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This failure of the international community to hold the scales even and the lack of interest shown in expediting APRC proceedings have given President Rajapaksa leeway to do what he wanted with the APRC. Thus, the end result of the APRC seems to be a foregone conclusion

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) chaired by Prof. Tissa Vitarana is in the doldrums. The recent spurt of activity, aimed at finalising a set of Constitutional reform proposals, has subsided. The energetic zeal displayed by some sections to make the APRC deliver has dissipated. Once again the APRC seems destined for the backburner.

The APRC has, during its existence, undergone different phases of pace caused mainly by external factors. Recently at the tail-end of August it seemed that the APRC was going into inertia. Then the beginning of September saw it being galvanised into action again. Now the APRC is about to hibernate in a state of ‘inactive activity’ until after the budget.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressing the 61st session of the UN General Assembly in New York, Sep 2006. AP [Courtesy: DailyNews.lk]

The appointment of the APRC and its panel of experts by President Mahinda Rajapaksa was perceived by many as a time-buying, diversionary tactic. It was felt that full-scale war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was on the cards and the quest for a political solution was only a sideshow.

Daunting task

Indeed, the APRC may have proceeded at a leisured pace but for external pressure by the international community, particularly India. As a result the Experts Committee came out in December last year with four reports comprising a majority, minority and two dissenting ones. Vitarana then took on the daunting task of forging a common set of proposals incorporating views proposed by the divided Experts Panel.

The APRC then began discussions using the Vitarana proposals as a basis. It was on the threshold of formulating a final report backed by a majority of Tamil, Muslim and leftist parties when President Rajapaksa intervened forcefully. Rajapaksa was troubled by the APRC majority opting for a non-unitary state, which he felt was going against his professed partiality for a unitary one.

Rajapaksa’s trump card was the fact that almost all the parties at the APRC were constituents of his government. The party leaders were all cabinet ministers. When the President summoned the party heads and insisted that the structure of the state had to be unitary, these leaders had to fall in line or resign from the government. Predictably, they fell in line.

The ball was then passed on to the Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake who chaired a formal All Party Conference (APC) attended by party leaders. It was decided there that the unitary character of the state would be retained. Since the President has given a green signal that maximum devolution should be made available within a unitary state, there was no problem about its substance.

Earlier the United National Party (UNP) had threatened to withdraw from the APRC if a report was not finalised before a stipulated date. Vitarana himself was able to increase the APRC’s pace by using the UNP’s deadline to devise a time-boundary. But when the UNP withdrew formally, the rationale for speeding up the APRC’s pace was lost.

More importantly President Rajapaksa was not keen on the APRC or APC finalising a report before the budget. This was because the budget vote was crucial as defeat on a money bill entailed dissolution of government.

Removing threats

Given the new Ranil Wickremesinghe-Mangala Samaraweera-Chandrika Kumaratunga configuration, the President was insecure about defections from government ranks and also about how the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) parties would vote.

The prudent course seemed to be that of removing, as far as possible, the points of disruptive potential threatening Rajapaksa’s Parliamentary majority. In that sense placing constitutional reforms on the backburner seemed essential. Reactivating the APC and deactivating the APRC were courses of action conforming to this design.

But there was a sudden shift into top gear. The President was scheduled to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 24. With the government receiving much criticism from international human rights organisations, the President was expected to defend himself during his UN address.

Given the rising tide of international opposition against the Rajapaksa regime, the President had to make a masterful face-saving presentation at the UN.

Such an address would be incomplete and indeed lack total credibility if he could not demonstrate progress in the quest towards a political solution through constitutional reform.

It was now necessary for the APC and APRC to meet quickly and finalise a report so that the President could refer to it in glowing terms as an achievement during his UN address. It was going to be the mainspring of the state’s counter-propaganda against its international detractors.

So the early part of September saw renewed vigour on the constitutional reforms front. It appeared that an APRC report would be finalised before Rajapaksa’s departure. But this appearance is now proving deceptive.

On the backburner

The APRC is once again on the backburner. The reason for this is that the President has revised the strategy to be adopted at the UN.

‘Medamulane Mahinda’ is a man who reacts strongly and fights back fiercely if he sees himself being pushed to the wall. The President does not intend playing defensively on the back-foot. He intends ‘taking the bull by its horns’ to use a metaphor close to the Medamulane Laird’s heart.

President Rajapaksa’s address to the UN will emphasise more on countering terrorism rather than on peace building. He would tie up the war against the LTTE as being part of the global war on terror. The thrust of the President’s speech would be that of placing the onus on the international community to help him out in his government’s struggle against what he terms as the second most ruthless “terror” force in the world.

President Rajapaksa would outline a roadmap at the UN. It would be a roadmap focussing more on countering terror rather than peace building. This does not mean that he would ignore peace building efforts. He will certainly talk about the efforts at constitutional reform and the role of both the APC and APRC but it will no longer be the pivotal component of his address.
Rajapaksa will also offer the Sri Lankan experience as a model to be emulated globally in the fight against terror. Colombo wants to play a pro-active and not a reactive role at the UN.

“We will present a roadmap to counter terrorism in the world at large during the UN sessions. Through this we would like to show our experience and the drive to counter terrorism. We also want to showcase our agenda to bring about a democratic settlement to the issue,” Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama told a press conference in Colombo.

What the President intends pointing out at the UN is that the efforts of the APRC, however commendable, are of little practical value until and unless terrorism is wiped out or seriously undermined. Speaking from a historical perspective, the President will point out that the LTTE has been the single biggest obstacle to achieving a meaningful and durable political settlement.

Two schools of thought

In broad terms, there are two schools of thought on how the Tamil national question is to be resolved. One school opines that a political solution acceptable to the ‘silent majority’ of moderate Tamils must be evolved to undermine and eventually defeat the LTTE.

The other school of thought argues that the LTTE has to be defeated decisively before any political settlement is achieved. The LTTE has to be weakened if any political solution is to be implemented for the simple reason that the LTTE would not allow any scheme to be worked out.

What the President plans to do now is to come out in the open on this issue. He is likely to argue that no meaningful political solution is possible without defeating or weakening the LTTE significantly. Instead of concentrating on the peace-building process, he will explain his war on terror. On the human rights issues he may ‘admit’ to mistakes, but will emphasise that ways and means of penalising culprits and preventing offences are being pursued.

