state of affairs is the fact that the primary motivating factor in New Delhi’s benign intervention in Sri Lanka during the eighties in Sri Lanka, was to ensure a just and fair deal for Tamils in a united Sri Lanka.

Generally Countries act in their own self – interest but often attribute lofty motives for such actions. In the case of India vis a vis Sri Lanka there were three factors.

Confluence of Factors

Firstly the Jayewardena Govt was spurning “non – alignment” and taking Sri Lanka into a pro – Western orbit. Under prevailing conditions of the day New Delhi feared a Washington – Tel Aviv – Islamabad axis. India needed to bring Sri Lanka to “heel” and keep out undesirable elements out of the region.

Secondly there was the domestic imperative. There was much concern in Tamil Nadu for the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu was once home to a flourishing separatist movement. India was concerned about the fall – out from Sri Lanka on Tamil Nadu if the conflict escalated here.

Thirdly there was the unacknowledged personality factor. Indira Gandhi was personally hostile to Jayewardena and Premadasa. At the same time she had a soft corner for the TULF politicians who remained loyal to her when in the opposition. The UNP on the other hand made fun of her defeat and cosied up to bete noir Morarji Desai.

[Indira Gandhi]

This confluence of factors deemed it necessary that India make a “benign” intervention in Sri Lanka

1)to help resolve the ethnic conflict within a united Sri Lanka but in a manner acceptable to Tamils,

2) make Colombo accept New Delhi’s hegemony over the region and appreciate Indian security concerns and teach the Jayewardena regime a lesson while rewarding the TULF.

It was at this point that the July 1983 pogrom occurred. Thousands of Tamils fled as refugees to India. Indian interests in Sri Lanka were harmed. This provided a “locus standi” for India to intervene in Sri Lanka.

[A.Amirthalingam]

Jayewardena then played into India’s hands by bringing in the 6th amendment disavowing separatism. This effectively disenfranchised the Tamil representatives in Parliament. JR also refused to talk directly to the TULF. This created an opportunity for India to step in and offer its “good offices” to bring about ethnic reconciliation.

So Gopalaswamy Parthasarathy became India’s official emissary tasked with evolving political rapprochement. But India followed a two – track policy. Tamil militant groups were trained and armed and housed on Indian soil. They were allowed to run political cum propaganda offices in Tamil Nadu publicly.

Indias Objectives

India’s objectives were clear. New Delhi wanted to use the Tamil militants as a cutting edge to de – stabilise the Jayewardena regime and also exert pressure on Colombo to deliver a political settlement. Once a viable solution was arrived the Tamil armed struggle was expected to end.

But the Tamils were not to be abandoned. India would underwrite a political solution and maintain a physical armed presence in North – East Sri Lanka to protect the Tamils and help implement the political solution.

Primarily, India was acting in its own interest. There was no “identity” of interests between India and the Tamils but there was certainly a “convergence” of interests between both. But this congruence had its limits.

Using the armed struggle for separatism as a pressuring device or bargaining tool was acceptable. But prolonging the struggle for a separate state in defiance of New Delhi was unacceptable. India was all for autonomy within a united SRi Lanka but opposed to a separate state.

Pragmatic Option

Pragmatically, the best option was for the Sri Lankan Tamils to hitch their “vandil” to the Indian star and accept the settlement provided through Indian efforts. The Tamils had a large support base in Tamil Nadu.

If the Tamils were politically astute they could have accepted the accord as a starting point and then gradually enhanced devolution to the point of quasi – federalism. In this exercise, India would have been on the side of the Tamils.

In practice , North – East Sri Lanka would have enjoyed a “special” status. The N – E would be part of a “de – Jure” Sri Lanka but virtually a “de – facto” extension of India. Let us remember that Indian “media” and “officials” were simply clambering aboard Indian air force planes and travelling to and from Palaly and Trincomalee then.

A delicate tight – rope walking act was required of Sri Lankan Tamil leaders. If they maintained correct relations with New Delhi and Colombo they could have elicited the best of both worlds for their people. If Sinhala hard- liners ruled the roost in Colombo and adopted a confrontation course with India, a Turkish – Cyprus type of de – facto partition may have ensued.

But these things did not happen. One reason was the shrewdness of Jayewardena who gave no cause for India to turn against him. Given the opposition in the South New Delhi was constrained to bail him out.

On the other hand there was the colossal political stupidity and self – centered arrogance of the LTTE. Not only did it target the Sri Lankan armed forces but also took on the Indian soldiers. New Delhi had no choice other than to fight the tigers. The IPKF – LTTE war altered the flow of events. War has a cruel logic and powerful momentum that changes things utterly.

Subsequent events may have transformed the situation drastically and alienated a large segment of the Tamils from India.Nevertheless the original intention of India to help evolve a political settlement within a united Sri Lanka is not to be faulted.

Distinct Nation

Even if New Delhi and Colombo dispute it there is no denying that the Sri Lankan Tamils are a distinct nation. But it is a tiny nation within another state that is also small. Also the Tamils have never had the North – East recognized as a distinct entity with an administrative apparatus. The accord provided it.

A tiny nation like the Sri Lankan Tamils cannot afford to fight the Sri Lankan state or the Indian state. The saner and prudent course would have been to align with India and accept what was given. Thereafter a process of political evolution could have extended Tamil political horizons.

Moreover Tamils cannot forget the depths of despair they had descended into after the July 1983 pogrom. A thoroughly de – moralised and dejected people revived themselves only after India stepped in. The Tamils felt they were not “orphans” only because of India. The hospitality shown by Tamil Nadu must always be remembered with gratitude.

It cannot be forgotten that till war erupted between the LTTE and IPKF, the Tamils on the whole appreciated Indian efforts in peacemaking and peacekeeping.

[Smiling Tamil Tot - Pic: HumanityAshore]

Changing Perceptions

I recall writing an article in the “Sunday Island ” twenty years ago headlined “Why Tamil Eyes Are Smiling” when the accord was signed.

That article went down well with the Tamil public because it basically reflected the prevailing Tamil mood. The Tamil sentiment was overwhelmingly for Indian intervention to ensure their rights in a united Lanka.

Weeks later in October war broke out. I was in Jaffna at that time and saw firsthand what was happening. It was my articles and news stories in the “Sunday Island” of Oct 25th 1987 that exposed the truth about “Indian military exploits” in Jaffna.

I was arrested on Oct 26th and held at the fourth floor for days. Later I was produced in courts and released on bail with a travel ban imposed. I had to report frequently to courts till I was cleared of all charges.

[Palmyrah tree lined A9 Road, in Navatkuli - Photo: HumanityAshore]

Months later I wrote an article in “Sunday Island” with the headline “Can the Pawan break the Palmyrah?”. The inference was to the IPKF operation codenamed “Pawan” or strong wind. I compared the Tamils to the Palmyrah tree which sways dangerously and may break in a storm but will never, ever bend like the reed to survive a storm.

Once again that article struck a responsive chord in the hurt Tamil psyche and I received innumerable letters. There were however some who disagreed. I remember , Rajini Thiranagama nee Rajasingham, my old schoolmate at Jaffna College arguing with me saying the “Palmyrah tree is broken”.

[IPKF Troops during the final withdrawal from the Island-Pic:bharat-rakshak]

These thoughts are recollected here only to portray how Sri Lankan Tamil perceptions changed about Indian intervention due to the IPKF – LTTE conflict. It cannot be denied that the tigers provoked the Indian army into responding the way it did.

While tiger supporters boast about “defeating the wiorld’s fourth largest army” Indian commentators try to set the record straight by emphasising “we foughr with one hand tied behind our back”.