Against this backdrop of a revised strategy at the UN, the APRC has once against lost its element of urgency. There will be reference to it in New York but will not be given pre-eminence. The finalisation of a report before September 24 is not deemed necessary as before. The situation now is that the APRC report must not be out until after the Budget and Appropriation Bill votes.

The President’s decision to ‘go for broke’ at the UN stems from fresh confidence. There are four reasons for this approach.

Fresh confidence

Firstly, he is confident that his government will survive not only the Budget vote but also in the months thereafter. The JVP will not vote against him if the beneficiary is going to be Ranil Wickremesinghe. There is a danger of the JVP changing track if Mangala Samaraweera is to be the premier and not Wickremesinghe. As for more SLFP defections, such a possibility exists only if Kumaratunga takes a frontal role, which she is unlikely to do at present.

Secondly, the armed forces are performing well on ground. The prospect of minimising, if not totally eradicating, the LTTE threat looms large on the horizon. There is increasing support among the people for pursuing a military option against the Tigers. There is a belief among sections of the government that a snap election in the wake of a major military victory is likely to yield tremendous political gains.

Thirdly, the President is confident that the international community will go along with him in the anti-LTTE war. Despite token censures and reductions, there would be no significant cut back of aid or finance.

In spite of regular diplomatic pronouncements that there can be no military solution and that there can only be a political solution, there will be no powerful attempt by anyone to restrain the armed forces as long as they target the Tigers and not Tamil civilians deliberately.

Fourthly, Rajapaksa feels that the Human Rights Lobby is not powerful enough to enforce resolutions against Sri Lanka at present. Despite the hot air blowing at the HRC sessions and the representations made by organisations such as Human Rights Watch, a resolution condemning Colombo is not likely to materialise.

For one thing, Amnesty International, whose Head Irene Khan has met Rajapaksa thrice, is reportedly not cooperating with others. More importantly, none of the big powers are backing such a move.

It is with this strident confidence that President Rajapaksa is going to take centre-stage tomorrow, September 24, at the UN and deliver a powerful address. It is also with the same streak of confidence that the President is confining the APRC to the backburner.

Going through the motions

Prof. Vitarana will go through the motions and inform the inquiring media that work is in progress and that everything would be wrapped up soon, but there does not seem to be even a remote possibility that the report would be out before the budget. It is likely to be finalised and handed over to the President only after the Budget and related votes.

Even then there are doubts about the date because there is no determined effort by any powerful party to force the pace of the APRC. The President and the SLFP along with parties like the JHU, JVP and MEP will prefer to delay the report until the LTTE is weakened further militarily. It would be easier to dilute the report further and impose a solution.

The UNP is also not interested in making the APRC work. If the UNP had remained in the APRC and cooperated with Vitarana, there could have been a sea change in the final outcome.

The UNP will not like the SLFP to get any credit through the APRC. It will also not want to be put in a tricky position of endorsing or rejecting an APRC report. In addition, the UNP can tell the minority communities that the APRC was an eye-wash to hoodwink them. The elephant would like to be an eel.

The Sinhala hardliners oppose positive measures at the APRC saying it would strengthen the LTTE separatists, but the irony is that the LTTE also does not want the APRC to succeed.

The LTTE’s rationale for Tamil Eelam is that the ‘Sinhala’ polity will never provide a meaningful political settlement. The LTTE ‘mouthpiece,’ the TNA, has 22 seats. It was kept out of the APRC by Rajapaksa. It was really a blessing in disguise for the TNA as the LTTE would not have permitted it to participate even if invited.

Reality

The reality is that a political settlement based on federal or quasi-federal lines is of paramount importance only to the Sri Lankan Tamils desirous of living in an undivided Sri Lanka with equal rights. Their case has not been represented powerfully at the APRC.

The only Sri Lankan Tamil party at the APRC is the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP). Its representative, S. Thavarajah made a minimal contribution to the proceedings and kept away on many occasions.

After his ’sudden’ departure to Britain, Lawyer Maheswary Velayutham attended meetings. Being well-versed in the Tamil struggle for equal rights, Velayutham spoke up on a number of matters including that of Buddhism being given foremost place. Devananda quickly substituted his docile uncle Sivathasan for Velayutham.

In the absence of an effective Sri Lankan Tamil voice at the APRC, it was left to the up country Tamil and Muslim parties to articulate the need for effective power-sharing.

In that respect, the roles played by the CWC’s R. Yogarajan and the SLMC’s Nizam Kariappar have been constructive and praiseworthy. The CWC and SLMC stances are all the more commendable because certain aspects of power-sharing are not as important to plantation Tamils and Muslims as they are to Sri Lankan Tamils.

There was however a limit beyond which up country Tamil and Muslim parties could not go. This was the case with the left parties also. They opted to lend support to what other parties proposed, rather than initiate proposals. In any case all these parties, being constituents of the government, had ‘lakshmana rekhas’ they could not cross.

Without powerful internal compulsions, only external pressure could have saved the APRC. Initially, India was keen on a faster pace, but eventually that interest waned.

Lip service

The international community has been generally staying aloof and paying lip service to the parrot cry of a “solution acceptable to all sections of the people.” The solution had to be home grown and the international community did not want to be seen as influencing it in any way.

This was a blatant display of double standards as the international community had stated openly that the solution had to be within the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

In a ‘clash’ between Sinhala ‘mono-statists’ and Tamil ’separatists,’ the international community ruled out the separatists. But in the struggle between unitarists and federalists, the international community remained detached. If the international community had emphasised that the envisaged solution should not be unitary, the doves would have been strengthened vis-à-vis the hawks.

This failure of the international community to hold the scales even and the lack of interest shown in expediting APRC proceedings have given President Rajapaksa leeway to do what he wanted with the APRC. Thus, the end result of the APRC seems to be a foregone conclusion. In spite of Vitarana’s indomitable courage and resourcefulness, he is ultimately going to lose face, the extent of which is debatable.

Though the APRC is in the twilight stages, it must be recognised that it has achieved a very great deal. The unitary state may be retained and the Northern and Eastern Provinces may be separate, but there has been significant progress as far as substance of devolution is concerned and also in terms of other power-sharing features. A short account of the salient factors in the proposed APRC report would be of relevance.

Salient factors

Structure of the State: Sri Lanka will be a unitary state.
Buddhism: Buddhism will continue to enjoy a pre-eminent position as provided in the current Constitution.

Parliament: Parliament will consist of a House of Representatives with 225 members, and a Senate with 75 members. The members of the House of Representatives will be elected to territorial constituencies as well as on the Proportional Representation system; 72 senators will be elected by the Provincial legislatures, while three will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Form of National Government: The government will be on the Westminster Model with the prime minister as the head. The cabinet of ministers will not exceed 30 in number. There could be 30 deputy ministers as well. The president of the country will be elected by Parliament and he will be the nominal head of state. There will be a vice president from a community different to that of the president. The vice president will chair the Senate.

Electoral system: There will be 110 territorial constituencies. An additional 110 MPs will be elected on proportional basis. Five seats will be reserved for the smaller parties. Each elector will be given two ballot papers, one to elect the constituency MP, the other to vote for the party of his choice in order to elect other MPs on proportional basis.

Judiciary: There will be no constitutional court. All constitutional issues will be referred to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal will have divisions in the provinces. Every province will have its high court. The provinces will have no say in the appointment of judges.

Individual and group rights: Section 29(2) of the Soulbury Constitution are included. Most provisions of the South African Constitution and the 2000 Constitution on fundamental rights are included.

Language: Sinhala and Tamil shall be the official languages of Sri Lanka enjoying parity of status for the first time. English will also be a language of administration. Sinhala, Tamil and English will be the media of instruction in educational institutions. Sinhala, Tamil and English will be the languages of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. Any member of the public could correspond with any government official in any of the three languages and will be entitled to receive a response in that language.

Unit of devolution: Unit of devolution will be the province. The districts will be the centres of administration as at present.
Merger of the North and East: This subject is to be discussed and decided at the peace talks between the government and the LTTE. The Muslim concerns are also to be addressed at that time.

Special arrangement for Indian origin Tamils: There will be a cultural and development council to meet the aspirations of the Tamils of Indian origin. The council will have its own budget.

Distribution of powers: The distribution of powers will be given in two lists, one for the provinces and the other for the centre. There will be no concurrent list. There will be no asymmetric devolution of powers. Education, including universities, health, roads, transport, housing, water supply, electricity, industries, agriculture, fisheries, irrigation, etc., have been included in the provincial list.

Provincial executive: Each province will have a governor appointed by the centre with the concurrence of the chief minister of the province. There will be a board of ministers headed by the chief minister as at present. There will be no deputy ministers. The governor will always act on the advice of the chief minister, except when he is required to do otherwise by the Constitution. There will be a public service commission for every province as at present.

Law and order: Law and order will be a devolved subject. All police officers above ASP level will belong to an all island service. The province will be empowered to recruit its police officers, even at the ASP level. The head of the provincial police will be the IGP while the national police will be headed by a director general of police, assisted by IGPs in his own office.
The province will have its own police commission. The power of appointment, transfer and disciplinary control of all police officers in the province will be with the provincial government.

Public service: There will be national public servants, all island public servants, and, provincial public servants. The province will be empowered to recruit all island service officers to fill its cadres at recruitment level. The government agent of a district, the divisional secretary of a division and the grama sevakas will form part of the provincial administration.

Land: A land use commission on utilisation of lands will give policy direction. The commission will be representative of the centre, the provinces and communities. The actual alienation of state land will be by the province.

Fiscal devolution: The province will have the power to borrow locally or internationally and to promote foreign direct investment. It will have powers over specific taxation. The new provisions are an improvement on the provisions in the 13th Amendment and the 2000 Constitution Bill.

Local government: Local government will go one step below the existing pradeshiya sabhas. Powers of the local authorities will be clearly spelt out in the Constitution.

Safeguards against secession: There will be provisions to permit the centre to impose president’s rule in a province if there be any attempts by the government or legislature of that province that could threaten the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

Amending procedure: The new amending procedure will be that which is applicable to a unitary constitution. The provinces will have no say in the amendment procedure. However, the requirement for a referendum will be done away with.

The above mentioned features outlining the essence of the consensus achieved at the APRC demonstrate that these proposals are a vast improvement on the 13th Constitutional amendment provisions or the 2000 draft bill. What is essential therefore is to see that these positive gains of the APRC are presented, approved and implemented as soon as is possible. Time is of the essence!

Ambassador Blake’s Remarks at the Seminar on “Sri Lanka: the Way Forward”
September 21, 2007 – Galle Face Hotel, Colombo

First let me express my thanks and commendation to the Fullbright Association both for arranging this seminar on “Sri Lanka: the Way Forward” and for putting together such a glittering panel of speakers. Let me also thank Tissa for putting me first because whatever I have to say will pale in comparison to the more erudite and lucid comments to follow!

[Ambassador Robert Blake - File Pic]

Since time is short and we Americans are known for not mincing our words, let me get right to the point on the topic at hand.

The Government of Sri Lanka has achieved some important victories in the last several months. The expulsion of the LTTE from the East and the recent sinking of several LTTE ships carrying arms and other provisions mark important military successes.

But these tactical successes should not tempt the Government to re-consider whether Sri Lanka’s conflict can be won by military means. It cannot.

While the Government must continue to defend the nation against terrorist attacks, the way forward lies in continuing to lay the basis for a negotiated settlement that will meet the aspirations of all of Sri Lanka’s communities: Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese.

A key part of that equation will be for the All Parties Representative Committee to complete its important work on a power-sharing proposal. From all accounts the APRC has made substantial progress.

But difficult issues remain that will test whether all of Sri Lanka’s parties can work together to arrive at a just and equitable proposal that will receive the support of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese. To achieve a compromise that will lead to lasting peace will require statesmanship from all sides and the will to put the national interest above narrow party interests.

The governing coalition must demonstrate it represents the interests of all Sri Lankans, not just southern Sinhalese.

The opposition UNP, which deserves much credit for the important steps it took to advance peace in 2002-2003, should, for the sake of all Sri Lankans, build on that record of achievement and work responsibly with the Government to ensure a successful APRC outcome.