[Rajiv Gandhi]

The end result however is that the Sri Lankan Tamils lost out and lost out badly in the end. Their plight has worsened after the LTTE’s colossal blunder of assassinating Rajiv Gandhi on Tamil Nadu soil.

Political Gains

People affected directly or indirectly by the Indian army find it difficult to forgive and forget. This is understandable to some extent.

But this rancour and ill – will should not cloud the fact that Indian intervention in Sri Lanka did succeed in providing what was perhaps the best ever tangible political settlement.

Emotional responses to the IPKF episode must not affect judgement about the political paradise gained (and now lost ) by the Tamils through India.

The greatest quantum achieved politically by the Sri Lankan Tamils in redressing valid grievances, accommodating legitimate aspirations and restoring negated rights was through the Indo – Lanka accord.

Aborted agreements like the Banda – Chelva or Dudley – Chelva pacts did not succeed. Constitution of 1972 and 1978 failed to deliver.

The District Development Councils of 1981 failed to get off the ground. Besides they were exercises in de – centralisation confined to districts.

The Indo – Lanka accord provided feasible devolution within constraints of the prevailing situation. It was a pragmatic effort to extend the federal idea as was practically possible.

Accord Provisions

The Indo – Lanka accord acknowledged for the first time that “Sri Lanka is a multi ethnic and multi – lingual plural society consisting inter – alia of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers”.

It recognised that “each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured”.

The accord also recognized that “the Northern and Eastern provinces have been areas of historical habitation of the Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived in this territory with other ethnic groups”.

It also emphasised “the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi – ethnic, multi – lingual and multi – religious plural society in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations”.

Among other things the accord provided for the establishment of Provincial Councils. The Province was to be unit of devolution. The North and East were temporarily merged as a single Tamil majority province with a single Provincial Council, chief minister,Governor and board of ministers.

A referendum was to be held in the Eastern province to determine whether the provinces should remain merged or be de- merged.

Sinhala, Tamil and English were to be official languages of Sri Lanka. The sixteenth amendment to the Constitution enshrined Tamil as an official language on par with Sinhala. The injustice of 1956 was remedied. Likewise the 13th amendment paved the way for Provincial Councils to be established.

Thus the accord accomplished and laid the groundwork for many praise worthy feats. It achieved a compromise between the concepts of Sinhala – dominated mono state and the Tamil separate state.

Sri Lanka was not the exclusive preserve of any ethnic, linguistic or religious group. . It was a multi – ethnic, multi – lingual, multi – religious country with a plural society.

The North – East was not recognized as the “traditional Tamil homeland” but as an area of historic habitation of the Tamil speaking people (Tamils and Muslims). This however was not an exclusive right.

It was acknowledged that the “Tamil – speakers” had lived in this territory at all times with other ethnic groups.

The temporary merger was a great boon as far as the Tamils were concerned. The referendum provided an opportunity to make or break the merger .

It was entirely possible that the merger could become permanent if an overwhelming number of Eastern Tamils and a sizable number of Muslims voted in favour.

Tamil as an official language was excellent in principle. Practically it involved a set of procedures to be evolved and the necessary facilities being set up.

India was keen on helping out in language implementation just as it was enthusiastic about constructing a coastal highway linking North and East.

Irrational Opposition

Given the irrational opposition mounted by the SLFP and JVP it was feared that any Constitutional amendment requiring an Island – wide referendum would not be ratified.

Thus the powers and composition of the envisaged Provincial Councils through the 13th amendment were somewhat restricted. The Supreme Court allowed it without a referendum because of this.

Even then the nine Judge bench was divided five to four. Interestingly three of the Judges voting in favour were from the Tamil, Muslim and Burgher ethnicities. All four opposing were Sinhala.

New Delhi however extracted a promise in writing from JR that he would devolve more powers to the PC’s within a specific time frame.But events took a different turn.

The Indo – Lanka accord was not perfect. It did not rectify all problems concerning Tamils. But it provided a good and great beginning.

The power equation of that time saw the Sri Lankan Tamils enjoying “favourite” status in New Delhi. This was of great advantage. With Indian support the Tamils could have resolved much of the problems within a united Sri Lanka where the North – East would have been an autonomous region.

Armed Confrontation

A tiny nation like the Sri Lankan Tamils could gain politically by modifying their aspirations within parameters set by India. These parameters themselves could have been extended to the advantage of Tamils over the years.

A pragmatic approach by the Tamils required greater co-operation with both New Delhi and Colombo. Extra -ordinary statemanship consisting of intricate balancing acts was necessary.

But the LTTE chose to confront India instead of compromising and co-operating. The armed confrontation saw the Tamils being perceived as enemies of India and vice – versa.

[Thileepan began a fast-unto-death on 15 August 1987]

Tragically, for the Tamils, their so – called leaders “blew it” to use an expression by Hardeep Singh Puri, former Indian political secretary in Colombo.

Once the LTTE went back on its pledge to Rajiv Gandhi , the first cracks began to appear. The LTTE began mobilising Tamil opinion against the accord and India.

This exercise was duplicated to some extent among the Sinhala people by the SLFP and JVP. Then came the Kumarappa – Pulenthiran episode.

Lalith Athulathmudali knew the LTTE mindset and manipulated it accordingly. The tigers took on the Indians.

[Lalith Athulathmudali]

The accord made it conditional that the Tamil militants would be disarmed.Earlier Indian High Commissioner had announced that the LTTE had surrendered 85% of its heavy weapons and 65% of small arms.

But now the LTTE was fighting the Indian army itself. Against this backdrop Colombo began backtracking on its commitments. India found itself caught in the middle.

N-E Provincial Council

If meaningful devolution was to be made a reality to the North – East and the temporary merger validated the Provincial Council had to be set up. New Delhi was further let down by the unwillingness of the TULF to contest PC elections.

Thus India was compelled to make a painful decision comprising two blunders. One was to under- estimate the LTTE. The other was to over – estimate the EPRLF.

The N – E provincial council was a farce. There was no contest in the north and a combined EPRLF – ENDLF list was returned.

In the East there was an appearance of elections. Ethnic rivalry was stimulated and exploited.

The EPRLF – ENDLF list catered to Tamils while the Muslim Congress and UNP catered to Muslim and Sinhala voters respectively. Apart from electoral malpractices voter mobilisation was on ethnic lines.

The EPRLF complicated matters further when its immensely popular secretary – General Padmanabha refused to assume office. He wanted his deputy Suresh Premachandran to take over.

[J.N. Dixit]

But Annamalai Varatharajapperumal curried favour with Dixit and got himself appointed as chief minister. Varathan was a Jaffna resident but his father was an Indian Tamil. He exploited this “card” with India.

Initially, Dayan Jayatilleke was also a N- E provincial minister representing the Sinhalese. But he resigned soon afterwards.

His replacement was Joe Seneivaratne who was in reality George of Malayalee origin.

The Muslim minister Abu Yusoof was also of Indian Muslim extraction.

Thus three of the four Provincial ministers including the CM were of Indian lineage.

This was a colossal blunder as both Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils became suspicious and hostile.

Then came the march of folly by the EPRLF and LTTE.

The EPRLF administration of Varatharajapperumal began to confront and estrange itself from the Central Government in Colombo.

Like the mythical serpent around Lord Shiva’s neck taunting the “Karudan” (kite) Perumal irritated Premadasa. Instead of establishing rapport with Premadasa he alienated Colombo.

Meanwhile the LTTE began targeting the provincial administration and council. Through a violent campaign the tigers made sure that the PC would not work.

Thus the North – Eastern council found itself unable to deliver with Colombo stifling it on the one hand and the LTTE undermining it on the other.