And we hope that all parties in the APRC will frame the final APRC proposals in a manner that avoids the use of divisive, emotive terms like “ederalism” and “unitary.”

Let me a say a word about the stabilization and reconstruction process in the east, which also is an important part of the way forward.

Now that conflict has subsided in the east, the Government has a significant opportunity to stabilize and develop the east in a manner that would demonstrate to all Sri Lankans, but particularly Tamils and Muslims, that they have a bright future within a united Sri Lanka and that the Government is serious about ensuring their rights and providing opportunities equitably within a pluralistic state. In short, a successful transition in the east can be an important confidence builder and a building block for a future negotiation process.

Conversely, the government faces significant risks if it fails to seize its opportunity in the east. Specifically, a failure to effect an orderly transition from military to civilian control, a failure to consult elected representatives of the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese communities on the development and other programs now being devised for the east, and a failure to rein in paramilitaries are all likely to destabilize the east and harden minority attitudes about prospects for negotiated settlement. Likewise, resettlement and development plans that change the ethnic composition of eastern districts, restrictions on access to means of livelihood, and slow economic development will produce similar negative effects.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that a solution to Sri Lanka’s conflict is in reach. But it will require Sri Lanka’s government and parties to work together to put the national interest first. The United States, as a friend of Sri Lanka and a Co-Chair, stands ready to assist in any way we can. [Press Release - US Embassy, Colombo, Sri Lanka]

by Izeth Hussain

The last few paragraphs of D.B.S. Jeyaraj’s article Tamil speaking aid workers an ‘endangered species’ in Sri Lanka (Sunday Leader, August 26 – Tamil Week Aug 31st ) were of extraordinary interest to me because they are very relevant to the view that I have been advancing for some time that our so-called ethnic problem is best understood in terms of a paradigm of racism. As this is meant to be no more than a brief comment on Jeyaraj’s article I will mention just a couple of the reasons why I have been advancing that view.

Most ethnic problems arise because of a perception by ethnic minorities that they are subjected to discrimination by majoritarian governments. Implicit in that perception is the notion that there are people in the majority ethnic group who actually discriminate against the minorities, or who approve of that discrimination. In Sri Lanka we used to call such people “communalists”, while in the discourse of racism they are called “racists”. But in the discourse of ethnicity there is no such term as “ethnicist” or any term at all to designate such people. There is therefore a weird lacuna in ethnic discourse, namely the absence of any term to designate the root cause of ethnic problems.

Since around 1971 the obviously inadequate paradigm of ethnicity came to prevail over that of racism, particularly in the Afro-Asian countries. For that there could have been two reasons, one of which is that Westerners believed that racism was something that could apply only to what the whites did against the colored peoples, doubtless having in mind the roots of Western racism in capitalism, industrialization, and Western imperialism. They tended to ignore the fact that racism can take many forms.

The other reason is that the Afro-Asian power-elites, drawn mainly from the dominant ethnic groups – in whose ranks flourish many pukkah racists as in Sri Lanka – found in ethnic discourse a convenient way of diverting attention from inconvenient facts. In that discourse the focus is on the many complex historical and cultural factors that lead to ethnic rivalry and conflict. Attention tends to be drawn away from the fact that at the root of it all is the racist who wants to kick down or kill members of hapless minorities.

I will now give some details from Jeyaraj’s article. In the body of it he scrupulously establishes that it is not aid workers as such who have been targeted in the North-East, but specifically Tamil and Tamil-speaking, that is Muslim, aid workers. This has been going on for nearly two years, he writes, and the fact that there has been no evaluation of the security and safety needs of the aid workers does not reflect creditably on the NGO “big-shots”. The lack of adequate concern may be because all the victims are Tamils or Tamil-speaking Muslims. “If the victims were from the Sinhala community or foreigners, the responses may have been different.” I would say that in that case the responses would certainly have been different.

An important paragraph reads, “Sir John Holmes sees the victims as humanitarian workers. This is true. But the larger reality is that they are victims because they are Tamils.” In an earlier part of the article he wrote that Holmes looked at the victims as humanitarian aid workers, not as Tamils, and that altered things dramatically and had maximum impact.

The data and arguments brought out by Jeyaraj point to a peculiar paradox that cries out for explanation. For almost two years Tamil and Muslim aid workers were killed, almost certainly by demented and lethal racists, and furthermore those racists operated with a virtual immunity from the law. In any Western country such goings-on would have provoked mass protests from anti-racist groups and the broader civil society, and governments would have fallen after being declared to have a neo-Nazi racist character. Nothing of the sort of course could have been expected from Sri Lanka`s duck-back civil society, off whose consciousness every enormity can be expected to slide like water off a duck’s back. But the international community also – here meaning of course the Western countries – has ignored the racist character of those goings-on and responded only to the aspect of the killings of aid workers.

What is the explanation? It would not be plausible to suppose that Holmes and the Western NGO heads are themselves racists, who therefore cannot bother about blacks killing off blacks and can respond only to the aspect of aid workers being killed. I believe that the most plausible explanation is to be found in the propensity – more often compulsion – of people to think within the bounds set by paradigms. In the West the racist paradigm prevails and the propensity therefore is to think of ethnic problems in terms of racists and their victims. In Sri Lanka the ethnic paradigm prevails, in which the focus is not on racists and their victims, and consequently there is an international row over the killing of certain individuals in their capacity as aid workers and not as Tamils and Muslims.

I do not believe that we can really solve our ethnic problem until we address the problem of racism that is there on both sides of the ethnic fence. A political solution involves far more than just a new Constitution providing a handsome measure of devolution. The point is that what really matters about a Constitution is not what it says but what we do with it, and what we do with it will not lead to a solution unless there is a resolve to give fair and equal treatment on all sides. That resolve will not come about unless we address the problem of racism, and learn to control it. As a first step, we must start looking at our so-called ethnic problem in terms of a paradigm of racism.

The International Independent Group of Eminent persons led by former Indian Chief Justice Bhagwathy has expressed concern over the progress of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by President Mahinda Rajapakse to inquire into fifteen incidents of alleged serious violations of human rights in Sri Lanka.

A recent press release stated:

“On 18 September 2007, the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (the IIGEP) submitted its second Interim Report to HE the President of Sri Lanka. The report contains details of the IIGEP’ s continuing efforts to ensure transparency and monitor the conduct of the work carried out by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights (the Commission), in accordance with basic international norms and standards, as directed in the Presidential Warrant.

The IIGEP had meetings with the Commission on 18 August 2007 and with HE the President on 20 August 2007 and highlighted a number of issues which continue to cause concern to members of the IIGEP. The meeting with the Commission of Inquiry examined several issues of concern.

These included the continuing slow progress of the Commission’s investigations and inquiries, including the procedures being followed; the independence of the Commission in the light of its inclusion of the Official Bar as its Panel of Counsel; the continuing need for effective victim and witness protection and assistance; and inadequate disclosure of information. The exchange with the Commission was thorough and amicable.

The IIGEP took note of the important efforts of the Commissioners to speed up its procedures and become more personally involved in the examination of the witnesses. The parties agreed on identification of the main issues at stake. Nevertheless, the IIGEP still has serious concerns as to the outcome of the process.

The meeting with HE the President, which was useful and constructive, tracked a number of the same issues, with a particular accent on the budgetary aspects of possible solutions that would enhance the effectiveness and independence of the Commission. Conclusion:

Taking into account the areas of concern identified in this public statement, the IIGEP concludes that the investigation and inquiry process to date fails to comply effectively with international norms and standards. The IIGEP calls upon the Commission of Inquiry and the Government of Sri Lanka, in order to achieve the objectives of the Commission’s mandate, to take urgent steps to remedy these concerns.

Dear Mr. President,

Constitutional Reform: Avoid the ‘unitary’ label and facilitate power-sharing consensus in North & East

The deliberations of the All Party Representative Committee to create a new constitutional framework are stuck in controversy over two key matters: (1) whether or not Sri Lanka’ Constitution should be explicitly labelled as ‘Unitary’ and (2) whether or not the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be remerged.

As members of Sri Lanka’s minority communities, we ask of you, as President, to (1) avoid labelling the constitution either as ‘Unitary’ or as ‘Federal,’ and (2) facilitate reaching consensus over power-sharing units for Tamils and Muslims in the Northern and Eastern Provinces instead of isolating them from one another.

Mr. President, you have stated in a recent interview that you will uphold the unitary character of Sri Lanka’s Constitution because you are constrained to act primarily on behalf of the sections of the Sinhala community who voted for you in the 2005 Presidential election. We are both disappointed and disturbed by this assertion.

We are disappointed because your assertion shuts out the opinions of large numbers of Sinhalese voters who have consistently voted for constitutional change involving devolution of powers in every election since 1994, including the 2005 Presidential election and the Local Government elections thereafter.

And we are disturbed because your assertion is also a rejection of your responsibility to serve all Sri Lankans and not just those who voted for you. More important, the assertion alienates the minority communities who want to abide by a Sri Lanka that politically and constitutionally includes them as equal citizens despite their lesser numbers.

The unitary label that was first inserted in the 1972 Constitution has since produced the biggest threat ever to the island’s unity. Even if that threat were to be defeated militarily, persisting with the unitary label will leave the cancer of alienation, which has grown since 1956, forever active among the minority communities.

The All Party Representative Committee, that you established, is the culmination of a process that began in 1994 under an SLFP-led Government to restructure the Sri Lankan State as an indissoluble Union that will include the minority communities as equals and enable power-sharing by all communities. This is your true and primary legacy.

We, the signatories to this letter, plead with you to honour this legacy, show leadership, and create a Constitution without labels, one that will make all the communities of Sri Lanka feel equal participants in working towards peace and prosperity. Thank you.

Signatories,

Prof. Kumar David, Sri Lanka

Mr. Namu Ponnambalam, Canada

This Open Letter to President Mahinda Rajapakse has so far been signed by over seventy activists, academics, writers and clergy from mainly the minority communities. The purpose of the letter is to express the concerns of Sri Lankan Muslims, Tamils and other minorities about the President’s reported insistence that any constitutional reform recommended by the APRC should be within the framework of a unitary constitution. The letter is still in circulation for signatures and will be sent to the President with copies to other political leaders.

19th September 2007

Can we break the cycle of ceasefire, talks and murderous violence in Ceylon (Sri Lanka)?

By Ravi Sundaralingam, ASATiC

Abstract: The cycle of ceasefire, talks, and violence have been used by both parties involved in the ethnic strife in Ceylon, allegedly, for their advantage. Meanwhile, the people have seen their civil society destroyed, basic human rights denied, and standard of living diminished. Left on its own the state will continue with this process until the total annihilation of the Tamil communities as viable, strong unit and a tattered economy. These do not leave the Sinhala nation, Sri Lanka, or India morally and practically in better positions. We suggest a tripartite formula for breaking this atrocious cycle. To kick-start this meaningful peace process, we propose the intervention of the Indian elder statesman, and the leader of the world’s Tamils to host a conference, here in Chennai, India.

Tripartite Formulae [for consultation]

The formula we suggest has three major components. They are:

1. Tripartite agreement; which must be signed between the Tamils, Sinhalese (Sri Lanka), and India,

3. Incorporating all constituencies within the Sinhala and Tamil communities at various stages.

Attempts to settle the “unresolved national question” in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) litter the pages of the island’s history many times one can care to mention. Those who are sincere students of history and social formations would have noticed the colonial period making different paths for India, and the island, which is the teardrop of India. They differ drastically not only in character but also in content, particularly when nation formation and social unification are considered.

The people of India though differing on linguistic and religious basis had a common and shared history, even before the arrival of the Europeans. One of the most striking features was that no single race or creed laid claim for the entire geographical space of India for its wealth exclusively for itself, even if the desire was to unify the vast land. The land of many nations allowed itself the luxury of having as many invented myths and tall legends, none at the expense of another. If the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian, linguistically different, social formations emphasize a natural fault line within the unification process, the dynamics of multilingual nation states saw to it that it was not the primary variable. As a person living in Europe were to identify an enduring character and content of the great Indian civilisation, it would be a personal one, it is the Indian nature of inclusiveness, often mistakenly mentioned as tolerance, term borrowed from the Western Multicultural verbiage. Tolerance, one can note, is a form of psychological accommodation of something without being fond of it. One cannot put this totality of Indian civilisation better than the great Mogul king Akbar himself. Descendent of those who came to conquer the infidels of the verdant and fecund land, eventually circumming to the great Indian truth that left Akbar in no doubt, and in his epitaph wrote, “world is a bridge, cross it, but don’t build your house up on it”. Akbar’s legacy, inherited from great Asoka, continued though his natural heir Mahatma Gandhi, and still present for all to see.