The violence unleashed by EPRLF elements against civilians suspected of supporting the LTTE and its conscription estranged Perumal’s administration from the Tamil people.

Perumal’s puppet regime was fast becoming a dud. Now the unexpected happened.

Defunct N-E Council

In what was perhaps the first major instance of the LTTE betraying the Tamil cause for its parochial interests, the tigers struck a deal with Premadasa. The Colombo Govt called for the IPKF’s withdrawal.

[R. Premadasa]

The LTTE then encouraged Premadasa to dissolve the N – E council while massacring the civilian volunteer force raised as the “Tamil National Army” by the N- E administration.

Varatharajapperumal played into Premadasa’s hands by his foolish proclamation of declaring intent to establish Tamil Eelam. As the council was dissolved Perumal fled the Country. He remains now in India as a highly protected person.

Within three months of the Indian army leaving Sri Lanka war broke out between the GOSL forces and LTTE.

The LTTE demonstrated that it was capable of destroying the North – Eastern provincial council for its own selfish interest and power.

Its latest betrayal was the enforced boycott of the Presidential elections after striking a sordid bargain with Rajapakse.

Thus the “Sinhala dominated” Government of Ranasinghe Premadasa negated the single – biggest gain of the Indo – Lanka accord. That the LTTE contributed wittingly and the EPRLF unwittingly to the dismantling of the North – Eastern provincial council is a severe indictment of Sri Lankan Tamil political integrity and sagacity.

The N- E provincial council became defunct and remained so for many years. Ironically the PC’s functioned in the other seven provinces.

The SLFP and JVP who opposed and boycotted these councils changed their minds and contested them. There are SLFP chief ministers, ministers and councillors. There are JVP councillors too.

But there is no PC in the N – E. where provincial councils were deemed necessary to share power with Tamils.

Despite the council being defunct , the unified North – East administration remained functional for years.

The Eastern referendum was postponed from time to time by Presidential decree.

There were some Tamils who thought that revival of the N- E , PC would be an effective fall – back position if and when other efforts to reach a political a settlement failed.

Administrative De-Merger

But such hopes are turning into dupes now. The Supreme Court ruled that the merger itself was not done legally. It did not rule out such a merger being validated through appropriate procedures.

But the Rajapakse regime seized on that ruling and is hell bent on altering the prevailing status quo.

Both provinces are now de – linked administratively. The North and East function separately. The GOSL is also aiming to transform the demographic pattern of the Eastern province.

It is likely that elections to an Eastern provincial council would be held soon. The de – merger could be made legally permanent through an engineered referendum.

If that happens the single biggest gain to the Tamils through the Indo – Lanka accord could be lost forever.

But realistically the merger at best was tenuous. Yet a determined effort may have brought it about democratically at a referendum if Tamil – Muslim co-operation was there

The LTTE lost the East politically when it alienated the Muslims.

It lost the East militarily when it failed to contain the eastern revolt led by “Col” Karuna.

What the Rajapakse regime is doing now is merely delivering the “coup de grace” to existential reality.

Gains Threatened

Apart from the unified North – Eastern province, other benefits derived from the Indo – Lanka accord are also under threat.

The Rajapakse regime is for a unitary state and for districts. villages as units of devolution. This is a reversal of the basic pluralistic elements of the accord.

Also in practice , the notion of Sri Lanka being “multi” ethnic, religious and lingual is under severe challenge. Inspired by the supremacist ideology of the Hela Urumaya the Rajapakse regime wishes to ensure “Sinhala”, “Buddhism” and the “Sinhalese” as the dominant entities of Sri Lanka.

The concept of the North – East being areas of historical habitation by the Tamil speaking people is also under threat. Recent official activity concerning the East was in Sinhala alone despite 75% of the province being Tamil speaking. Schemes are underway to alter the demographic structure through colonisation.

Tamil as an official language remains simply as a paper guarantee. Successive regimes have not shown any interest in implementing Tamil as an official language. The Rajapakse regime has pruned drastically the funds allocated in this respect.

Thus we see that all gains of the Indo – Lanka accord are being reduced , removed and reversed even irredeemably.

India was the guarantor of the accord. Once India was edged out physically and politically the accord was doomed.

The desire of Sinhala dominated governments to sabotage an accord thrust upon Colombo is understandable. What cannot be forgiven is the LTTE’s conduct in helping Sinhala regimes to do so.

The Indo – Lanka accord is becoming increasingly irrelevant both in letter and spirit. The constructive gains are becoming irredeemably lost.

New Delhi Policy

There seems no chance of salvaging any of these uless New Delhi re – activates its interest again. Given current realities such a change seems highly unlikely.

The LTTE conflict and resultant estrangement with the Sri Lankan Tamils has shown India that the Tamils cannot be taken for granted as a perpetual ally. The genuine sympathy and natural empathy for Sri Lankan Tamils that existed within the Indian power structures earlier has eroded greatly.

The Tamil Nadu factor is no more a compulsion. LTTE’s acts of violence and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination has changed Tamil Nadu perceptions. The chief Political party’s like the DMK, ADMK or Congress are not vying with each other to help the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. The Lankan Tamil issue is now an embarassment.

There is a new dispensation in New Delhi. Sonia Gandhi is the power behind the throne of Manmohan Singh. Even if there is some concern about Sri Lankan Tamils nothing concrete is likely to be done because of the LTTE.

As long as the LTTE under Prabakharan’s leadership remains in a position of self – imposed leadership there is very little that India would or can do. This is true of the International community too. The LTTE depicted as the Tamil nation’s military asset by tiger supporters is being perceived as a political liability of the community by India and other countries.

More importantly relations between Colombo and New Delhi are much improved. After developments like the Free trade agreement the Sri Lankan economy is becoming more integrated with India. Indian investment is on the rise in Sri Lanka. India would not want to jeopardise this situation by leaning too much towards the Tamils represented by the LTTE.

There is also greater awareness of Sinhala and Muslim sensibilities and sensitivity. It is understood that matters cannot be resolved through a Tamil perspective alone. While India would like a political settlement recognizing Tamil rights it realises that such a settlement requires widespread multi – ethnic acceptance.

Hence the current emphasis on settlements acceptable to all sections of the people.

There is also concern about Countries like China and Pakistan gaining more clout with Sri Lanka. India would not like a situation like that of Myanmar where China got closer to the military junta while New Delhi irritated Burmese rulers by stressing on restoration of democracy.

Thus we see people like national security adviser K. Narayanan “warning” Colombo about modes of purchasing arms. India promises to supply all needs. Overtly New Delhi says it will not supply “offensive” arms but only will provide “defensive” equipment.

But there is a very, thin line dividing offensive and defensive. What seems likely is covert help and assistance to Sri Lanka. Already there is transfer of intelligence and naval co-operation. These are in accordance with the Indo – Lanka accord. New Delhi is also concerned about the LTTE’s air capability.

Presently,India will not touch the LTTE with a barge – pole. It is wary of helping the Tamils because it fears that would indirectly strengthen the tigers. As long as the tigers remain the dominant entity among Tamils, New Delhi will tread carefully and slowly.

This attitude towards the LTTE also deprives India of an indirect “cutting edge” vis a vis Sri Lanka. In the eighties New Delhi utilised Tamil militancy to pressure Colombo. Now it does not have such an option. Besides New Delhi is not likely to pursue such a “schizoid” policy again.

Limited Options

Against this backdrop India’s policy options are limited. In a nutshell Indian policy towards Sri Lanka seems to be this.

Eonomic, cultural and social cooperation is encouraged. Indian investment and sales are enhanced. Tourism increases. Cultural links are enlarged. Indian economic clout increases and Sri Lanka becomes economically inteegrated with the giant neighbour.

Militarilt India shares concerns about the LTTE. So intelligence is shared and naval co-operation is co-ordinated. Defensive equipment is supplied overtly. Training is given openly.Covert military assistance is likely to be provided.

India is not “requesting” Colombo to call the war against the LTTE. All that it stresses is that civilians should not be victimised. But New Delhi has remained quiet throughout the recent Eastern upheavals where Tamil civilians were penalised.India was also silent when Tamils were expelled from Colombo recently.

Politically India wants Colombo to continue a parallel political process. It wants the All Party Representative Committee to come up with an acceptable solution. India has been engaged in “gentle persuasion” on that count.

In this situation a pro – Tamil swing like what happened in 1987 seems improbable unless a few things happen. One is rising xenophobic tendencies in the “Sinhala” south and violent hostility towards Indian “expansionism”. Two a genocidal pogrom being unleashed against the Tamils. Three a total demolition of the LTTE and unrestricted ascendancy of Sinhala hegemonic chauvinism. Four the prospect of Colombo aligning itself completely with powers deemed hostile to India and possible intrusion into Sri Lanka.

If these things happen there could be a shift in Indian policy. There is also the unlikely chance of the LTTE defeating the Sri Lankan security forces and declaring Tamil Eelam unilaterally. Then India would intervene decisively but on the side of Colombo.

So India would for the moment remain a concerned and well – informed spectator of events in Sri Lanka. The de- construction of accord related achievements will certainly cause concern but not too much worry. Besides I think New Delhi had revised its stance on the North – East merger much earlier.

. India will be pro – merger only if the Muslims also want it. Now after the Karuna revolt even Eastern Tamils are divided on the issue. The military re- conquest of the East adds a further dimension.Therefore I see no reason for India to “intervene” on behalf of Northern Tamils and re- impose the merger. But chauvinist attempts to colonise the east and alter demography will cause concern.

Salvaging Accord

Tamil voices mainly from the North and abroad are loudly urging India to intervene and prevent the undoing of gains accrued to Tamils through the accord. Now it is grudgingly accepted that the accord did benefit the Tamils. Earlier there was no overt recognition of this fact or gratitude expressed to India. The Tamils apart from a few notable exceptions did not deviate openly from the LTTE line vis a vis India.

The Tamils clamouring for India to salvage the accord have forgotten a salient fact. Once the LTTE dishonoured its commitment , refused to disarm and fought the Indian army, New Delhi’s obligation to Colombo also failed.

The Sri Lankan government is well within its rights to insist that the LTTE be disarmed as a pre – requisite to implementing Tamil friendly provisions of the accord. There are two sides to the accord “coin”.

Those who demand that India should prevent the dismemberment of gains made through the accord must also demand that the LTTE abide by provisions of the accord first. If the latter demand is impossible then the former too is not possible.

The accord despite its positive attributes seems destined for oblivion. Paradise gained is now becoming paradise lost.

[Statue of Mahakavi Bharathiyar, in Nallur, Jaffna: Photo by Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]

As the Thamizh bard Subramaniya Bharathi sang “a well – fashioned musical instrument thrown in the dust is decaying!”

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

Related: Remembering Rajiv on Fifteenth Death Anniversary – by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

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Can We Have Informed, Non – Emotional Discourse About Critical Issues?

By Bradman Weerakoon

The subject Ranjit Wijewardene prescribed for me was The Press and Politics and I am thankful to him for his instruction that I could use as broad a brush as I wished, roam as broadly within the prescribed subject as I cared or even to tread (warily) outside it.

Bearing in mind the nature of the occasion, the distinguished audience- and the time – I propose to limit myself to some general reflections on three points;

Firstly the interesting and perhaps well-known nexus between the Press (ie the Owners/ Proprietors and decision makers) and what is broadly described as Politics – ie the people who practice the art of managing political power in Sri Lanka. As I survey the scene over the many years that I have been privileged to have a ring – side seat mainly from the Prime Ministers Office, I have seen the shift of emphasis between these two powerhouses – the Press and Politics – for not for nothing has the Press been aptly termed the Fourth Estate. Very broadly the shift is one, in which from an earlier time, the Press influenced the nature and structure of Politics, to one in which Politics or the Political Order influences the nature and structure of the Press.

Secondly to make some personal observations on the manner in which the Press handles and presents the major, critical political questions of the day and the profound consequences that has had on our social and political development.

Thirdly reflect on the principal challenges that the Sri Lanka Press faces today and particularly the challenge the Press faces from the State – the pre-eminent political force today

As we celebrate the life of Don Richard Wijewardene through this memorable annual event – the presentation of the Award for the best Sinhala novel in manuscript form for the past year (2006) – permit me the personal observation that this symbolizes the fulfillment of a particular dilemma of the Wijewardene era.

DR Wijewardene, like many other Ceylonese leaders of his time, perhaps with the exception of DB Jayatilleke who could write with great felicity in Sinhala, were schooled and more at home, in the language and culture of the West – the colonizer – than in the native idiom. Of course they knew their Sinhala but like the other leaders of Asia at the time – and Jawarhalal Nehru of India has indeed said so, were more steeped in the ways of the West than of their own country. In fact Nehru would bemoan the fact that he felt like someone between two worlds, in neither of which he was completely at home. That gap and omission – reluctantly shared by many of his Ceylonese contemporaries – is I think being comprehensively made up today through this celebration which highlights the value and relevance of Sinhala writing and the encouragement which Lakehouse, its newspapers and subsidiaries give to the national languages and culture.

While always being conscious of the Sinhala and Buddhist traditions in which he was grounded, and committed to a future in which his country was to be henceforth free from foreign rule, DR Wijewardene gave to his journalistic enterprise a bedrock of values that sustained his journalism throughout his life. This cluster of values emphasized secularism over sectarianism, a search for a Ceylonese – later Sri Lankan – identity over an exclusive majority community identity and such ideals as – equality, inclusivity, pluralism, an appreciation of dissent and in short liberal democracy. DR Wijewardene and his kind believed that these were political values that were important in the forging of a new nation comprised of different ethnicities, regional variations, religions and languages.

There is no doubt that these objectives were inspired by his early upbringing and experiences as Iranganie Meedeniya Serasinghe so eloquently reminded us;

- as his biographer says he was the son of a wealthy family, educated at a leading Christian school – S Thomas College – and a contemporary of DS Senanayake and Francis Molamure

- he went to England for his further education at Corpus Christi, Cambridge, where he is inspired by GK Gokale and the reform movement for Indian independence

- he comes back to the Ceylon Bar and collaborates in the formation of the Ceylon National Association of which he was elected Secretary and later the Ceylon Reform League where he cuts his political teeth as Joint Secretary.

So we find the founder of the preeminent newspaper in the country very much into politics and with the ability through his newspapers to forcefully project his views on a wider canvass and mightily influence public opinion.

The newspapers that DR Wijewardene inaugurated reflect this intimate nexus between the Press and Politics. The Daily News which he began in 1918 for example had some clear objectives;

it was to be a newspaper with a soul and a achievable objective – political independence

it was to display strong convictions and opinions but was always willing to provide a fair show to the opinions and convictions of others

what was said through the paper appealed to thoughtful men and women anxious for the country’s welfare and advancement irrespective of race and creed.

HAJ Hulugalle, who was later one in the line of great Daily News editors and Wijewardene’s biographer, emphasizes the critical role that the Press and the great men that run them played at the time;

“Before he was fifty DR Wijewardene had established several flourishing newspapers, built up a great business and influenced the course of the island’s history”.

Hulugalle has gone as far as to say that DR Wijewardene’s enduring monument will be not his newspapers but the contribution he made to the building of his nation. DS Senanayake paid him the tribute of calling him “one of the foremost architects of the country’s freedom.”