The attempts to unify India from the North or South were based on this shared truth and its historical experiences. As we see the 21st century come roaring at us, and the new religion of ‘globalisation’ brings new form of material prosperity and with it the reminder of the old challenges, we wait to see how that great Indian truth will reassert itself for the benefit of all mankind, not just for the Indians.

In contrast, all experiences to unify the island of Ceylon into a single unit prior to the colonial period were based on the single principle based on the Sinhala mystery, Mahavamsha, written in the 12th century, which seizes the entire island for the Sinhala speaking Buddhists and the resistance to this conspiracy by other communities, principally by the Tamils. The process after the departure of the British is the same, except, now the state’s apparatuses are firmly in the hands of the Sinhala chauvinists, who merrily used them to legitimise their belief in their tall stories.

It is this difference in content and character, which marks the difference between India and Ceylon in the context of the colonial period. To put it simply, for India the colonial period was help in its process towards its natural unification, a great experiment nevertheless. British bringing the vast space under a single unit of administration, great Indian railways-the main artery of the new unified land and a world on its own, Gandhi the leader, the independence struggle, and the painful partition, are all further passages added to that common experience, which in part cemented the ‘nation-building’ process.

In contrast, ‘quit Ceylon’ movement, if at all were substantial, was only a process of stealthy campaigns by the Sinhala Buddhists and its Tamil counterpart, which saw the period of Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu nationalism grew in relation to the Christian foreigners and their religious conversion centres, the missionary schools.

Colonisation period was help for India in its attempt for greater unity, while for its neighbours it only firmed up the differences between communities with chauvinist elements coming to the fore.

As India celebrates its 60th anniversary of its independence, with cautious confidence of its future, it can look back with satisfaction of having absorbed the European interlude in its stride, and its subscription to the globalisation scheme with verve and as a new avenue, both contributing further to its nation-building programme. The success of India’s nation building cannot be better illustrated by none other than the Tamil Nadu Chief minister Kraunanithy, the reluctant Dravidian, the man who laid his life on the railway track at Saithaped against the Hindi domination, now transformed into an elder statesman for the whole of the Indian nation.

However, the prospects of its neighbours, whether it is Pakistan, which has yet to define what it is, Ceylon called Sri Lanka by the Sinhala chauvinists who captured it and continuing the fight prior to the arrival of the colonial period to keep the ill-gotten, and Nepal which is yet to be delivered from the early feudal social formations, successful formulae for nation-building are still illusive. All these are failed states in some respect, and India cannot ignore that and therefore, the contrasting human conditions and, its regional responsibilities.

Perhaps, the events of marking the anniversary of launching of Mahatma’s Satiyagraha philosophy, and the UN voting overwhelmingly to make his birthday 2nd of October as the International Peace & non-violence day, were more poignant reminders of its responsibilities for India than its Independence Day celebrations. It is in these we as neighbours pin our hopes and base our expectations of India, more than of its economical achievements, which can be of huge benefit also. India, Amartya Sen rightly says, which has been very vocal during the time when it was considered a mere 3rd world country, cannot be silent now when its strength on the world stages has grown, and expected to grow even further.

A resurgent India, therefore, surrounded by failed states, cannot base its foreign policies simply on ’strategic interests’ or ‘economic interests’, but must be on its willingness to come forward and take its share of the regional responsibilities; the socio-political stability of its neighbours and, economic empowerment of the common man.

Having laid the framework for our arguments, let us start with our first point.

It is our argument, when seeking a solution for a pre-colonial period, one cannot ignore the multidimensional nature of it, and therefore, it requires a globalised solution. When we say globalised we mean pluralism, in terms of structure as well as system of any organisation, which is willing to submit itself to scrutiny according to universally accepted vales and norms.

What is more globalised than India, available for a resolution of any problem in the region?

It is obvious to anyone who can think without bias or tilt, Sri Lanka as a state and a system and, LTTE as an organisation and a system have failed miserably in these respects.

In the Sinhala state, minorities do not have a stake, even from a basic individual human rights point of view, as the structures and the systems of the civil society have been destroyed fundamentally.

Individual opponents of the system, no matter from which community, are not guaranteed of their lives, let alone their right to opinion and protest.

The value of life is too cheap in Sri Lanka, so much so when quoted a figure of 2 lacks for the IDPs in the Eastern Province, the Sri Lankan President dismissed it nonchalantly saying, “you are wrong, only 1 ½ lacks are displaced”.

Let us not go further into the easiest of routes, already raised by MPs in foreign parliaments, and ask “how is that a state can drop bombs on its own people?”

Ordinary humans irrespective of their race or creed cannot argue or protest against their living conditions as the “war against the Tamil Terrorism” perennially takes priority. Every working man and women are subjugated, and sometimes even convinced by this chauvinist argument by those who aspire to capture the seat of government of the Sri Lankan State, an affair that has been going on since the so called ‘independence’. And this war against terrorism has also become a going concern, people in high places making sacks full of money, paid into foreign bank accounts.

One can see the Sinhala nation has not developed large and powerful enough constituency to embrace pluralism and democracy, in a multicultural sense as in India. (However, there are signs, for the first time in the history such a constituency is emerging and as Tamils and Indians we should be fully supportive of it.)

Therefore, intellectuals and humanists from all communities, who yearn for a long-term solution to the ethnic strife, agree that the weakness is in the structure of the state than the governments, which feel compelled or easier to satisfy their Sinhala-communal constituencies to access power. (Except on one occasion when Chandrika Kumarathunga won a clear mandate for peace and to settle the grievances of the Tamil communities.)

Covert attempts to ‘persuade’ the Sinhala-only constituency to adopt a more practical approach to its own wrongs have only contributed to inflame the Sri Lankan state-terrorism and Tamil counter-terrorism. If the terminology alone can put anyone in the docks, then both parties could be put there promptly; Sri Lanka for the state-crime, the genocidal acts against the Tamils, and several Tamils groups, including the LTTE for ‘individual-terrorism’.