While the legacy of Wijewardene was being acted upon, and his multi cultural, multi ethnic, multi religious framework of values acting as the springboard for reportage and editorializing in the papers of the ANCL, other emerging forces liberated by the end of colonialism were making themselves felt even from the first decade of the life of the new state. .

1956, the social revolution that SWRD Bandaranaike expertly put together and led, the pancha maha balavegayaya – the collective force of the Sangha, guru, veda, govi, kamkaru was to prove irresistible. The Sinhala press particularly played a tremendous role in mobilizing the emerging impulses of ordinary people for a share in the pie, and for power in the evolution of the nation in an alternative trajectory of growth. Those few in this audience of my age might recall the formidable effect that the cartoon of the mara yuddhaya in the political pamphlets and posters that plastered the walls of our cities and towns, did have. Howard Wriggins – political scientist and later the Ambassador for the US in our country called it one of the most powerful and compelling political illustrations of all time. It captured in a memorable way all of those so called anti – national elements that stood in the way of the progress of a nation struggling, as its advocates perceived it, to be born. Prominent in this composite image of the so called anti – national forces were the Catholic Church and the Tamil trader in addition of course to the usual suspects – the capitalist, the American dollar, and the debauched western way of life. This and the promise of a quick and easy entry into a golden age proved most attractive to the impatient masses. In the fevered atmosphere of a landslide victory for SWRD Bandaranaike, Sinhala – only legislation, nationalization and the restoration of the religion and culture of the majority became aspirations which were unstoppable. Many observers of the local scene aver that the battle lines drawn between political parties and the supporting Press groups then continue with perhaps added hostility and force today.

The emergence of an alternative independent Press to rival the established Lakehouse Group was no doubt a natural expression of the broadly different constituencies represented by the two mainline political parties of then and now – the UNP and the SLFP. From then on there was to be a contest in the print media for advocacy of differing causes and the influencing of the choices of the hearts and minds of the public. The competition was finally overtaken by the virtual nationalization of the print media. As we all know a major part of the print media and later the most powerful parts of the electronic, became thereafter hostage to the dictates of the all powerful State. While there were protestations that the Press Take Over was in the interests of greater freedom and ostensibly to free the monopoly of the ‘Press barons’, the greater objective of a broad -basing of the ownership – although promised by succeeding governments has still not been fulfilled. Again, underlying the obvious fact that control over the Press is too valuable a prize to be shared with all of the people. The question that remains is whether this appropriation has been utilized for the common national good or used for the benefit of the political party in power at the particular time.

I do not propose to take this interesting thesis further and would commend it as a worthwhile subject for an aspiring Phd student engaged in the study of Power, politics and the art of communication. But I cant resist one compelling hypothesis from this story inspired by a recent reading of Amartya Sen’s “Identity and Violence – The Illusion of Destiny”. Reading Sen, one of South Asia’s and the worlds great thinkers, makes one feel that the regrettable and unacceptable, at times murderous violence that divides our country today could well be driven by the reductionist division of people by race, religion and class which has been a feature of much of the presentation of news today. Sen refers to the big conceptual confusion about peoples identities which turns multi – dimensional human beings who are at the same time, say a Professor of Science, a Rotarian, a devotee of yoga, a father, a Hindu and a member of the Liberal Party into a one dimensional creature – a Tamil or as the case might be a Sinhalese or a Muslim. .

I have been too personally touched by 1958 (when I saw my first torching of a human), 1971 (my first dead insurgent), the crime of 1983, the suffering of ordinary people in the intervening years and the faint possibilities of a peaceful land in the early years of the 21st century, to remain emotionally unmoved by the sad events of today. . The Press has undoubtedly had a major role to play in all these happenings whether by commission or omission or both; whether through the agency of its ownership or bias in its reporting. It underlines the profound social responsibility of what remains of the independent Press in the country along with the other major shareholder the Political Order, and the heavy burden they carry in configuring the future shape and form of our country.

In this context and background and in conclusion of my remarks, let me touch very briefly as a member of the public, on three issues of current debate here which go the heart of the relationship between the Press and the Political Order. Time dies not permit their exploration in any depth, but let me flag them for what it is worth, as key issues of public concern and credibility.

Objective and accurate reporting of news regarding the war/ armed conflict (or terrorism) whatever it is called. The importance of this is that the public should always be informed of the actual position. If not they can be completely surprised and disoriented at the subsequent turn of events, as for example Accords between countries such as the Indo -Sri Lanka of 1987, invitations to foreign countries to act as mediators or facilitators, and Cease Fire Agreements as that of 2002.

“Truth” as John Pilger has said “is the first casualty in war”. But can’t at least we be truthful about some key elements of it; as for example the real costs of war. The public’s credibility can be severely strained by the constant press refrain that since about ten years ago the casualty figures-after almost 25 years of intermittent conflict- are yet at 60,000 deaths. Why this underplaying of a vital statistic that must surely be well known.

Secondly, in an increasingly interdependent global world order, the reluctance to recognize what are our mutual inter dependencies. The defensively strident editorials, feature writing, including letters to the editor when national governance and human rights issues are ventilated by civil society or foreign agencies (including the murder of pressmen and politicians with impunity) is not only regrettable but unacceptable. Our standard practice seems to be to “kill the messenger” if the message he carries is unfavourable. A truly free Press should welcome bad news and make it the reason for detailed and systematic inquiry, not cover up. Gareth Evans the President of the International Crisis Group in his Neelan Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture two days ago from this very rostrum, spoke convincingly of the Limits of State Sovereignity and the Responsibility of the international community to Protect, in this 21st century. His thoughts merit consideration as we grapple with the States obligations to all of its people under international humanitarian law.

And finally, can we the public have an informed, non – emotional and open discourse about such critical issues of national concern as presently challenge us; the nature of the future State – unitary or federal; the unit of devolution, limits on executive power, subsidiarity or empowering local people, the protection of human rights, freedom of the media; all are up for determination as we grapple with the challenge of Constitutional reform.

At the dawn of freedom our leaders succinctly expressed our goals in what were called – the 4 freedoms;

Freedom from disease
Freedom from ignorance
Freedom from want, and
Freedom from fear.

The Press then had a significant role to play in translating that dream into partial reality. The Press of today have a more formidable responsibility. I have no doubt that our people will continue to honour and respect – as we did the founders of our Press of our past, the Pressmen and women of today, if they are true to their immense responsibilities and address their tasks resolutely and with courage.

(Text of Speech by Mr. Bradman Weerakoon at the DR Wijewardene Memorial Award 2007 ceremony held at the BMICH on July 31st 2007)

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People Fighting “Lost” Battle For Survival In The Eastern Province

By Shakuntala Perera

The Eastern province was always going to be our success story. It was where the country was going to test the formula for peaceful co-existence and development. The success of any Sri Lankan government at a long term solution to the ethnic conflict was going to be proven in the East. But today, the province stands devastated, desolate and alienated. The effects of a three decade old war are all on show here.

A recent visit to the war- ravaged districts of the Eastern province showed that it will be a long time before the province will lift its head in dignity. The hundreds of thousands left desolate in camps for the Internally Displaced People, the thousands of houses ravaged by the war and the multitude of livelihoods lost are testament to some agenda going very wrong here.

No one government or non governmental agency seems to have the exact number of the destruction. Everyone relies on each others’ numbers. No one seems sure enough. The damage is far beyond one entity’s ability to assess. In this situation solutions, be they short or long term are a difficult thing in itself. It is not surprising that no one really knows where to begin. This sadly includes the government.

The reality that meets one here is that of a situation that is far removed from the grasp of the government. Numerous ambitious projects of the government for the development of the East are mere dreams here.