But, these talks have no practical value towards peace and just solution than serving as propaganda tools for those who want to persist with their crimes; and we shall be critically more constructive than that.

Bilateral agreements, therefore, between the Sinhalese and the Tamils have no binding qualities, historically before or after the ‘independence’. We can list so many attempts at this: Banda-Selva, Dudley-Selva pacts prior to Tamil militancy and several secret ‘understandings’ between the LTTE and various Sinhala rulers, Premadasa, Chandrika, and Ranil Wickramasingha, including the Oslo accord.

Bilateral agreement between India and the Sinhala state did not bring any solace either due to obvious reasons.

Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was an example, which has brought much more tragedy to the minorities, as one should have expected. The simple problem was, there weren’t anybody to take ownership of this deal; Sinhalese resented it and were looking at it as an ideal opportunity to teach the ‘Indians the taste of their own medicine’; enter the LTTE, not impressed with the fine details and the way it was forced to accept the deal, goes into an ‘agreement’ with Premadasa and exit the IPKF; and for India, especially at the centre pressing issues with Pakistan, Nepal meant the Accord wasn’t that important, even after the murder of Rajiv Gandhi. Consequence of Rajiv’s murder is another story, which played right into the hands of the Sri Lankan state, and what followed afterwards for the Tamils can be witnessed, right now, as we speak.

At least in reflection, one has to accept the fallacy of entering into an agreement on behalf of someone else, irrespective of the events that highlight it.

If anything earlier bilateral agreements without the consent of the Tamils in Ceylon were pointer to it, yet, those lessons were ignored. The agreements India made without even the consent of the Tamils in India (Tamil Nadu), namely the Srima-Shasthri and Srima-Gandhi pacts to expel large number of Ceylon Plantation Tamils from their homes and denying their birth rights should have reminded the Indian authorities of the future difficulties they might have with the Sri Lankan state. We know what kind adverse effects they have had on the Tamils, generally exposing all Tamil communities, and the Plantation Tamils in particular to the will of the majoritarian-terror.

Bilateral deals or agreements between India and chosen ‘Tamil Representative’ did not bear any joy for anyone.

First was the deal that took the LTTE alone to the Bangalore Talks, just a few months after the Thimbu Talks, where collective Tamil representatives were taken. EROS understood the signal from India that LTTE was to be its chosen group, thus wished the best and accepted LTTE’s leadership for the phase of ‘national liberation’. What ensued after was confirmation to all of us, as TELO was virtually wiped out as the other groups counted their days.

After the ‘Delhi Talks’, essentially between the LTTE and India, yet another bilateral deal, we had the Accord and, problems with the LTTE started to snowball. Later

India entered into yet another bilateral deal, with the EPRLF and saw to it until its total demise, supervising the dysfunctional Northeast Province Council under EPRLF for a while.

What are the basic problems with these deals and agreements?

1.They were not base on universal, pluralistic principles.

2.They were all done without proper participation of the parties concerned.

3.They have no transparency or scrutiny.

4.They had no ownership.

We say, lets cut the chase, become realistic for the sake of all the peoples in Ceylon, and come to a Tripartite agreement between the three parties. Instead entering into bilateral deals and agreements, which only help to perpetually fuel the crisis, serving no purpose for the region or the communities involved. In fact, the unresolved national question in Ceylon and the ethnic civil war has become a destabilising influence for the entire region.

Let us also not disguise the fact that India will always have ‘interests’ in the island and waste no valuable time behind the term ‘international community’. These interests can only be served if India can be party to the solution, than a facilitator or endorser or supervisor.

In other words, more than a signatory to an agreement, India should also become party to the solution, a tripartite agreement, as the enabler to improve relationships by facilitating greater access to the Indian economy, dropping visa requirements for all Ceylonese, and providing an economical package. An economical package in concept, similar to the US Marshall plan to Europe to alleviate the devastation of the war waged by the state and its terror, and the resistance and counter terror from the Tamils.

These will go a long way in assuring all the communities in Ceylon of India’s intentions in the island. In these circumstances, even as a hegemonic power, India can be a welcome and resourceful ally to all the communities, recovering its leverages and legitimacy lost during the past years, than thousand plots and covert operations, and deals with the Sinhala state could achieve.

These arguments clearly lead us to the next point of having to have principles for any tripartite agreements.

As we have already pointed out, now a well-established point everywhere, the Sinhala state, Sri Lanka, has to accept its ownership to a compelling solution by agreeing to democratise itself.

The first question is why, as a lot of pundits are already predicting the defeat of the LTTE, the only armed group against its will.

Whether this assertion is true or not is irrelevant from the Tamil point of view. For them it is simply a matter of self-preservation.

Is the fear of the Tamil community real or mere propaganda?

We will not demean ourselves here by recounting course of our history; you can all search your souls.

Would the defeat of the LTTE serve the purpose of finding a lasting solution?

The decision for our generation to opt for the strength of arms was justified and logical to change the very nature of the state we specified above. The fact, now that armed component the Tamil resistance is an exclusive privilege of the LTTE is an unnatural evolutionary process engendered by Indian intervention as we suggestively pointed out. The social structure of the island’s populous is vastly different to that of India, where the dynamics and stability are due to multinational relationships within a union of states. In Ceylon we have singularly dominant Sinhala community and the minorities, who are linguistically Tamil, laying a fractious dysfunctional dynamics.

The arms were taken up to supplement the strength the minorities did not have, against the will and the ‘war’ waged by the state against Tamils in general. That it has caused serious difficulties, in terms of civil society and democracy, does not remove the fact that the minorities still do not have the protection from anyone. The Accord could have paved a way, yet, for reasons of its own failed.

But the question remains. What are the protections in place of the military component to assuage the fear of the Tamil communities?

If disarming the LTTE were to be a principled position for peace and a just solution, how arming other groups against it become credible?

We have seen it all before, one digging a hole for earth to fill the earlier one recently dug, and this cannot continue as a viable mode of policy-making.

Yes, arms have contributed to shore up the strengths of the Tamils, and its role is no longer revolutionary. But, the guarantee has to come from somewhere to remove them from the equation. If removing a group were to be a solution, those who advocate it should pay a little heed to what is happening in the West Bank and Gaza; there is a parallel for all to see.