What is sadder still is that there isn’t even anything on an interim basis. There is nothing on ground to even suggest that the government has even begun a proper re-settlement programme. Aside from merely dumping the people whereever it suits them politically, there is little to prove the government’s ambitious programme on paper.

In its present form, the East is the perfect breeding ground for terrorism. No one could blame anyone suffering the trauma of the war turning towards either of the militant groups for refuge. The people feel neglected and ignored by the State to feel desolate enough to turn towards a terrorist group for survival.

At the end of the day, the tragedy of the East is exactly that; one of survival. The people in the IDP camps don’t know whom to turn to. They don’t know when or where the next meal is coming from. Lost of all their livelihoods they have become virtual beggars, waiting for any handout that comes their way.

The youth are becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of a direction to turn to. There are no employment creation centres here. There are frankly no jobs to have. A province with so much potential for economic development, it is today groping in the dark. Investors are no longer interested in the potential of the East.

There are no incentives for investment here. Even for the few who are ready to take the chance, there is no assurance by either of the two warring parties that their investments will be honoured.

The people feel angered by the recent celebrations of the capture and liberation of the East. The freedoms so obtained escape them. They charge that the benefits of such liberation have not come to them. They question the validity of the celebrations when they have long lost the battle for survival.

The people have begun to question the role of the Karuna faction. The questions seem very valid, when you assess the presence of the groups in the province today. Batticaloa is clearly under the control of the group. Despite assurances of moving towards a democratic process, the group has the entire district under its gun.

Allegations of child recruitment, extortion are aplenty. The people are living in fear. They claim that the government has left their fate in the hands of another militant group. They refuse to accept that the Group has joined the political process. Theyrefuse to understand the apparent ‘understanding’ that exists between the State.

Certainly the role of Karuna leaves much to be desired of the government. It’s difficult to justify the room left for the Group to handle the district. There is too many human rights abuses for the government to turn a blind eye to. It is clear that the situation has gone out of control.

The people question under whose authority their fate has been handed over to the Group in this manner. They charge that they have simply fallen from the frying pan to a very hot fire. They demand that their silence not be used for political gain.

The situation raises the question of the moral right of the government in fighting the LTTE under the banner of a terrorist group, when it is entertaining the fancies of another group. The absolute must for the government as a democratically elected one to meet the legitimate concerns of the people in the East becomes imperative in this scenario.

When the Karuna cadres carry out the same violations that the international community labels the LTTE guilty of, there can’t be room for the government to turn a blind eye. Certainly, the degree of violations may be different, but even one child recruited is still a violation, and one that cannot be condoned by any democratic government.

These will become serious questions for the government when it next attempts to justify the ban of the LTTE before an international forum. International fora are already raising these questions today. The government can’t expect to legitimize these actions of the Karuna group when it directs the finger of accusation against the LTTE next time.

It becomes the necessary duty of the government to meet the violations that are carried out on a daily basis by the Karuna Group. The people speak of fears in going to the law enforcement authorities against the Group. This is not the situation of a people ready to join a program of peace.

Denied the dignity of the basic human rights, the people would be far from ready to face any political process. The elections are the last thing on the minds of the people in this scenario. They strongly believe that the presence of Karuna cadres in their present form will be a threat to any free and fair election. In this situation they refuse to trust the outcome of any election.

These seem very legitimate concerns on the part of the people. It is unfair to believe that the people don’t understand the neglect. They know that they are far removed from the political plans of the government. They suspect they never will be.

COURTESY: DAILY MIRROR

Comments (2)

Ten Paradigms For Electoral Reforms In Sri Lanka

By Prof. Lakshman Marasinghe

Electoral Reform has presently become one of the Principal concerns of a number of persons, Bodies and Institutions. Electoral Reform is one of the principal avenues for good Governance and for a vibrant Democracy. While Voting in Democracies is a key to internalized political stability of a Nation, it could also swing the other way and provide a Nation with instability and in its train, untold harm. It really is a double edged sword.

Students and Institutions that study Electoral Reforms have worked out at least ten baskets of Reforms from which Constitution makers have drawn, sometimes singly, sometimes in combinations and through evolutionary and dialectical processes, electoral systems suitable for a given political society. Therefore out of these ten, a certain number of hybrids have been worked out to suit local needs and affiliations.

The reform of an Electoral process must commence only after the constitutional structure had been worked out and in a way that the electoral system would further not to satisfy the aspirations of those who have laid their hands on the arc of government but to fulfill the aspirations of the multitude of voters who had voted those into governance. A failure to do so would resemble the case where an Oral medicine had been inadvertently used as Eye drops. The political system gets blinded and acutely dysfunctional.

A good example is our 1978 Constitution. A constitution which is a testament of a nation. A nation like ours, which is riddled with dynamic political forces, where the political growth factor is of a very high order, requires a Constitution which is flexible and more easily amendable. In countries in which our present system could be found, such as in Australia, there is a stable society underpinned by a constitution that had stood the test of time for over 100 years. We are a part of a nation which had seen three constitutions with in a short span of sixty years. We have a Constitution with 18 Amendments the 19th having failed at the stage of judiciary scrutiny. This dynamism of the body politic is seen in a visceral form.

The Electoral system contained in the 1978 Constitution provided the precise opposite of flexibility. Its inflexibility has boded ill for the Nation.

These must be thoroughly reflected in the constitution before any Electoral system is worked out. Second, cardinal principal is that the Electoral system must be such that the process that the voters utilize in bringing into the Legislature their representatives to form a government must be as effective as the electoral method that they may use to vote a government out of power. This is a procedural perquisite to good governance. This ability is lacking in a total sense in the Electoral process found under the present 1978 Constitution. Thirdly, we have a special problem.

That is to bring not only peace on paper but most importantly establish peace among co-ordinates who share power rather than among subordinates who are allowed power. Lastly, but this list is not closed, a future constitution for this country of ours should provide not only equality, fraternity and liberty, but the means by which these might be protected in a manner that there shall be no intrusions from the Executive. It should be a constitution that recognizes the ethnic mosaic that we are and bottomed by rights which are equal, inalienable and indestructible. Rights are not meant to be measured on fine scales as one does when one is buying gold and silver in a public Bazaar.

There must be a recognition of shared rights which at the end of the day binds all communities and followers of all Religions, Agnostics and Atheists alike, into a common bond which would undeniably help towards forging a single Nation. It is within the umbra of such a constitutional paradigm that any Electoral system should be conceived.

It is important to briefly state the ten types of electoral systems that have been considered by students of voting methods in democracies. Much have been written about these and the literature regarding them are well known to those who have been students of “Voting in Democracies” ( Lakeman and Lambert) and those Institutions which have the study of “Voting in Democracies” as a major undertaking in their work ( Plant Commission – Peter Kellner and de Hondt Systems).

Any elaboration of each of these could fill the pages of an entire book. What is given here are thumb-nail impressions of each of the electoral systems while the French and the German systems would receive some extended comment. The ten enumerated here are sources from which combinations of voting systems in democracies have been fashioned. Many of them in their raw form are largely unsuitable for any direct application in democracies. They may have elements found in them useful for structuring voting systems for democracies. With that caveat the following summaries are provided to introduce them to scholars who may desire to utilize them.


No 1. First, the voting process referred to as the First Past the Post (FTPT). This is the simplest and commonly used among many members of the Commonwealth, particularly in Canada and the UK. The United States also follows this method. Each voter votes for one candidate whom they might prefer and the Candidate that receives the greatest number of votes is elected. The problem experienced in this method of election is that the Candidate who receives the largest number of votes may not be the Candidate who had received the majority of the total number of votes cast in that voting unit. This method could however be used, to elect multiple members in multiple member constituencies.

No 2. Second, what is commonly referred to as Run – Off voting (r.o.v.). In this system voting takes place in two rounds. The first round is essentially to choose the candidate who could obtain a 50% of the total vote cast. If no single candidate obtains that 50% figure of the total number of votes cast in that voting unit or constituency, a second round of voting is held. This second round is the “Run-off – Vote”. Normally, it is the top two candidates who had obtained the two highest totals, yet falling below the 50% of the total number of votes cast in that voting unit or constituency that participate in the – “Run off Vote”. There being only two candidates in the “Run – Off- Vote”, the question of “first – past -the -post” does not arise. The person who gets the highest number of votes obtains the majority of the votes cast at the “run-off-voting” and gets elected.

No 3. Third, is referred to as the single transferable vote (stv) system. This is a system devised to elect multiple candidates in a constituency. This electoral process may be used where there has been the demarcation of a District as a single constituency as in Sri Lanka, under the 1978 Constituency. The transferability is established by the voter marking “1″ against the candidate whom they consider as their first preference, and “2″ against the name of the candidate of their next preference. There may even be a third preference. The preferences are counted and accounted for in obtaining the final total of votes cast for a candidate. This might result in a candidate being elected by a combination of the preference votes rather than from the principle vote.

No 4.Fourth, system may be regarded as the single transferable proportional vote (stpv) system. In this process, the lowest polling candidate is eliminated from the race and the votes cast in that candidate’s favour gets redistributed, proportionately, to the other remaining candidates. This process of elimination and redistribution proceeds until the number of candidates entitled to be elected in that voting unit or constituency is reached. Here there is no quota and therefore all candidates what ever the total number of votes they may have received could get eliminated and their votes redistributed until the required pre-ordained number of candidates for that voting unit or constituency is reached.

No 5.Fifth, this is the alternative vote (av) system. This is the same process as the one that adopts the single transferable vote (stv) system, except that unlike the STV system, there is only one candidate to be elected out of the group of contestants. The procedure for counting the votes is the same as the STV system, except that there is no reallocation of any surplus votes.

No 6. Sixth, is the Supplementary voting system (sv). This is a scaled down version of the Alternative Vote (av). Here the voter has only one preference vote while in the single transferable vote (stv) system and the alternative vote (av), the voter has more than one transferable vote. The only transferable vote in this system is referred to as the supplementary vote.

No 7. Seventh, referred to as the approval voting (av) system. Each voter is allowed to vote for as many or as few of the list of candidates. The total number of such votes would determine the winning candidate or the winning candidates.

No 8.Eight, is voting under what is described as the Party List System (pls). The principle here is that a voter shall have two votes. One in which he shall mark his preference of the political party and the other in which he shall mark the preference of his candidate. This allows for the plugging in of a preferential voting system or some other selection process of the candidate, of the voter’s choice. Members of Parliament are chosen under this system according to the proportion in which the political parties have obtained votes. That determines the number of candidates that each political party may become entitled to receive. Additionally, Members of Parliament may be chosen according to the order in which they may appear on the list of candidates presented by the various political parties contesting the election. Some Party List Systems have pre-ordained threshold points. If any political party were to obtain a number of votes below that threshold, the votes cast for that party does not provide any Members of Parliament. Some Party List Systems have worked out a number of elaborate arrangements for the redistribution of those wasted votes. The versatility of the Party List System is one of its most attractive features. This system could be combines with a system of single or multiple transferable votes as mentioned above.

No 9. Ninth, is the Additional Member System (ams) of voting. This system is used where an additional member or members become needed to complete a composite number of Members of Parliament that the overall Voting system has ordained. Additional Member System is not used by itself, but in conjunction with others. It is sometimes utilized where the Preferential voting system is used or any other system is used where the numbers of elected Members of Parliament fall short of the number of seats found in the legislature.This system is of particular importance to supplement the voting system found in the present German Constitution.

No 10. Tenth, is the Mixed Member System (mms). The mixture arises out of the election being held for two very different categories of seats. One for single member constituencies and the other for election of Members of Parliament from Party lists. There might be other forms of mixtures. The results of one category of elections will have no bearing on the other category and both categories of Members of Parliament once elected shall have an equal status in the legislature. Additional Member System (ams) helps to balance the allocation of Party List seats with the constituency seats to form the total number of seats required to establish the legislature. In the present, Mixed Member System (mms), the voting system is such that the number of Members of Parliament elected under one category does not affect the numbers elected under the other category. Numbers elected under the List system and those elected under the constituency system, together form the total membership of the legislature. No additional members are needed to compliment the required number of seats to form the legislature.

Some Specific Case Studies: (i) France; (ii) Germany.

(i). France.

The French National Assembly comprises of 577 Single-member constituencies. This membership has been formed out of 555 constituencies from Metropolitan France, 17 from a combination of “Overseas Departments” and “collectivites territoriales” and 5 for “Overseas territories”, a total of 577. Other than for a brief period in 1945 / 46 French electoral system did not apply Proportional Representation.

The election for the President of the Republic presents a perfect system for a “Run-Off Vote”. If no Presidential candidate at the first balloting obtains a majority (50%) of the votes cast then the first two candidates who have obtained the two highest number of votes would become eligible to face the “Run-Off Vote” which must be held within 15 days of the first ballot. President Sarkozy’s 31.18 % on the first vote was transformed into 53.06 % in the “Run -off-Vote”. Mlle. Segolene Royal’s 25.87% on the first vote yielded 46.94% on the second vote. With only the first two highest scorers facing off in the “Run – Off – Vote”. This produced a majority vote for the Presidency.

The process for the election of Members to the National Assembly provides a mirror image of the process for the election of the President of the Republic. Electoral system to the National Assembly takes place in two stages. In the first stage, and in each of the 577 constituencies, constituency wide elections are held. A candidate who obtains 50% or more of the total number of votes cast with a 25% or more of those registered on the electoral rolls voting, is elected without more. If both of these requirements are not fulfilled, then there would be a “Run-Off Vote”.

The “Run-off-Vote” will be held for the two candidates who had scored the two highest number of votes, but had failed to obtain the 50% of the total votes cast at the first vote with a 25% or more of those enrolled as voters voting at that vote. Therefore there will only be two candidates in the “Run-off-Vote” in each of the relevant constituencies. The two political parties whose candidates are participating in each of the constituencies in the “Run-Off-Vote” has the power, if the party so wishes, to enroll together with the principal candidate for the “Run-off-vote” a “substitute candidate”.

This is not a commonly used procedure but it is done by some of the French Constituency parties. Both the ” substitute candidates” and the “principal candidates” who obtain the highest number of votes in their respective categories, then they are elected. The two elections are conducted as two parallel elections voted at the same time. It is possible that the principal candidate and the “substitute candidate” may sometimes be elected from two different political parties from among the political parties participating in the “Run-off-Vote”. The roles which the two candidates play are quite different. If the winning candidate were to become incapable of representing the constituency due to, death, ill health, conviction by a court of law for a criminal offence, resignation or by being appointed a Diplomat or a Cabinet Minister by the President of the Republic, or suffers a disqualification to remain a member of the National Assembly, then the “substitute candidate” who too had been elected by obtaining the highest number of votes in that category, would take the place as the next member of the National Assembly for that constituency. This eliminates the need for by-elections, although by-elections are recognized under this electoral process when ever there is no “substitute candidate” or he becomes unavailable for substitution..

There are three principal characteristics of the French electoral system which require noting. First, there are two votes that are sometimes used so as to obtain a perfect majority of 50% + in the French electoral process. Second, both the first vote and the “Run-off-Vote” are not based on the first-past – the post electoral system but on a 50% majority basis. Third, the introduction of the second, ” Run-Off-Vote” prevents a skewed election result as the first-past-the -post obtained for Sri Lanka at the 1977 General Election.