It is precisely why we seek India’s involvement as a party to the solution than mere endorser. It is India that can provide the assurances that will satisfy both the state, and more importantly the Tamils or any other in the future to give up arms as a ‘means to defence’. Violence begets violence, alas, a lesson we must all have surely learned.

Then the next question is if it is an option, how can the defeat of the Tamils as a viable, strong community serve the interests of India?

As for Sri Lanka, despite the Sinhala chauvinists, the vast majority of the Sinhala people would not want to be the ‘Modern Germans’ always having to disassociate themselves from the genocidal forefathers, committed in the name of duty to a country. If moral arguments are wasted on primitive societies, we ask, even if the Tamils are quietened militarily, wouldn’t the basic nature of the structure of the state bring other minority communities into disrepute, and violence ensue?

Can anyone deny this as a possibility?

Therefore, the Sri Lankan state for its peoples’ sake must accept of its own will, or it should be persuaded to accept, that it should democratise its structure.

The arguments about the system; how it should be phased in, what power the centre should have, etc, are all practical questions which have to be addressed at the same time through a process. Here we state our second principle.

Which is, the state and the Tamil speaking communities must accept civil society and humane values should be restored, without preconditions and prevarications.

If this to be a practical prospect, this requires active participation from India and, other members of the ‘international community’, and all the communities in the island. There have to be stages and targets set by India and others which should lead to a ‘minimum understandings’ among all the groups and communities that speak Tamil, and eventually moving towards to a ‘collegiate’ to represent the collective will of the communities. It is here we should start our process towards a lasting solution, developing a forum for communication and, eventually discussions, leading to a ‘minimum understanding’.

ASATiC as group feels that it has become imperative that there should be a minimum understanding among all Tamil parties therefore, proposes the intervention of Muthalvar Dr. Karunanithi, the elder statesman of India and the leader of the Tamil-speaking world. Such an involvement from India to host All Ceylon Tamil Party Conference, in Chennai can only empower those who seriously want to contribute for peace. We also call on Sri Lanka and all the Tamil groups and, Ceylon Tamil expatriate groups to earnestly undertake this proposition as their mission, and assist its process if they are genuine about a just solution for the Tamil communities in Ceylon.

No one expects a conference alone to be the panacea for all the aliments we experience as Tamil communities. There have to be back stage work and confidence building that accounts for the vast portion of the effort if such a project can be successful. These can only proceed successfully in stages, only if there is a sincere belief among the parties that India and Sri Lanka are fully supportive of this effort.

It is during these stages we all have the opportunities to consider the system and arrangement of governance that will fulfil the expectations of the various Tamil communities in Ceylon.

One must understand we do not base our argument for a democratic representation of the Tamil communities simply on the ‘ground control’, but firmly on principle born out of proper research and consultations. We disputed the LTTE’s claim for the sole representation on two principles. One, it does not categorise the Muslims as part of their nation; while they are also indigenous Tamil speakers with ownership to the land they live. If they are a separate nation as the Tamil Elam nationalists have pronounced, then they have the right to talk separately to the ‘Tamils’ and the Sinhalese, for their solution. These seem contradictory in theory and practice. Two, the claim for separate recognition as a nation, though have in itself all the historical arguments and justification, the main reasoning for demanding that separation have been the historical accounts of the crimes by the state, against the Tamil speaking people irrespective of their origin, religion, region and cast. This situation has not changed, despite the single act with the Accord, now all the Plantation Tamils in principle are assured of their citizenship, thanks to EROS. Yet, Plantation Tamils have bore the brunt of these state crimes ever since. We disagree with the demerger of the North-East provinces and dispute the Sri Lankan claim for ownership, again on principles than who control the ground. The solution we seek, must be the just solution for all Tamil speaking communities if it is to last. As we define the dispute is between the state-structure and different communities in the island, even the Sinhala Southerners and rural youth find that to be true at some stages, and search for a solution, we must embrace broader understanding, and the leadership should reflect that reality. The conference we propose falls into this category, and expect the leadership required to face the challenges will emerge from it, in order to find a complete solution for the unresolved national question in Ceylon.

It is the starting point for our way of constructing a path towards a just solution and peaceful coexistence. If the conference were to happen, we would expect that to transform into a Tamil Political Collegiate, a forum with firm organisational structure. Within this we expect all Tamil communities to have their representation, irrespective of their stands towards a particular issue. We expect, this forum to interact with Sri Lankan and Indian political parties to assist in their progress towards conflict resolution. It is through an all embracing, engaging process such as this we are advocating, the solution, which has to be the Tripartite Solution, can be achieved.

We therefore conclude with a brief recount of the tenets of our argument:

1. India is the key to the resolution of the ethnic war in Ceylon, having been part of it historically and as a contributing factor in recent times.

2. The process towards a lasting peace in Ceylon has to involve India, and the warring parties from the bigining.

3. The process should start with the Tamil speaking communities of Ceylon, therefore, with the Indian involvement through its elder statesman, and the leader of the Tamils all over the world, Muthalvar Dr. Karunanithy hosting All Ceylon Tamil party Conference.

These will hopefully lead us to the just and lasting solution, based on,

-Tripartite agreement; that must be signed between the Tamils, Sinhalese (Sri Lanka), and India.

1. no bilateral arrangements between Sinhalese and Tamil organised by India like that was at Thimbu (Bhutan),

2. not between India and Sinhalese as it was with the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, an agreement without the participation of the Tamils,

3. no secret deals between India and a section of Tamils as it was the case in the “Bangalore Talks”, and

4. including a comprehensive economic package, without visa considerations for all communities in the island.

-Based on two principles:

1. The state’s structure must be democratised, and

2. Both societies must be democratised, restoring civil societies based on universal values.

- Incorporating all constituencies within the Sinhala and Tamil communities at various stages.

1. Leading to a Collegiate of representation for the Tamils,

2. Which incorporates all Tamil Speaking communities, including the Muslims and, Plantation Tamils, and

3. Leading to, ‘Reconciliation Council’ for the entire communities in the island.

Thank you for your kind invite and patience.

- Ravi Sundaralingam

[Paper presented for discussion at the ORF Chennai Chapter, 21st of August 2007]