  • (ii)Germany

  • The lower House of Parliament, the Deutsche Bundestag presently has 598 members . But as will be explained later this figure might increase at each general election by 3 or 7 seats by a process which producers extra members called “overhangers”. This will be explained later.

Of the basic 598 members, 299 are elected in single constituencies by first -past -the- post. These constituencies are located within each of the 16 Landers (State). The number of constituencies are increased each time there is an increase of the population in any constituency by 25%. This is done by redrawing the constituency boundaries within each Lander (State).It is important that the re-drawn constituencies must fall within the boundaries of the Lander which would then have an increased number of constituencies within that particular Lander. Re-drawing of constituencies should not be such as to fall outside the boundaries of the Lander(State) in which the population increase had occurred.

As mentioned earlier the first group of 299 members who are elected first- past-the -post do not raise any particular problems, other than those that are associated with the choosing of people’s representatives that may not represent the true will of the voters of that constituency. Sri Lanka has a long history of experiences with such problems until 1978 when Proportional Representation was introduced. Particularly when one is reminded of the skewed results obtained at the 1977 General Elections.

However, the second group of 299 members elected by proportional representation raises a number of matters that require careful consideration. This category introduces the use of two votes. One vote for the political party of the voter’s choice and the other for the candidate, again of the voter’s choice. Under the German System a political party may place the name of one person on both for the first-past-the post list and the same candidate on the proportional representation list. If the names of candidates of a particular political party are placed on both lists and they win under both lists, their election under the first -past -the- post- list is the only list under which their election is recognized. They become constituency members. Their election under the proportional representation list is discounted and others on that list are pushed up so that they would be elected to maintain the proportion that that political party had obtained under the proportional representation system.

As an example, if the ” Grey party” had named Mr. Green, Mrs. Yellow and Miss Blue in both lists, so as to ensure that their importance to the ” Grey Party” was so significant that their party was greatly interested in securing their entering the Bundestag, under one list or another. If one or more of these valued members get elected under both lists, then their election under the first-past-the-post list would be the only basis upon which their election to the Bundestag would be recognized. Their election under the proportional system would be discounted.

At that point a re-adjustment of the original list of candidates submitted by the “Grey Party” would be automatically made, by pushing up the candidates ranking lower than those who had been elected under both lists. The ones pushed up would fill the positions of those whose election under the proportional representation had been discounted. This is done so as to maintain the proportion which the “Grey party” may have obtained under the Proportional representation system. We shall assume that the “Grey party” had obtained 10% of the vote in that Lander (State) entitling them to 2 seats.

Supposing the “Grey Party” had won 5 seats under the first-past-the -post in constituencies within that Lander (State). The rule is that ” if under the proportional system list a particular party had won less seats(two seats in the case of the “Grey Party”), than under the constituency system ( five seats in the case of the “Grey Party”), under the first-past-the-post system, in that Lender (State), the “Overhanging Seats”, as they are referred to, the three seats, are not taken away, but are left with the “Grey Party”. These are referred to as the “Overhanging Seats”. There is no adjustment made with the “Grey Party” or with any other party contesting in that Lander (State) regarding those “Overhanging Seats”.

Those extra three seats are given to the Lender (State) as seats belonging to the “Grey Party” . The only adjustment that the German Electoral system immediately makes is that the total number of seats allocated for that Lander (State) would be increased by three and the total number of seats in the Bundestag would accordingly go up by three, to 601 seats.

As a long term adjustment, if there is vacation of a seat by one of the members of the “Grey Party”, for what ever reason, that vacant slot in the “Grey Party” will not be filled. That vacancy would be used to adjust the membership of the Bundestag to bring it back to the figure of 598 members.

The reverse of this process occurs where the “Grey Party” in a particular Lander (State) fails to obtain the threshold of 5% of the votes cast in that Lender (state) under the Proportional representation system or had failed to obtain at least three seats from the first-past-the-post list pertaining to that Lander (State). This is a constitutional requirement that all German political parties must fulfill to remain in the election within that Lander (State). Supposing the “Grey Party” in a particular Lander (State) had failed to fulfill those two requirements, then the “Grey Party” gets completely excluded from both the electoral processes in that Lander (State) namely; from the first-past-the-post list and also from the proportional representation list.

Notwithstanding this if only one or two of the “Grey Party” candidates had been elected under the first-past – the – post system and not the three that would have been required for the “Grey Party” to remain in the electoral process, the election of that one or two members of the “Grey Party” under the first -past- the-post system remain nonetheless valid and unaffected by the exclusion of their political party, the “Grey Party” from the electoral process. Notwithstanding the fact that the “Grey Party” now having been excluded from participating in the electoral process in that Lander (State), the one or two of the candidates elected under the first-past-the-post system would now take their seats in the Bundestag, from that Lander (State), not as members of the “Grey Party” but as “Independents”. They are freed from their party affiliations. Such members are referred to as “Lone Rider” in German parliamentary language.

  • An Evaluation of the two Systems 
    The German system is not only a combination of two separate and unrelated electoral processes, but it is also based on a number of diverse political assumptions. First, it produces two categories of Members of Parliament. Those who are responsible to constituencies and those who are not. Those who are responsible to larger “Regional Units” and those who are not. The two categories of Members have no common threads and may leave the voter confused and un-served.
  • Second, it subscribes through proportional representation the representation of minority parties. The constitutional requirement of obtaining 5% of the popular vote or three seats at first -past -the-post to remain in the electoral process does not apply to political parties representing minority interests. Therefore, the political parties of national minorities such as those representing the Danish, Frisan and Sorbish national minorities are excluded from that threshold requirement.

Third, it is based on Regions – Landers – States – which are much more autonomous than our Provinces and are those that had come together as semi independent States to form the Federation. Lastly, the system provides for coalition of many political parties and may act both as a cohesive factor or as a divisive agent. Fourth, one half of the members will enter parliament under a skewed Majoritarian process in the absence of a “Run-off-Vote”.

First, the French electoral system is less complicated and is based upon a perfectly balanced Majoritarian principle geared towards producing stable Administrations. It introduces a “Run-off-Vote” so that the first-past-the-post provides an equitable result unlike in the German system.

Second, the French system is based on constituencies, both in the principal vote and in the “Run-off-Vote”. Therefore it provides the voter with a firm grip on his Member of Parliament. Third, the Member of Parliament will not be able shirk his obligations towards his constituents by referring to the “other Member”, elected upon a very different basis.

Third, the absence of two unrelated systems under the French System makes this electoral system much easier to comprehend and utilize in obtaining a fair election. Third, the French system provides a sort of first-past-the-post process without the inequitable and unbalanced results which the country experienced at the 1977 general elections. Lastly, it will be a poor example for minority representation in the electoral process.

  • Conclusions

  • From the above discussion it might be a good measure to take if half of the seats are chosen upon a Proportional Representation system while avoiding the complexities of the German system and the other half are chosen according to the French system. By such an adoption the best aspects of the two systems are made available to the nation while leaving behind the difficulties that the post and the pre – 1978 electoral systems had caused by both the first-past-the- post and rather complex proportional voting system.
  • By adopting a mixed system, it would both accommodate the minorities and minority parties and at the same time make the kind of first-past-the-post system both equitable and more representative of the wishes of the voters. Remembering that no system for electoral reform is perfect, one must produce a system which as the wit of man could devise, would respond to the needs of the nation at the moment.

The writer is an Emeritus professor of Law at the University of Windsor in Canada and an Attorney -at-Law.

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